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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
RACE/ETHNICITY IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE
The era following World War II which signaled the beginning of
decolonialization has witnessed a renewed interest by sociologists in
the question of race and ethnic relations.

This renewed interest in

research and theory building reflects, more than anything else, the
persistance of ethnicity and the emergence of many ethnic conflicts
within and between societies around the world.

Aside from class, race

and ethnicity are probably the most widely recognized lines along which
cleavages within most of the world's societies occur.
Glazer

and Moynihan,

until

quite recently

in

According to

the west

"the

preoccupation with property relations obscured ethnic ones", at least in
Western societies,

but now "it is property that begins to seem

derivative, and ethnicity that seems to become a more fundamental source
of stratification".

1

The emergence of racial/ethnic conflicts, however, stands in direct
contradiction to the assertions by early sociologists of the inevitable
mitigation and even disappearance of race/ethnicity as a factor in intra
and inter-societal relations.

Weber, for example, argued that ethnicity

1

Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory
Experience, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 17.
1

and

2

or 'ethnic honour' is one more example of irrationality.

According to

him, communal consciousness and ethnic identity flourished only in the
absence of 'rationally regulated action'.

Hence, ethnic consciousness

and identity could not be expected to survive within the confines of
bureaucratic rationality which Weber saw as sweeping over the western
world.

Karl Marx, similarly, described what he called the "remains of

nationalities" as "fanatic partisans of the counter-revolution" and
foresaw their disappearance as an inevitable outcome of the 'great
historical revolution' . 2 Tonnies' famous dichotomy of gemeinschaft and
gesellschaft also reflected a process whereby irrational, kin-like or
tribal bonds between people give way to affiliation based on mutual
interest and need.

Durkheim, similarly, talked about the process where

organic solidarity would replace mechanical solidarity.

The fact that

ethnic relations were long ignored by sociologists is partly due to such
assertions by the sociological giants.

According to Rex, for a long

time race was considered the domain of biology but, he adds, "even
..... when the falseness of racist biology was systematically exposed,
some sociologists were inclined to argue that the problem simply did not
exist." 3
The historical development of race and ethnic relations, however,
proves that neither industrialization, modernization and urbanization,
nor class solidarity have been powerful enough to do away with ethnicity

2

Parkin, F., Marxism and Class Theory: ~Bourgeois Critique.
York: Columbia University Press, 1979, p. 31.
3

Inc.

New

Rex, J., Race Relations and Sociological Theory, Schocken Books
New York: N.Y. 1970, p. 1.

3
as a focal point of societal cleavages.

The inadequacy of the earlier

formulations is magnified not only by the persistence of racial and
ethnic conflicts but also by the intensification of these conflicts.

we

need alternative explanations.

Contemporary Racial and Ethnic Theorizing:

The

last

two

decades

have

witnessed

a

renewed

interest

sociologists in the study of racial and ethnic problems.

by

As research

efforts intensified several theorizing patterns began to emerge.

Among

the areas of ethnic relations that have received the most attention have
been:

ethnic

solidarity.

prejudice,

consciousness

and

identity,

and

ethnic

The underlying assumption of most research in these areas

seem to be the argument that, given the level of modernization and
industrialization, and given the fact that ascriptive criteria are being
replaced by achievement criteria,
rewards and privilages),
forthcoming.

promotion of a
assimilation.

positions,

then integration and assimilation will be

The structural and

liberal democracies

(for assigning roles,

political arrangements of western

in particular were considered conducive to the

value consensus

and therefore

to integration

and

It is also generally assumed in such arguments that the

system is interested in promoting social harmony.

Because one of the

characteristics of the capitalist system is that it operates through
economic rationality and,

since social harmony and the absence of

conflict are in line with such economic rationality,

it seemed not

unreasonable to attribute the lack of ethnic integration or its slow

4

process to factors

other than structural or political.

This

is

especially so when the public ideology speaks loudly of such goals.
Thus, when studying ethnic groups, researchers have stressed cultural
variables, miscegenation, or as Harris (1959) prefers it 'endogamy' vs.
'exogamy', attitudes, prejudices, patterns of residential segregation
and the like.

All of these variables are said to result either in the

emergence of 'collective identity' which hinders integration, or enhance
integration and assimilation.

While the study of these variables is

important and at times can yield some explanations it does not in and of
itself adequately explain either the persistence of ethnic conflicts or
their inter and intra-societal variations.
Because such approaches

failed to

account

persistence of ethnic conflicts, another

for

'extreme'

the continued
view,

to use

Bonacich' s term, 4 which argues for the primordialness of ethnicity
emerged.

This view argues that ethnicity, race, and nationality (in

short, communalistic frames) are 'natural bonds' which link people
together.

Such a bond

denominator.

is strongest when shared ancestry is the common

However, according

to Bonacich there are at least three

reasons for questioning the primordial nature of such communalistic
ties.

First,

as a result of interbreeding, a mixed ancestry is

continuously being generated which makes it problematic to define ethnic
boundaries. 5 Second,

intra-ethnic conflicts and class struggles have

4

Bonacich, E., 'Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Class', The
Insurgent Sociologist, vol. X, no. 2, Fall, 1980, p. 10.
5

U.S.

In his comparative analysis of four societies (Mexico, Brazile, the
and South Africa), Van den Berghe (1967) argued that where these

5

persisted in spite of shared ancestry.

Third,

the fierceness of

conflicts based on ethnicity, race, and nationality is not dependent
upon shared ancestry.

In other words, the fact that ethnic groups share

common ancestry does not necessarily make the inter-ethnic conflicts
milder and vice versa.
Because of these reasons Bonacich concludes that "ethnic, national,
and racial solidarity and antagonism are all socially created phenomena"
which use "primordial sentiments".

But these sentiments which are based

on ances"try are "not just there", they must be "constructed" and
"activated".'
The model of primordial ethnicity theory accepts ethnic division as
given and proceeds to comment on its consequences.

These are seen as

either negative in the form of discrimination against out-groups or
positive in the form of support for the in-group members.

Such analysis

is typical of the psychologically rooted tradition which can best be
characterized as ahistorical and politically naive.

Criticism has been

levelled against such approaches for their inadequacy to explain much.
As Wolpe noted:
In sum, a member from a racial group is treated unequally, it is
asserted, because he is defined as a member of that group ..... This
would seem to give rise to questions concerning the conditions in
which definitions or attitudes of hostility arise but, in fact,
sociologists who adopt this approach take this simply as given and,
as a consequence, race relations are removed from both an economic
and structural context and treated as an area sui generis. 7

interbreeding or, miscegenation were accepted racism was lowest.
6

Bonacich, E., 1980, p.

7

Wolpe, H.,

11.

'Industrialization and Race in South Africa'.

In:

6

Van den Burghe accuses such research of trivializing race/ethnicity and
characterizes sociologists who undertake such approaches as conservative
and politically naive,

He said:

The stance of the liberal academic establishment on the issue of
race was not only conservative and politically naive, it was also
bad sociology, because it attacked mostly epiphenomena like
attitudes, stereotypes, and discrimination rather than the
underlying historical, economic, and political causes of racism.
A~ trivial questions and you get trivial answers.
And, at the
policy level, trivial answers cannot solve fundamental problems ... •
Schermerhorn complained that in recent years the trend has been to
depend more on updating the results of scientific studies in the field
than on "rethinking them".
A decade

9

later a similar criticism was levelled against the

inadequacy of research on racial/ethnic relations.
for

example,

In the fall of 1980,

a special edition was published by The

Insurgent

Sociologist designed to further the development of sociology of race and
ethnicity which placed them, according to the Binghamton Collective,
" ... within the larger context of class, capitalist development, antiimperialist struggles and the transition to socialism. 1110 The editorial
board argues that "Sociologists have followed the lead of journalists
and politicians in focusing upon racial/ethnic tensions, while ignoring
the class and colonial bases for conflicts which have arisen at various

Zubaida, S. (ed.), Race and Racialism, London: Tanistock Publication,
1970, p. 156.
8

pp.

Van den Burghe, Intergroup Relations, Basic Books, New York, 1972,
10-11.

9

Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory
and Research, New York: Random House, 1970, p. 9.
10

The Insurgent Sociologist, vol.

X, no.

2, Fall 1980, p.

3.

7

periods in time .....

These simplistic analyses contribute to the

mystification process and tend to reinforce a conservative, status-quo
line of political action." 11
Despite such criticisms, or perhaps because of it, sociological
inquiry into the field of race/ethnic relations has continued to yield
sever•l theoretical formulations.

The most recent of such theoretical

formulation is the 'Split Labor Market Theory', which relates ethnic
antagonism to conflicting economic interests between, basically, two
classes:

capitalists and high paid workers.

12

Its claim to validity

lies in the fact that it avoids the pitfalls inherent in attributing
ethnic discrimination to primordial human nature and the notion that
ethnic solidarity, and hence ethnic discrimination, is a remnant of precapitalist societies
Consequently,

and expected to vanish with modernization.

in explaining group variations of ethnic antagonism,

majority-minority relations are not treated as a simple dichotomy.
Rather, majority groups are identified and their relations with and
attitudes towards the minority are analyzed on the basis of their
material interests.
Such a treatment of the majority is befitting the Israeli case in
which the status of the Arab minority has been sensitive to intra-Jewish
cleavages.

11

12

While on the surface it appears that differential attitudes

Ibid.

Bonacich, E., 'A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor
Market' .
American Sociological Review, vol.
37, (October), pp.
547-59.

8

toward the Arabs are split along ethnic lines (Oriental- Ashkenazi), 13
in reality this split is rooted in the conflicting material interests of
the two Jewish ethnic groups which are derived from their different
locations within the occupational hierarchy.
From this perspective there is a remarkable similarity between Israel
and

S~th

Africa where the status of the nonwhites was shown to be

influenced by conflicting material interests between business and white
labor.

14

In her analysis Bonacich shows that there exists a definite

relationship between the occupational
'majority'

location of members of the

(white minority) and their attitude toward the nonwhites.

She has shown that the status of the colored in South Africa has been
contingent upon the results of a continuous struggle between two 'white'
groups with conflicting material

interests:

capitalists and labor.

Accordingly, Bonacich was able to map-out the attitudes of each group
with regard to policies related to the coloreds and document the methods
by which these attitudes have been institutionalized and are expressed.

13

Among all the terms used to indicate the Jewish ethnic cleavages
in Israel, Oriental-Ashkenazi seems the most adequate. 'Orientals' is
used instead of 'Sephardim' because Sephardim includes European Jews
from England, France, Italy, and Greece, who were dispersed from Spain
following the Crusades in Europe and the Spanish Inquisition (see
Schnall, D., Radical Dissent in Contemporary Israeli Politics, New York:
Preager Publishers, 1979, f.n. p. 156). Similarly, while some writers
prefer the use of the term 'Western' others prefer Ashkenazi. Although
'Ashkenaz' means Germany, the term has gained a wide usage in Israeli
society and has come to describe the privilaged non-Oriental Jewish
population which includes Jews from Europe, America, and even Russia.
Hence, throughout this thesis the terms Orientals and Ashkenazim will be
used to identify two culturally distinct Jewish ethnic communities.
14

See Bonacich, E., 'Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa:
A Split Labor Market Analysis'. In: Zeitlin, M. (ed.), Political Power
and Social Theory, vol. 2, Greenwich: Connecticut, 1980, pp. 239-271.

9

In her analysis, labor is shown to be more hostile toward the colored
and has continuously supported exclusionary policies whereas capitalists
were shown to be more supportive of inclusionary policies.
Since the split labor market theory will be used throughout this
analysis an expanded presentation of its concepts and theoretical
under~nnings

is necessary.

10
THE SPLIT LABOR MARKET - THEORETICAL FORMULATION
The theory of the split labor market has been undergoing modification
and refinement ever since it was first formulated by Edna Bonacich in
1972.

The most recent modification was introduced in 1986 by Bosewell

who elaborated and clarified some of its concepts, and introduced new
ones cJt his own.

15

The general premise of the theory is that economic processes are more
'fundamental' to the development of ethnic antagonism in a given society
than racial and cultural differences.

The key concept,

antagonism', was chosen by Bonacich for analytical accuracy.

' ethnic
The use of

the term 'ethnic' was preferred over the term 'racial' for two reasons;
a) while races come from continents, Bonacich argues, ethnic groups come
from 'subsections of continents'; b) discrimination (exclusion and/or
caste-like treatment) could be found 'among national groupings within a
racial category.

116

Similarly, the term antagonism

was preferred over

other terms such as prejudice and discrimination because the former
carries 'fewer moralistic and theoretical assumptions' in that it allows
for the possibility of reciprocity.
The central hypothesis is that ethnic antagonism is one of the
consequences of a labor market split along ethnic lines.

In order for a

labor market to be split two conditions have to be met: a) two or more

15

Bosewell, T., 'A Split Labor Market Analysis of Discrimination
Against Chinese Immigrants, 1850-1882,' American Sociological Review,
1986, Vol. 51 June PP. 353-71.
16

Bonacich, 1972, p.

75.

11

labor groups must exist in a society, and b) there must exist a
discrepancy in the price of labor for doing the same work, or that a
discrepancy in their price would exist if they were to do the same work.
This split in the labor force is usually superimposed on the market by
the business community.

As a result of the expansion of the economy

and/or high benefits and wages gained by local labor, business tends to
turn to other sources of labor power.

These sources are found either

locally in distant and isolated communities, or through the importation
of foreign labor, or through frontier expansion and occupation.

The

newly acquired labor force is paid, usually, less than the local labor.
As a result of discrepancies in the price of labor, a conflict
develops between "three key classes:

business, high paid labor, and

cheap labor" 17 The business class is mainly interested in keeping
production costs as low as possible in order to compete in the market
and/or increase the margin of profitability.

Thus, when local labor

costs are high business tends to either import cheap labor or use
"indigenous conquered populations".

Consequently, the higher paid labor

feels threatened since the new class of cheap labor will replace the
higher paid labor in some industries and/or geographical areas which has
the effect of undermining the bargaining power of the high paid labor.
In reaction high paid labor develops hostility and antagonism toward
cheap labor, even though "cheap labor does not intentionally undermine
more expensive labor".

17

Ibid. , p.

81.

18

Ibid. , p.

83.

18

In fact it is the cheap labor's weakness,

12
Bonacich argues, "that makes it so threatening, for business can more
thoroughly control it." 19 If such a split in the labor market occurs
along ethnic lines, Bonacich argues, then "the class antagonism takes
the form of ethnic antagonism" 20
Although the concept antagonism was chosen to allow for reciprocity,
cheap labor initially plays only a passive role.
develops between the high paid labor and business.

The major conflict
A victory for the

former is manifested in either exculsion of or caste-like treatment for
minority labor.

While the exclusion movement aims at preventing the

physical presence of cheap labor in and around employment areas, the
caste system attempts to apply exclusivity to the higher paying jobs and
:i:estrict cheap labor from entering these categories.

Both systems

result in the preservation of high pay for already advantaged labor and
discriminate against low paid workers.

Exclusion, however, represents a

more complete victory for the high paid labor and, therefore, Bonacich
argues, it is the preferred system even if it means the high paid labor
has "to do the dirty work" 21 themselves.
The split labor market theory is essentially a materialistic theory
in that it takes economics as its most basic variable.

Bonacich argues

that the status of ethnic minorities in the occupational structure is
determined by the outcome of a continuous conflict between employers and
'white' labor.

The formation of attitudes toward minority labor is both

19

Ibid., p.

81.

20

Ibid., p.

82.

2 1

Ibid. , p.

88.

13
a part and a product of this conflict.
made clearer by Bosewell who
discourse'.

As will be seen this point is

introduces

the notion of

'racist

The 'cheapness' of cheap labor is attributed by Bonacich to

lack of 'resources'

which are available to

it at the point of

origination, and the inability of such labor to organize politically and
economically thereafter.
In this sense Bonacich diverges from Marxist analysis which argues
that the capitalist class aided by the powers of the state is basically
responsible for the creation and maintenance of ethnic divisions.

The

racist attitudes of expensive labor are explained by Marxists as the
result of being bought off by capital which is responsible for the
diffusion of false ideology, for the purpose of segmenting the working
class, and the eventual adoption of such ideology by expensive labor.
According to Burawoy, a Marxist scholar,

racism is used to divide

because it "is such a powerful ideology, binding together classes within
racial

groups,

shaping

class

configurations of alliances,

interests,

promoting

particular

and generally shaping the terrain and

expressions of class struggle." 22 Bonacich, on the other hand, accords
expensive labor a major role in the power struggle and considers their
racist attitudes to be a consequence of their attempt to protect
themselves from being displaced by the cheap labor, at the initiative of
capital.

She argues

that "Business .....

rather than desiring to

protect a segment of the working class supports a liberal or laissez-

22

Burawoy, 'The Capitalist State of South Africa: Marxist and
Sociological Perspectives on Race and Class'. In: Zeitlin, M. (ed.),
Political Power and Social Theory, vol.
2, Greenwich: Connecticut,
1980, p.

292.

14
faire ideology that would permit all workers to compete freely in an
Open competition would displace higher paid labor." 23

open market.

While the theory has been successfully used to explain antagonism
between blacks and whites 24 certain areas and concepts of the theory
remain either ambiguous or undeveloped.
areas.

He,

rightly, points out that:

Bosewell mentions three such
1) there

is an ambiguity

concerning the dynamics which reproduce split labor market conditions;
2) the theory completely neglects the function of a racist ideology, or
what Bosewell calls 'racist discourse', and the role of the state; and
3) the theory does not elaborate on the consequences of the reproduction
of split labor market conditions and racist discourse for labor market
segregation. 25
Related to the first point is the question of the continued cheapness
of cheap labor.
altogether.

Burawoy, for example, rejects the notion of cheap labor

He argues that the responsibility of the state for the

reproduction not only of labor power but the labor process, i.e., the
reproduction of the system of exploitation as a whole, makes the 'price'
of cheap labor rather expensive.

This is because in order to guarantee

the 'cheapness' of labor to the individual employer, the state oppresses
struggles, regulates the flow of labor and so on. 26

23

Bonacich, 1972, p.

24

see Bonacich, 1975, 1976, 1980; Wilson, 1978; Bosewell, 1986.

25

Bosewell, 1986, pp.

26

See Burawoy, 1980, p.

87.

353-55.
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While this argument by Burawoy is basically correct it is only half
the truth.

If the state is as powerful as Burawoy believes it to be

(which is not altogether erroneous), then the state can create and
justify the existence of mechanisms through which the costs are passed
on to minority labor.

Such was the case, for example, with the Chinese

immigrant workers who were required in 1852 by a California law to pay
$3 per month for the privillage of mining.

It did not matter that the

law was declared unconstitutional in 1870 because by then mining had
become unprofitable anyway. 27 Beyond that, maintaining 'law and order'
and regulating the flow of minority labor in underdevelopd societies may
not be as expensive as Burawoy supposes.

One should remember that in

such societies where unequal development is characteristic, minority
labor is dependent on the developed segment for many services, the most
important of which is transportation.

Without such a service minority

labor is usually immobile and unthreatening.
In Israel, for instance, Ian Lustick (1980) shows that the Israeli
authorities achieved almost total control over the Arab minority through
three mechanisms all of which were handled at a fraction of the cost.
These were: segmentation through isolation and fragmentation;
dependence; and co-optation of leadership.

economic

The last is shown to be

particularly effective and cheap in light of the traditional Arab mode
of family organization exemplified by the extended family.

27

For more details see Bosewell, 1986, p.

359.
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Hence,

although the intervention of the state is necessary to

generate and maintain the cheapness of low-cost minority labor other
factors influence the discrepancy in the price of labor and should be
considered, at least during the initial stages.

For example, the

differential cost of labor can be a result of differential resources
(economic and political)

which are available to the two groups of labor

respectively, as Bonacich argues.

Or, such differentials in wages can

simply be the product of "regional or national differences in income and
the

cost

of

living which result

from

uneven

development

of

capitalism. " 2 8 While such conditions can produce differential wages
during the initial stages they cannot accour,t for the continuation of
the low cost of minority labor.

Bonacich explains the continuation in

wage differential, or more precisely the low cost of minority labor on
the basis of what she calls "weak market position". 2 9 She does not
define the source of this weakness, however.
In fact,

beyond the initial stages one should expect wages to

eventually equalize due to an increase in demand for cheap labor and a
corresponding decrease in demand for expensive labor (the logic of
supply and demand).

Unless, of course, other factors are introduced

which cause overcrowdedness of cheap labor in certain industries and/or
geographic locations.

Under such circumstances the split labor market

is reproduced, and hence the continued 'cheapness' of minority labor is
guaranteed.

According to Bosewell,

28

Bosewell, 1986, p.

29

Bonacich, 1976, pp.

353.
39-40.

"market crowding increases the
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relative supply of minority labor for a position, thus reproducing the
Crowding in one industry will push

ethnic split in labor cost.

minorities to other industries, spreading split labor market conditions
and ethnic antagonism throughout the labor market." 30
To create such conditions the function of ideology and the role of
the state must be considered.

While Bonacich (1980) completely ignores

the role of the state, Burawoy (1980), as noted, accords it a major role
in creating and maintaining cheap minority labor.

This is particularly

true in the case of settler colonial situations such as South Africa and
Israel.

As will be shown later, through confiscation of Arab property

the Israeli government increased the availability of Arab

labor.

However, restrictions imposed on the movement of this labor to certain
geographic locations forced Arab labor to accept even cheaper wages than
they would have otherwise.
restrictions

by

sectoral

The eventual replacement of geographical
and

positional

restrictions

resulted,

furthermore, in overcrowdedness which has had the effect of maintaining
Arab labor at low cost.

Bosewell (1986) elaborates on the role of the

state from a split labor market perspective.

The intervention of the

state is required in conjuction with a specific ideology because,
according to Bosewel l, "the initial ethnic differences in the cost of
labor will not be continually reproduced under competitive market
conditions unless workers continue to be ideologically identified. 1131
However, the state actions cannot be seen as totally dependent on the

30

Bosewell, 1986, p.

31

Ibid., p.

354.

353.
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political power of the 'victorious', i.e., expensive labor or capital.
It is also contingent upon "the potential effects on the economy in
general and tax revenues in particular, the national and international
political environment, and the sequence of elections." 32
Bosewell makes a significant contribution by distinguishing between
the long term interests of the working class and the interests of the
individual worker.

While the long term interest of the working class is

to prevent discrimination, he argues, it is in the individual worker's
interest to support state actions aimed at limiting the competitive
potential of minority labor.

32

Ibid., p.

354.

19
ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS
The Pre-State Period:
Intra-Jewish conflict of interest with respect to the Arabs seems to
have surfaced long before the state was established.

This intra-Jewish

conflict revolved around the employment status of the Arabs in Jewish
businesses and was manifested despite the continuing Arab-Jewish bloody
conflict over the land of Palestine throughout that period.
Relations between Arabs and Jews began deteriorating in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century when Jews, represented by the Zionist
Organization, announced their intentions to return to Palestine to
"rebuild" a homeland for the Jewish people and were exacerbated by the
subsequent Jewish immigration which followed.

Prior to that period, the

Jewish community living in Palestine had developed good relations with
the Arabs.

Numbering around 24,000 and living mostly in the four towns

of Hebron, Safed, Jerusalem and Tiberias, half of this Jewish community
was Sephardic (Oriental), and the other half Ashkenazi or European.
Even then, however, relations between the Arabs and the two Jewish
ethnic communities were differentiated.

According to Kalvarisky,

a

Jewish administrator of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association,
The Sephardim,....
in the course of their work or commerce had
business connections with the Arabs and sometimes went into
partnership with them. The relations between the Sephardic Jews and
the Arabs were good, and many Jews and Arabs became firm friends. 33

33

Cited in A.

Cohen, 1970, p.

46.
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The Ashkenazim, on the other hand,

are described as having had no

contact with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.

The nature of

relations between the Arabs

and the Ashkenazim,

however, began to change with the arrival of the first Jewish immigrant
group to Palestine.

This group of immigrants, known as the first aliyah

(literally "ascendance", but implies immigration to Palestine/Israel),
comprising 25,000 Jews from Russia and Rumania arrived in Palestine
during the period between 1882 and 1903.

The new settlers, according to

Lucas, "had a capitalistic and colonialistic approach to the land and
the Arab population was seen as a reservoir of extraordinary cheap
labour. 1134 Indeed, it is reported that these early immigrants employed
ten times as many Arabs as Jews.

35

The exploitation of the native Arabs was not dissimilar to colonial
patterns on the African Continent and elsewhere.

36

It was characterized

by the settlers' cultural distaste and racist antagonism toward the
natives.

3 7

Accordingly,

out

of sense of a

superiority the Jewish

settlers referred to the Arabs of Palestine as barbarians.

38

34

Lucas, N. The Modern History of Israel, London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1974, pp. 24-5.
35

Hirst, D.
1977, p. 25.

The Gun and the Olive Branch, London: Faber and Faber,

36

Weinstock, N.
"The Impact of Zionist Colonization on Palestine
Arab Society Before 1948".
Journal of Palestine Studies, 2 (Winter),
pp. 50-51.
37

Childers, E. "The Worldless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees".
I.
Abu-Lughod (ed.), The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 166.
38

Hirst, 1977, p.
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While organized Jewish groups continued to immigrate to Palestine the
newcomers were not united in their approach to the Arabs.
and May 1948

Between 1882

(just before the establishment of the state was

proclaimed), 517,200 Jewish immigrants had arrived in Palestine, mostly
from East European countries (see Table 1.1).

Whereas the First aliyah

sought after and exploited cheap Arab labor settlers of the Second and
Third aliyahs (1904-1923) objected vehemently to the employment of Arabs
in Jewish businesses and enterprises.

It was during the Second aliyah

that the concept of "conquest of labourn, which meant the replacement of
Arab workers by Jewish workers, was first introduced.

The Histadrut,

which was founded in 1920 as the General Federation of Hebrew Workers,
was the strongest and most militant of all organizations which opposed
Arab employment.

In 1933 the Histadrut began using even force to remove

Arab workers from Jewish enterprises. 39

39

See the statement by Flappan in Chapter 6.
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Table 1.1
Immigration of Jews to Palestine and Israel
by Continent of Origin and Period of Immigration
1882-1975
Period

1882-1903
1904-14
1919-23
1924-31
1932-38
1939-45
1946-My48
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952·-54
1955-57
1958-60
1961-64
1965-67
1968-73
1974-75

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

All
Countries
(thnds)

Asia &
Africa
% (1)

Eastern
Europe
% (2)

25,000
40,000
35,100
81,600
197,200
81,800
56,500
101,819
239,576
170,215
175,129
54,065
164,936
75,487
288,046
60,793
247,802
52,007

4.0
5.0
4. 7
12.3
9.0
18.3
4.0
14.0
47.5
49.6
70.8
75.8
68.2
36.0
60.5
37.8
26.8
9.2

96.0
95.0
84.2
78.3
60.3
34.4
67.7
53.0
27.5
44.9
25.7
11. 7
23.0
55.5
31.9
13.6
37.5
62.4

Central
Europe
% (3)

Balkans

0.0

0.0
0.0
2.1
2.7
3.9
6.8
4.5
21.4
9.5
0.9
1.1
2.1
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.0

o.o

4.6
2.7
22.9
37.0
21.0
8.2
12.6
2.8
1.3
2.7
5.7
1.9
1.2
2.3
2.2
1. 7

% (4)

Western Others
Europe
% (5)
%
0.0
0.0
4.4
4.0
3.9
3.5
2.8
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.3
3.8
1. 7
3.5
4. 7
8.8
18.7
19.5

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.6
2.4
1.2
0.8
3.9
1.1
2.5
1.5
4.2
7.9
7.2

Excluding South Africa.
USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania.
Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.
Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey.
Other European Countries, North America, South America, South
Africa and Oceania.

Source: Figures are calculated on the basis of Tables 2.7, p.
37 and
2.11, p.
41, in Dov Friedlander, The Population of Israel, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979; figures for the years 1882 to 1914 are
from Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1978, Table 9, p. 281.
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It is

important to note that while Jewish immigration to Palestine

was continuing,

more and more Arab peasants became hired labor.

This

was precipitated mostly by land purchases by the Jewish National Fund
and

(J.N.F)

the

Palestine

Jewish

Colonization

from

Palestinian and

non-Palestinian feudal

more details).

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the two

agencies

had

embarked

upon

an

landlords

Association

ambitious

(See Chapter 4

program

of

land

for

purchases

through which large tracts of land were bought during a relatively short
period

of

time.

These

purchases,

however,

resulted

in

either

disposession or eviction of the Arab peasants who were working the land.
Having led a peasant life and lacking other alternatives the Arabs were
willing to work for
minds

of

Jewish

low wages.

employers

as

This
well

fact was never absent from the
as

Jewish

workers.

As

Granott

testifies:
The extent of Jewish labor in the old villages, which served as the
center for private agricultural investment, was as a rule only
limited, and even in those plantations which engaged Jewish workers,
there was always a group of Arab employees receiving low wages in
comparison with the Jews (emphasis added).
The existence of such
bodies of Arabs in Jewish villages was somewhat of a danger to
security in times of emergency, and even more to the maintenance of
a higher economic standard. 40

As this quotation indicates Jewish employers were not completely at
liberty to reap the fruits of cheap Arab labor.
fought against

it and attempted to prevent it.

Various Jewish groups
Tensions among the

Jewish population concerning the status of Arab labor
as the early 1900's.

40

surfaced as early

The different resolutions passed by the Zionist

Abraham Granott, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London:
Ayre and Spottiswood, 1956, p. 51.
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organization and the Histadrut condemning and prohibiting employment of
Arab labor in Jewish businesses and enterprises, and prescribing
,sanctions against Jewish violators testifies to the seriousness of the
"problem".

This is to say, in addition to the national conflict which

characterized Arab-Jewish relations, there was a conflicting material
interest among the different Jewish groups which played a significant
role in determining relations of the different Jewish communities with
and attitudes toward the Arabs.
The Arab-Jewish war of 1948 ended, (at least temporarily), the bloody
clashes between Arabs and Jews which had lasted almost fifty years.

The

immediate result of that was the establishment of the state of Israel
and the dispersion of most of the Palestinian people who became refugees
in adjacent Arab countries and elsewhere.

A small Arab community, which

numbered about 160,000 remained in Palestine and became a minority in
the Jewish state.
The Post-State Period:
The state of war which has characterized relations between Israel and
its Arab neighbours since 1948 has often been cited as the major
impediment to the integration of the Arabs into the political, social
and economic life of the state, mainly on security grounds.

Government

policy in the Arab sector, it is claimed, has been determined on the
basis of security considerations.

The claim has been made that Israeli

Arabs, in view of their cultural affinity with the Arabs across the
border and their physical and legal presence within the boundaries of
Israel, pose a security risk to the state.
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True, it would be an historical inaccuracy to ignore the national and
security factors on shaping the predicament of the Arabs in Israel.
After all, the Arabs are part of the Palestinian people who have been at
war with the state since the beginning.

Furthermore, it is doubtful

that they have resigned themselves to accepting the state and its
policies unconditionally.

If anything the Arabs have been undergoing a

process of re-Palestinianization and show an increased awareness of
their Palestinian nationality and affiliation.
Furthermore, between Arabs and Jews there are primary linguistic,
cultural and religious differences which have been institutionalized and
cannot be expected to weaken as a result of Arab modernization, social
mobility, the end of the state of war, or any other development.

The

Arabs are Arabic-speakers whereas Hebrew is the official language of the
state and the Jewish population.

Arabs are either Arab or Palestinian

in nationality and Moslem, Christian or Druze in religion.

They are

therefore alienated from the basic ideology of a Jewish and a Zionist
state.
In addition to their national and political losses, the Arabs have
suffered great economic losses as a result of the establishment of the
state.

Many villages were destroyed during the 1948 war and the period

after that, and much property and Arab land were confiscated.

While

some of the inhabitants of these villages remain in Israel they were
never allowed to go back and reclaim their property and therefore became
internal refugees.

Add to that the fact that even though the Arabs are

a minority in the Jewish state they are part of a greater majority in
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the region.

This is never forgotten by either the Arabs or the Jews.

Hence, the national question constitutes a major division between Arabs
and Jews in Israel.
Several institutional arrangements have been built into the very
structure of the state which are designed to emphasize its Jewish
sectarian character and consequently increased the rigidity of the ArabJewish division.

Among these arrangements are:

the Law of Return which

grants automatic citizenship to Jews who immigrate to the state but not
to Arabs; the adoption of Jewish symbols in the Israeli public domain;
and, the induction of Jews but not Arabs into the armed forces.

The

last has come to constitute an admission criterion to many positions and
job-categories and

for

entitlement to housing subsidies,

grants,

admission to institutions of higher education and even child allowances
and other benefits.

Using service in the armed forces as a basis for

either entitlement or increased benefits -was done with the prior
knowledge that the Arabs are the only group which would not qualify.

In

consequence, these arrangements have institutionalized the Arab-Jewish
division favouring Jews and discouraging the development of Arab
(Palestinian) nationalism.
The security question is derived from this division.

Consequently,

certain policies and practices have been specifically designed to
address the security issues which cover areas unrelated to security as
the concept is applied in the West.

To mention only one example, a

return of those internal refugees to their former property would have
been considered a threat to security, a possibility against which the
Israeli authorities evidently felt compelled to guard.
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Nonetheless, it would be equally misleading to attribute the state of
Arab-Jewish relations in Israel to the national and security factors
alone.

For one thing the use of national security as a justification

for differential treatment against the Arabs has been inconsistent. 41 In
addition, the differential attitudes toward the Arabs among the Jewish
population along the Ashkenazi-Oriental axis, for example, weakens the
security argument.

While antagonism and prejudice by both ethnic groups

towards the Arabs are high, they are higher among the Orientals than
among Ashkenazim (see Chapter 3).
the unreasonable assumptions

Hence, unless one is willing to make

that either the Orientals

conscious than the Ashkenazim of

~he

are more

security requirements of the state,

or that Orientals are more chauvinistic than other Jews,

it is very

difficult to explain this variation in antagonism on the basis of
security grounds.
situations,

As Schermerhorn points out "prejudice is a product of

historical

situations,

economic situations,

political

situations; it is not a demon that emerges in people simply because they
are depressed. 1142
The limitations of the security argument can further be demonstrated
when one considers the status of the Druze community.

This community

constitutes about 10 percent of the non-Jewish population.

Despite the

fact that members of this community are the only non-Jews who have been
inducted into the armed forces, their status does not fare much better
than that of the other members of the Arab minority when it comes to

41

See Waschitz, 1975.

42

Schermerhorn, 1970, p.

6.
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land confiscation, economic development, or the attitudes of the Jewish
majority.

Beyond that, however, the validity of the security argument

can be questioned on the grounds that many of the official and
unofficial policies and practices toward the Arabs pertain to areas
which have no bearing whatever on national security.

The expropriation

of Arab lands (Chapter 4) and the refusal of the Histadrut to admit Arab
labor to its ranks until 1959 (Chapter 6), are only two examples.
Liberalization of policies and practices toward the Arabs, as limited
as they may be,

which have ensued over the years despite the

continuation of the state of war, suggests that other factors,

in

addition to the national aspect and the ensuing security considerations,
are involved in the determination of the status of the Arabs.
these policies

That

have not gone far enough toward integrating the Arabs in

the social, political, and economic life of the state on an equal basis,
despite the demonstrated military superiority of Israel vis-a-vis all
the Arab countries combined, further reduces the explanatory power of
the security argument.
Between 1948 and 1959 Arabs were almost completely excluded from
Israeli economic, political and social life.

Through a

combination of

military government orders which restricted the movement of Arabs and
controlled a wide range of their daily activities and the successful
efforts by the Israeli labor union (Histadrut) to keep Arab labor away
from the Jewish labor market,
maintained.

a rigid Arab-Jewish division was

The residential segregation between Arabs

enhanced this division (Chapter 2).

and Jews further
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While the Arab-Jewish division continues to be maintained, a certain
elasticity in the dividing line began to appear in the late 1950's.
This was represented by: 1) the beginning of a process of relaxation of
travel restrictions, 2) the eventual abolition of the system of military
government in 1966, 3) the extension of union protection by the
Histadrut to Arab workers in 1959, and 4) the opening of certain social
mobility routes, although limited, to Arabs.
In this thesis, I will attempt to demonstrate that the status of the
Arabs in Israel has been influenced by conflicting material interests of
two Jewish ethnic groups: Ashkenazim and Orientals.

It will be shown

that, while the maintenance of a rigid Arab-Jewish division which
excluded Arabs from the economic, political and social life of the state
worked to the benefit of both Jewish groups, the Orientals benefited the
most from such a situation.

By contrast, Ashkenazim gain greater

benefits from a certain elasticity in, but not the complete elimination
of, the dividing line.
A rigid

division which

excludes

Arabs

provides

employment

opportunities to educated Orientals who man those agencies which either
control or serve the Arabs because of their knowledge of and familiarity
with the Arabic language and Arabic culture.

In addition, the exclusion

of Arabs provides protection for lower class Orientals who mostly man
unskilled and semi-skilled positions.

A rigid Arab-Jewish division,

however, limits the access of Ashkenazim (who are mostly either managers
or employers) to cheap Arab labor.

The maintenance of an elastic

division, on the other hand , while it continues to benefit the Oriental
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middle-class, does not provide as effective a measure for protecting the
lower-class.

As to Ashkenazim, elastically maintained division results

in the expansion of the system (because of the need to create extra
organizational apparatus to maintain the division) which enables the
accommodation of some of the demands of Orientals for equality without
any loss to Ashkenazim.
access to Arab labor.

At the same time Ashkenazim can enjoy greater
Consequently,

it will be shown that while

Orientals express greater hostility and support exclusionary policies
toward the Arabs, Ashkenazim support more 'liberalized' policies.
Rather than being ethnically anchored, the intention of this thesis
is to demonstrate that the heightened antagonism by Orientals toward the
Arabs is partially derived from their material interests which are best
served by the exclusion of Arabs.

To be sure, the study does not intend

to show the extent of discrimination and oppression against the Arabs in
Israel.
does

Much has already been said and written about the subject.

Nor

the study intend to analyze Arab-Jewish relations in their

totality.

I only wish to demonstrate that the status of the Arabs

in

the Jewish state has been influenced by conflicting material interests
of two Jewish ethnic groups; namely, Orientals and Ashkenazim.
consequence the

analysis does not

intend to detract

from the

significance of the national conflict between Arabs and Jews.
fundamental

contradictions

imbeded in the

In

The

Arab-Jewish historical

conflict over the land of Palestine continue to be the most significant
element which governs the Arab-Jewish relations in Israel.
here, therefore,

My attempt

is to add an additional dimension by examining the
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effects which the

dynamics of the intra-Jewish

maintaining the Arabs in a segregated,

conflicts have on

subordinate position,

and to

explain some of the changes which have accrued over time.

The significance of this analysis stems from the fact that if indeed
the

heightened Oriental

antagonism toward

the

Arabs

is

anchored

ethnically rather than being materially motivated, the ascendence of
Orientals to positions
worrisome to the Arabs.

of power in Israel

should be particularly

Worth noting in this regard is the fact that

the Orientals' ability to influence policies has been gaining momentum.
This

is

partly due to their

population due

to a

increasing proportion in

relatively high birthrate and

the Jewish

a decline

in

immigration from Western countries.

The Orientals constitute over 60

percent

While they

of the

Jewish population.

underrepresented in the country's military,

are still

political,

grossly

and economic

elites a noticeable rise in Oriental ascendance to positions of power
(economic and political) can be expected.

If, on the other hand, this analysis is correct, and the attitudes of
the Orientals toward the Arabs are indeed a derivative of their material
interests,

then

the prospects

of Orientals

gaining a

substantial

representation in the country's institutions will not be accompanied by
any dramatic changes in policies toward the Arabs because a change in
their occupational positions will lead to a subsequent shift in their
material interests.
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As to the attitudes of the Jewish population in general,

while one

expects antagonism against Arabs to remain high, a convergence of
attitudes between Ashkenazim and Orientals is very likely.

When such

time comes and occupational positions and power are more equitably
allocated between the two Jewish groups, it is likely that the Jewish
ethnic cleavages will be transformed into class cleavages.

But even

then their attitudes toward the Arab population will continue to be
antagonistic because the primary dynamic which governs their relations
with this population; namely, control over enemy-affiliated minority,
will remain essentially the same.

CHAPTER II

THE ARAB MINORITY
The unequal development of the Arab and Jewish sectors in Palestine
continued in the post-state period.

Having come mostly from developed

countries, Jewish immigrants (see Table 1.1) were more technologically
and educationally advanced than the indigenous Palestinian Arabs.
Furthermore, the economic activities of the Zionist organization and
other Jewish institutions during the pre-state period undermined
economic development in the Arab sector.

1

The persistence of these

conditions meant that from the beginning of the state of Israel
conditions existed which produced wage differentials between Arabs and
Jews.
In addition, the perpetual forced co-existence which typified ArabJewish relations since the inception of the Zionist settlement did not
change with the establishment of the state.
Jewish division was now institutionalized.
Jewish division

To the contrary, the ArabThe maintenance of the Arab-

legitimized discrimination against the Arabs

and

provided the ideological basis for the continuous reproduction of split
labor market conditions, condemning the Arabs to dead-end low paying

1

For further details on the effect of the Jewish economic activities
on the Arab economy see Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: ~ Study in
Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979,
especially chapter 3.
//~,·::."·'.
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jobs.

Thus, while certain conditions

initially existed which were

responsible for the initial Arab-Jewish differentiation,
'constructed'

and

became

instrumental

in

others were

perpetuating

this

differentiation.

This

chapter will

demographic
methods,

describe these

distribution

mechanisms

and

and

constructed

conditions:

continued segregation of Arabs;

institutions

responsible

for

the
the

boundary

maintenance between Arabs and Jews; and the availability of and access
to economic, educational and political resources.
discuss the effect of ideology on how Arabs

In addition, I will

are viewed in Jewish

academic circles which in turn has the effect of perpetuating the
dominant ideology.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARABS

The most immediate consequence of the establishment of the state was
the reduction of the demographic status of the Arabs from a majority to
a minority.

Close to 900,000 Palestinians inhabited Palestine at the

time of the issuance of the Declaration of Independence proclaiming the
establishment of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948.

Following the

1948 Arab-Jewish war, only 160,000 Arabs remained within what came to be
known as the Armistic lines -- later the Green lines--.

2

The rest of the

Palestinians were dispersed and became refugees scattered throughout the
Middle-East and beyond.

2

J. Abu-Lughod, 'The Demographic Transformation of Palestine', in I.
Abu-Lughod (ed.)
The Transformation of Palestine, Evanstons:
Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 161.
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Hence,

contact between Arabs and

Jews

involves what Stanley

Lieberson 3 calls subordination of an indigenous population by a migrant
group.

Whereas the Arabs represent only a fraction of the original

indigenous Palestinian people, the Jewish population grew mostly as a
result of immigration.

From 1882 to May 1948

(just before the

proclamation of the establishment of the state), 517 ,200 Jews had
immigrated to Palestine.

From 1948 to 1975 another 1,629,875 Jews

entered the country as immigrants (Table 1.1).
While the number of Arabs in Israel increased over the years their
relative proportion
constant,

in the general population

ranging between 11 and

14 percent.

remained somewhat
High birthrates,

especially within the Moslem community, a decrease in infant mortality,
and low levels of out migration on the part of the Arabs seem to have
offset the high level of immigration among the Jewish population (Table
2.1)

3

Lieberson, S., 'A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations.'
American Sociological Review, 1961, vol. 26, pp. 902-10.
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TABLE 2.1
Jewish and Arab Population in Israel:
1949-1981 (in thousands)
Year

1949
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1981

Source:

Total
Population
1,173.9
1,789.1
2,150.4
2,598.4
2,944.0(a)
3,405.2
3,811.7
3,877.3

Jews

Arabs

1,013.9
1,590.5
1,911.3
2,299.1
2,582.0
2,959.4
3,282.7
3,320.3

160.0
198.6
239.1
299.3
362.0
445.8
529.0
545.0

Arabs as %
of Total
13.6
11.1
11.1
11.5
12.3
13.1
13.8
14.0

Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Jerusalem, no. 33, 1982, p.31

(a) Includes Arabs of East-Jerusalem.

It is estimated that almost 70 percent of the Arabs are Mos lems, 4
about 20 percent Christians and 10 percent Druze. 5
The great majority of the Palestinians who had inhabited the area in
which Israel was established either fled or were forced out during the
war or were expelled by the Israeli authorities thereafter.

Only 107

4

The addition of the Arabs of East Jerusalem raises the proportion
of Moslems to about 78 percent.
5

A sect which is an offshoot separated from Islam around the 11th
century. The Druze are concentrated basically in Northern Israel, Syria
and Lebanon. For a detailed yearly estimates in the relative proportions
of the three religious groups, see Dove Friedlander, 1979, Table 2.4,
p.34; Sabri Jiryis, 1976, Table 4, p. 291.
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villages out of 585 in this area remained. 6 The large urban centers were
almost totally emptied of their Arab inhabitants.

Only 10 percent, or

close to 29,000 Palestinians, out of the over 300,000 who inhabited the
big urban centers of Jerusalem, Jaffa,

Haifa, Lydd-Ramleh,

Akka, Tiberias and Safed remained in these cities.

Nazareth,

7

Most of the remaining Arabs live in Galilee in the North, with two
other major concentrations in the Little Triangle, in the Center, and in
the South where the Bedouins reside.

The annexation of East Jerusalem

since 1967, however, added another major concentration in the Jerusalem
district

(Table

2.2).

around 66, 000 in 1967,

As noted
do not

earlier,

those Arabs,

who numbered

share the experience of the Arabs

in

Israel. They are still considered by most of the world community, which
does not recognize the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel, and in
turn consider themselves to be, under occupation. While they are not
included in this analyis, their inclusion in the demographic statistics
is due to the difficulty of separating them from the general figures
given by the Israeli Abstracts. 8 The increase in the Central district,
however, came as a result of an agreement between Israel and Jordan in
1949 which gave the former control over the villages of the Little
Triangle.

6

Zayyad, T., 1976, p. 94.

7

See Lustick, I., 1980, Table 2, p. 49.

8

p.

The number of Arabs in East Jerusalem is estimated by Smooha (1978,
280), to have reached 92,000 in 1975.
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TABLE 2.2
Distribution of Arab Population by District:
1948-1973 (percentages)
District

1948

1961

1968

1973

Jerusalem
North
Haifa
Central
Tel-Aviv
South
Total

1.4
73.4
8.4
2.2
3.2
11.4
100.0

1. 7
57.8
19.4
10.4
2.7
7.5
100.0

18.2
48.0
16.3
9.2
1.9
6.4
100.0

17.7
47.6
16.4
9.6
1.8
6.9
100.0

Source:

Zureik,

E., The Palestinians In Israel:

~

Study in Internal

Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.2b, p. 110.

The evacuation of the urban centers meant that most of the Arabs who
remained in Israel were rural residents.

Over 80 percent live in all-

Arab rural areas and two all-Arab towns (Nazareth and Shafa-Amr); the
rest live in mixed towns the most notable of which are Akka, Haifa, TelAviv-Jaffa, Ramleh and Lydd (Table 2.3).
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TABLE 2.3
Distribution of Arab Population by Area of Residence:
1955-1973 (percent)
Year

All Arab
Villages

1955
1961
1971
1973

74*
74*
69*
44

Total

Mixed
Settlements

All Arab
Settlements
10
13
13
31

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

16
13
18
25**

* Includes Bedouins, who by 1971 amounted to 10 percent of the Arab
population. A settlement has a population of 5,000 or more.
Altogether there are fifteen all-Arab settlements and six mixed
settlements.
** Includes East Jerusalem.

Source: Zureik,

E., The Palestinians In Israel:

~

Study in Internal

Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.3, p. 111.

What is remarkable in Table 2.3 is the fact that since 1948 the Arabs
have

remained

residentially

significant movement

segregated

in

their

villages

and

no

from village to urban centers can be detected.

Even in the so-called mixed towns, Arab and Jewish neighborhoods are
segregated.

The Arabs

usually

inhabit

neighborhoods under slum-like conditions:

those run-down

and

decaying

Wadi-Nusnas in Haifa; Hai-el-

Ajami in Jaffa, and the Old city in Akka are some examples.
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The refusal of the authorities,

as well

as the Jewish public to

integrate the Arabs in mixed neighborhoods is the most important single
factor which is responsible for this segregation.

Requests by Arabs to

live in developmental towns such as Carmeil, Upper Nazareth and others
have consistently been turned down by local Jewish authorities as well
as officials of the housing ministry.
the Arabs in Akka.

Most telling is the experience of

Despite their desparate need for housing and despite

the existing vacancies in newly built apartment houses in the new city
the Arabs are not admitted to those housing projects.

Instead, they are

being encouraged to transfer to Maker, a near-by village on the Western
tip of lower Galilee, to housing units erected by the government for
this purpose.
As

will

be

shown

later,

keeping

the

Arabs

segregated

in

their

villages and towns proved to be expedient for the purpose of control,
and for discrimination in terms of government allocation of services,
development funds and employment opportunities.
discriminatory,

differential

allocation

has

In addition to being
been

particularly

instrumental in perpetuating unequal development between the Arab and
Jewish sectors and proved to be significant in reproducing split labor
market conditions as a result of crowdedness of Arab labor in the only
available jobs in the Jewish sector.
It should not be understood from the above that the Arabs live in
secluded areas far away from Jewish settlements and urban centers.
size of the country prevents such a conclusion.

The

But beyond that, under

a policy of Jewish population distribution the authorities have built
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Jewish settlements and towns in the heart of every Arab concentration,
which has had the effect of reducing the proportion of Arabs relative to
Jews in all districts (see Table 2.4).

TABLE 2.4
Population Distribution of Arabs and Jews:
1948-1971 (Percent)
District

1948
Jews

Arabs

Jews

96
37
84
87
99
28

4
63
16
13
1

98
58
82
93
99
89

Jerusalem
North
Haifa
Centarl
Tel-Aviv
South

Source: Zureik,

72

1961
Arabs
2
42
13
7
1
11

E., The Palestinians In Israel:

Jews
76
51+

84
92

99
91

~

1971
Arabs
24
46
16
8
1
9

Study in Internal

Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.3, p. 111.
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The most dramatic decreases in the proportion of Arabs occured in the
Southern

and

Northern

districts

(Table

2.4).

In

the

South

the

proportion of Arabs has decreased between 1948 and 1971 from 72 percent
to only 9 percent.
district
percent.
result

has

Similarly, the proprortion of Arabs in the Northern

decreased

over

the

same period

from

63

percent

to
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While these decreases in the proportion of Arabs have been a

of

systematic policy

by

the

applied successfully in all districts.

government

this

policy was

not

Although in the South the policy

has been most successful, in the Northern District the success of the
Israeli authorities has been rather limited, although the Arabs ceased
to constitute a majority in the region.

The 'Judaization of Galilee' is

one such project designed to further reduce the proportion of Arabs in
the Northern District.'

While Arabs, as noted, are barred from residing in these settlements
and

towns,

they

enterpreneurs.

10

are

'welcomed'

as

commuting

laborers

but

not

as

The immediate consequence of this policy of population

distribution has been the tapping of all sources of cheap Arab labor by
the Jewish settlements and employers.

In addition to geographical segregation other societal and structural
arrangements have

also been

constructed to

emphasize the

Arab-Jewish

demarcating line.

These will be discussed in the next section.

9

See an expanded discussion of the programs and policies which are
designed to address this issue in Zuriek, E., 1979, especially pages
106-112.
10
See the experience of the Arabs from Der-el-Asad, Bina, Nahef and
Majd-el-Kurum with Carmiel, in Chapter 4.
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SOCIETAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE
The Arab minority was promised full equality by the 'Declaration of
Independence' which emphasized that

Israel will maintain 'complete

equality of social and political rights for all its citizens, without
distinction of creed, race or sex'.

The Declaration went on to call

upon the 'sons of the Arab people dwelling in Israel to keep the peace
and to play their part in building the state on the basis of full and
equal citizinship'.

Although they were enfranchised the Arabs became a

nonassimilating minority

in a

state in which religion

nationality, and ethnicity and class overlap.

defines

Membership in the group

is ascriptive in that Arabs are born to their minority status.
Several structural arrangements have made crossing over between the
majority and minority groups very difficult. Among these, and the most
important perhaps,

is the

legal separation between the religious

communities and the unavailability of civil marriage which makes
intermarriage impossible unless one of the parties converts so that
marriage can take place within the confines of one religion.
marriage does not exist in Israel nor is it

recognized.

Civil

Hence,

notwithstanding a few exceptions, endogamy is the practice of members of
both majority and minority. In addition, the definition of a Jew as one
who was either born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism limits
the mobility of individual Arabs to a majority status to its minimum.
Moreover, the Arabs are easily identifiable by a special combination of
appearance, accent, name and address. The fact that the identity cards,
which must be carried at all times and presented upon request,. state
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clearly a person's identity as either Arab or Jew, eliminates ambiguity
concerning one's identity altogether.

Hence, Arabs can rarely pass as

Jews.
Discrimination against the Arabs was

legitimized through other

institutional arrangements which were built into the very structure of
the state since the beginning and came to emphasize its Jewish sectarian
character.

The Law of Return was among the first laws to be enacted and

it is one of the most exclusionary of the Israeli laws which represents
to a great extent the state's sectarian character. By extending the
right of citizenship to all Jews of the world who wish to immigrate to
the state while refusing such rights to native Palestinian refugees the
law clearly established a favourable status for Jews in Israel. The
extensive incorporation of Jewish symbols in Israel's public domain,
such as the flag with the star of David and the national anthem (which
speaks of the Jewish 2000 years of yearning to return to the holy land),
further testify to this Jewish sectarian character and act as an
alienating force toward the Arabs.
On the other hand, the policies and mechanisms which were,

and

continue to be, devised by the Israeli authorities to deal with the Arab
minority seem to be aimed at continued segregation and subordination of
this minority making them economically and politically dependent on the
Jewish sector.

The most diffuse pattern of this institutional behavior

is reflected in the setting-up of special departments, within the
ministries

and other

institutions, to handle the affairs of the

minorities which include the Arabs. Needless to say these departments do

45

not apply the same standards and guidelines, in assesing needs and
eligibility, which are applied to the Jewish population by the general
departments.

For example, programs and projects which are designed to

aid certain underprivileged groups, such as subsidized public housing,
income tax deductions, low interest loans and grants to investers are
limited to the Jewish population. The local council of Ma'alot-Tarshiha
in the northern district exemplifies this point in its extremity. The
council was established in 1963 by a municipal union of Jewish Ma'alot
and the Arab village of Tarshiha, to be a model of cooperation on an
equal basis between Arabs and Jews.

Despite the fact that the council

has a common budget, the government continues to give preferential
treatment to the Jewish population by classifying Ma' alot, but not
Tarshiha, as a development town, a border settlement and a locality with
a needy population. 11
Differential treatment of Arabs by the authorities was further
manifested in three other areas: free movement, land confiscation and
service allocation.

The movement of Arabs was

restricted by the

military government which was imposed on the Arabs between 1948 and
1966.

12

Land was confiscated from Arabs and given to Jews,

13

and there

has been a differential allocation of services such as connecting Arab
villages to water and electric networks, pavement of roads, building of
schools and development funds.

11

These policies have resulted inevitably

See Smooha, 1978, fn. 25, p. 399.

12

See Chapter 5 for more details on the Emergency Regulations, the
activities of the military government and the rationale given.
13

See Chapter 4 for details.
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in the generation of a surplus of Arab

labor with employment

alternatives being limited to Jewish businesses and enterprises which
were not completely free to use this labor.

The next section will

present an overview of the experience of Arab labor.

ARAB LABOR
Despite the granting of full citizenship to Arabs the Histadrut and
other labor organizations continued their pre-state struggle against the
employment of Arabs.

Only this time their success was almost complete

in that Arabs were, until 1959, exc.luded from the labor market through
two legally sanctioned methods: first, the Histadrut was put in charge
of all labor exchanges through which it chose to serve only its members
who were, by definition, Jews (Arabs were not admitted to the Histadrut
until 1959);

and second, the Arabs were placed under a military

government and their movement out of their villages was restricted. To
move out of the villages, even for the purpose of employment, Arabs
required special permits which were issued by !!- regional military
governor on a very selective and limited basis.

14

Hence, during the

first few years of statehood, the Arabs had a very limited access to the
Jewish labor market.
On the other hand, the few employment alternatives which existed in
the Arab villages were limited to agricultural work.

An extensive

program of Arab land confiscation by the Israeli authorities, however,
eliminated many of these employment opportunities.

14

See Chapter 5 for further details.

This resulted in a
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high unemployment rate among the Arabs.
High unemployment rates were not limited to Arabs during this initial
period of statehood, however.

During the first few years the country

experienced great economic difficulties which necessitated even the
rationing of food and other commodities. Not until the mid fifties did
the economy begin to show some signs of recovery.

Until then the Jewish

population experienced the highest unemployment rates the country was
ever to experience (Table 2.5).

The flow of hundreds of thousands of

Jewish immigrants to the newly created state was the most important
single factor which contributed to this state of affairs.

Between 1948

and 1951 over 686,000 new immigrants entered the country, half of them
coming from Asia and North-Africa (Table 1.1).
conditions,

namely,

economic

depression

and

Clearly, unde:"." these
hightened

immigration, there was hardly any demand for Arab labor.

Jewish
Hence, labor

organizations were successful in their bid to limit access of Arabs to
the Jewish labor market.
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TABLE 2.5
Unemployment as a Percent of the Labor Force
1949 -1965

Year

Percent
Unemployed

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

13.9
11. 2
8.1
8.8
11.5
9.2

Civilian Labor Force
(thousands)

343
450
545
584
599
608
619
646
690
698
714
736

7 .4
7.8
6.9
5.7
5.5
4.6
3.6
3.7
3.6
3.3
3.6

774
818
840
884
912

Source: Nadav Halevi and Ruth Klinov-Malul, The economic Development of
Israel, New York: Praeger, 1968, Table 14.

Changes

in

expansion of

both

conditions

the economy and a

beginning

in

the

mid

1950's,

significant decline in the

i.e.,

number of

immigrants entering the country, precipitated an increased demand for
Arab labor.
and 1960,

Only 294 ,484 immigrants entered the country between 1952

which was

less than

half of what had

entered the

country
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during the first three years of statehood (or a yearly average of 29,448
compared with a yearly average of 228, 913 immigrants during the first
period).

But in order to have more open access to Arab labor it was

necessary to lift, or at least partially relax, the restrictions on the
movement of Arabs.

A step the authorities proved willing to undertake,

under pressure from different Jewish groups who began intensifying their
campaign of

opposition to the

restrictions

around 1958.

This

step

proved to be the first on the road toward a gradual and eventually total
elimination of the whole system of military government in 1966.
The Arab labor force, which had been partially generated through land
confiscation since 1948, was disoriented as a result of disposession and
control

by

the

military

government.

Lacking

other

employment

alternatives this labor force was eager to work for wages and benefits
below what was offered to Jewish labor.
earners

working

for

Jewish

employers.

Most of the Arabs became wageThis

increased

the

Arabs'

dependence on the Jewish sector and the Jewish economy which gradually
incorporated them heavily in the lower ranks of the occupational ladder
concentrating mainly in specific employment sectors and job-categories.
As will be shown, under these conditions the Histadrut elected to admit
Arab laborers to its ranks 15

15

See Chapter 6 for more details.
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ARAB EDUCATION
The Arab educational system and education for Arabs in Israeli
universities is still problematic.

Although more and more graduates of

the Arab educational system are being accepted for higher education in
Israeli universities, the situation is still far from satisfactory.

In

1983/84, for example, only 4.4 percent of the total Israeli students
enrolled in Israeli universities were Arabs, (of whom only 25 percent
were enrolled in the natural sciences).

In addition, 1,900 out of 4,700

or 41 per cent of total number of Arab students were enrolled in
universities outside Israel.

Statistics show that the proportion of

Arab students to the Arab population in Israel is 4 students per
thousand citizen.

This proportion falls far below the Palestinian

average of 40 students per thousand.

16

Comparing Arab and Jewish students Mar'i shows that until 1973 Arab
university students comprised 2 percent of the total student population
in Israel. Since 1974, however, this proportion has increased to 3.5
percent which is still very low relative to the 15 percent which
represents the proportion of Arabs in the general population.

17

In

addition, vocational schools for Arabs are scarce and where they exist
they are usually poorly staffed and equipped. Despite a rising demand by
the Arab population for such education the government is still very slow
to respond.

16
17

18

Falestine Althowrah, 22.6.85, No.563:33 (Arabic).

Sami Mar' i, Arab Education
University Press, 1978, p. 106.

in Israel,

Syracuse:

Syracuse
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Arab university graduates have great difficulty finding appropriate
employment, commensurate in status and income with their training.

In a

government-sponsored survey of Arab university graduates who received
their degrees between 1961 and 1971 it was found that 47.3 percent of
those employed in white collar occupations worked as teachers.

19

Since

nothing has been done to remedy this situation, it is likely that these
findings continue to be reflected in current employment patterns.
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Although the Arabs are enfranchised, during the 38 years of Israel's
existence, the Arabs have never been allowed to form their own political
parties.

On the contrary, any attempts at such political organization

were very quickly suppressed.

The late fifties and early sixties

witnessed a particularly increased interest by the Arabs in organizing
politically. The Al-Ard (the land) movement was the most serious of
these attempts. All these attempts, however, were crushed. Not until the
election of 1984 did the Arabs attempt to organize politically again.
This time some elements of the Al-Ard movement formed a coalition with
leftist Zionists to form a slate called 'The Progressive Slate for
Peace'. Although the Elections Committee initially denied the group
their request to run in the elections, through a subsequent appeal to
and ruling by the High Court of Justice (Supreme Court) the group was
granted the right to enter the elections.

They were not allowed to

campaign fully and were not sure they would be allowed to enter the

18

Ibid., especially Chapter 8, pp. 145-172.

19

Lustick, 1980, p.21.
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elections, however, until a confrontational meeting with the minister of
defense, who has the authority to outlaw the group despite the ruling by
the Supreme Court, took place. During their meeting with the defense
minister the Arab delegates were cross examined by the minister who,
under intense pressure from the Jewish -delegates, finally gave the goahead.

The slate won two seats in the Knesset which were alloted to an

Arab (head of the slate) and a Jew. The Arab member evetually lost his
immunity on the ground that he holds extreme political views. 20

EXPLAINING THE STATUS OF THE ARABS
The Arab-Jewish division has continuously been used as a basis for
explaining the predicament of the Arabs.

Everything is derived from

security requirements and every decision is claimed to be merely
political as though politics are completely divorced of societal
undercurrents.

Such claims have been so widespread that even academic

circles have come to accept the situation as fait accomplis.

Despite

the public and institutional recognition of the status of the Arabs as a
separate ethnic entity they have rarely been considered by Israeli
sociologists as an integral part of the Israeli society, differing
ethnically yet deserving of analytic consideration and investigation
within this framework. Indeed very little has been done in the form of
any serious academic work concerning the Arabs in Israel. 21 This curious

2 0

A personal communication with the Arab member of Knesset in
November 1985.
21

See Zureik, 1979, particularly Chapter 1.
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lack of interest in the sociology of the Arabs in Israel is what
prompted Lipset to conclude that:
Almost none of the academic research and policy decisions about the
problems of education, or social mobility, ever deal with Arab
citizens of the country ..... Articles about the Israeli situation
which break down attainments and statuses by ethnic background are
generally headed 'The Israeli----- System', but have no column for
over 400,000 Israeli Arabs who comprise 14 percent of the population
of the state. 22
As noted, such omissions are usually reasoned away by the claim that the
problem of the Arabs is purely a political one. The following footnote
by an established Israeli sociologist, Chaim Adler, in a paper entitled
'Social Stratification and Education in Israel' is typical. He said:
It ought to be stated quite clearly that this analysis does not deal
with another aspect of stratification within Israel, namely the
Arab-Jewish division. This has, unfortunately, so far been first and
foremost a political problem and only secondarily a social or
educational one. 23
When such an 'apologetic' note is omitted, however, and the Arabs are
included in the works, they are either underrepresented 24 or, dealt with
in terms of side issues. 25 Other investigations related to the Arabs
have been

limited

mainly

to

socio-psychological

and/or

socio-

anthropological perspectives. 26 Henry Rosenfeld's research stands as an

22

Seymour Lipset, "Education and Equality: Israel and the United
States compared'', Society March/April, 1974, p. 65.
2 3

Chaim Adler, "Social Stratification in Israel",
Education Review, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 12.

Comparative

24

Out of 450 page book entitled "Israeli Society" Eisenstadt (1970)
devotes no more than 16 pages to the Arabs.
2 5

In a 700 page book entitled "Integration and Development in
Israel" prepared by Eisenstadt, Bar Yosef and Adler (1970), the Arabs
are represented through two articles entitled 'Sedentarization of the
Beduins in Israel' and 'The Status of Arab Village Women'.
26

See, for example, Raphael Patai's (1947) work on Middle Eastern
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exception to the above rules. The most notable of his works is a
research paper entitled 'The Origins of the Process of Proletarization
and Urbanization of Arab peasants in Palestine' (1974).
The lack of interest in, and under-representation of minorities in
established sociological circles is not peculiar to Israel. In fact, as
Zureik (1979) noted, interest in the sociology of minorities can be seen
as a direct correlate of acts of protests and violence. Such research,
when it is forthcoming, does not address the problems from the vantage
point of the minorities. Rather, sociologists have tended to adopt the
'official' labeling of what is problematic and borrow a world view which
is in agreement with the dominant ideology. In this sense Zureik argues
"it is the sociological locus of the problem which has become the
problem itself" 2 7 such that "the formulation of the solution to a
particular social problem is rooted within the problem itself, which in
turn has been defined in terms of the minority at hand". 2 8 The Israeli
sociologists do not seem to have deviated from such tendencies.
The following quote from Sarni Smooha, himself an Iraqi Jew is only
one example.

Smooha writes:

The mass of Jewish people regard
feelings toward them range from
pity, to indifference. They opt
Arabs, entrusting a free hand to

the Arabs as outsiders, and their
hostility, through contempt and
out of any responsibility for the
the authorities to deal with them.

societies, including Israel; Emanuel Marx's (196 7) research on the
Beduins; Erik Cohen's (1971) work on Arab youth; Yochanan Peres'
(1969,1971) investigations of Jewish-Arab ethnic relations; and Yalan et
al. (1972) work on the modernization of Arab villages.
27

Zureik, 1979, p. 4.

28

Ibid.
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The authorities being on the average more liberal than the general
public, are interested in pacification and the continued compliance
of the Israeli Arabs ... 29
Irrespective of the accuracy of Smooha's description, the statement
does not make clear why the authorities are more liberal than the
general public, nor does it explain why this has continuously been the
case despite the continued change in leadership.

As will be shown in

the next chapter the 'authorities' have not been independent of the
influence of the general public in their policies toward the Arabs.

Nor

have policies been promulgated with complete disregard to their effect
on the Jewish economy and population.

More to the point, however, given

the description of the harsh treatment of the Arabs it cannot be
concluded that such has been a result of liberal policies.

If anything

the description by Smooha fits the dominant ideology which regards the
Arabs as an inferior people and dispensable to the system.
SUMMARY
In this chapter the major structures and mechanisms which define the
boundaries between Arabs and Jews are identified.

Boundaries have been

maintained through residential segregation, institutional segmentation,
laws and regulations, and the adoption of Jewish symbols in the public
domain, which set Arabs apart from Jews.
Whereas residential segregation and institutional segmentation made
differentiation against the Arabs easy the laws and regulations provided
not only the legal basis for this differentiation but also the

29

Smooha, 1978, p. 46.
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justifying ideology.

Through segregation and institutional segmentation

it was made easy, for example, to direct development funds to Jewish
towns and settlements, encourage economic development through favorable
tax laws, expand educational and recreational facilities in Jewish but
not in Arab settlements.

Even when Arab and Jewish settlements were

grouped under one municipal jurisdiction, such as the case of Jewish
Ma'alot and Arab Tarshiha, governmental and quasi-governmental agencies
found the way to channel extra funds to the Jewish settlement only, by
defining the Jewish but not the Arab as a development town, despite the
geographic proximity of the two towns.
As a consequence of these

po~.icies

the Arab and Jewish sectors

continued to develop in an unequal pace.

However, these policies and

the accompanying unequal developments would not have been possible
without clearly marked demarcating lines which were, and continue to be,
maintained

through

residential

segregation

and

institutional

segmentation.
While segregation and segmentation represent a manifestation of the
physical separation between Arabs and Jews, this division would have
been very difficult to maintain without the support of an ideology.
Through the enaction of laws and the adoption of certain symbols, which
emphasized the Jewish sectarian character of the state, the extension of
superior status to Jews compared to the Arabs was justified.

Hence, it

was possible for governmental and quasi-governmental agencies such as
the Histadrut to promulgate policies against the Arabs designed to
further the Jewish interests.

However, as it will be shown in the next

57

chapter some policies benefited certain Jewish groups more than others
which resulted in the emergence of conflict of interests among the
Jewish population.

This conflict set the dynamics which underly changes

in the attitudes of the Jewish population and in policies toward the
Arab population.

These dynamics will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE JEWISH POPULATION AND THE ARABS
A split labor market can be maintained only if the majority is
clearly differentiated, and particularly if such a differentiation is
along certain demarcating lines such as ethnicity.

This chapter will

highlight the Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation along the AshkenaziOriental lines emphasizing the respective benefits of each of the two
ethnic groups from, and their attitudes toward, the different policies
dealing with the Arabs. As part of the documentation of attitudes,
voting trends in national elections will be examined in lieu of the
advocated policies and platforms of two of the biggest political
parties: Labor Alignment and the Likud.
THE JEWISH INTER-ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND THE ARAB MINORITY
Differentiation of the Jewish population along the Ashkenazi-Oriental
lines seems to correspond to different attitudes along these lines
toward the Arabs.

Whereas Ashkenazim occupy managerial and elite

positions in the economy, the polity and the military, Orientals man the
lower rungs in all of these spheres.

This Ashkenazi-Oriental division

is well established in Israeli society and much has been written to
describe and analyse its causes and consequences for Israeli society.
While writers differ in their theoretical orientation and philosophical
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leanings they all agree that a disparity exists between Ashkenazim and
Orientals in the economic, social and political spheres.
There are many causes for this Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation.
While they will not be dealt with here extensively a few seem relevant
to our discussion and therefore

deserve attention.

First,

the

immigration patterns: whereas the major Ashkenazi immigration pre-dates
the establishment of the state, most Oriental immigrants arrived after
the state and its institutions were already established (see Table 1.1).
The implication of this is that not only did Orientals enter the new
society from the bottom, they did not participate in the bloody fighting
between Arabs and Jews which had lasted for almost fifty years prior to
the establishment of the state. The fighting was carried out mostly by
Ashkenazim who bore the consequences

and paid the price.

Thus,

Ashkenazim have felt that they are the ones who are responsible for, and
therefore they should enjoy the fruits of, the establishment of the
state.
Second, most Oriental immigrants came from Arab countries, speak the
Arabic language, subscribe to the Arabic value system, and even resemble
Arabs in their physical features.

While they clearly had occupied a

subordinate positions in these countries there is no evidence to suggest
that they had been harshly mistreated.

1

The Ashkenazim, on the other

hand, resemble European Gentiles and their cultural heritage is based on
Yiddish, which is a German-Jewish dialect.

1

See Smooha, pp. 49-50.
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And third, Orientals were perceived and treated by Ashkenazim as
inferiors who have nothing to offer the new society even before the
establishment of the state: no efforts were expended by the Zionist
Organization to either encourage or attract Oriental immigration to
Palestine, nor were they received enthusiastically once they arrived in
the country. 2

It was not an accident, therefore, that the social

institutions which were built by the early comers, i.e. Ashkenazim, were
geared to the needs of, and were controlled by Ashkenazim.

According to

Smooha,
The neglect of the Oriental Jewry abroad by the Zionist movement was
only duplicated by the East European establishment regarding
Orientals in Palestine. Behind the lofty ideals of 'one people' and
the neutralization of ethnicity there were the stark realities of
superiority and paternalism of Ashkenazim toward Orientals which
rendered impossible any meaningful relations between them.
Orientals were looked upon as backward and incapable of contributing
to the new society. They were considered marginal members of the
Yishuv (Jewish Settlement) whose lack of adaptiveness was deplored,
yet nothing was done to incorporate them as equal members. 3
Even after they arrived in Israel the Orientals' reception was "far from
cordial or enthusiastic". 4

2

The experience of the Yemenite Jews who immigrated at the turn of
the Twentieth Century provides a clear example of how Oriental Jews were
treated and the role they occupied within the Yishuv. It is asserted
that they not only occupied a subordinate position relative to the
Ashkenazim but they were expected to play the role of Jewish working
class and were treated accordingly, getting smaller plots of lands than
did immigrants from Eastern Europe and smaller apartments etc. For a
detailed history of the Yemenites' experience and treatment see Smooha,
1978, pp. 54-55; Patai, 1970, pp. 187-8; Gluska, 1974, p. 110.
3

Ibid., p. 59.

4

Ibid., p. 86.
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Clearly, as the above demonstrates, the similarities between Arabs
and Orientals are striking.

Arabs and Orientals share language, customs

to a great extent, values, and a negative image bestowed upon both of
them by Ashkenazim.

Furthermore, since most Orientals immigrated after

the state was established and the Arab-Jewish active hostility had
subsided, they were saved the burden of exchanging reciprocal hostile
acts with the Arabs.

Hence, one would expect more cordial relations to

have developed between Orientals and the Arabs.
shows that the opposite happened.

However, the evidence

That is, Orientals are more hostile

toward the Arabs than are Ashkenazim and support exclusionary policies .
mJre often than do Ashkenazim.
JEWISH DIFFERENTIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ARABS
Data from a variety of sources such as public polls, voting patterns
and survey research point out that Orientals and Ashkenazim differ in
their

attitudes toward

the

Arabs.

While systematic

data

are

unfortunately not available, the few studies which attempted to address
the subject seem to agree in their findings.

On the basis of these

studies three conclusions can be reached: 1) the proportion of those who
express hostility toward the Arabs is very high among all Jewish groups;
2) this level is higher among the religious than it is among the
nonreligious; and 3) Oriental Jews, on the average, express negative and
hostile attitudes in higher proportions than do Ashkenazim.
For the following reasons the religious-nonreligious dichotomy will
not be dealt with in this analysis. First, it is inherently difficult to
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define the religious population.

While the concept is vaguely defined,

in Israel it connotes the orthodox Jews. This connotation, however,
leaves out many reformists, observants and self-professed religious
people. Certainly the three religious parties (the National Religious
Party, Agudat Israel, and Poali Agudat Israel) do not.represent the
entire religious population. According to Elyakim Rubinstein, only 13-15
percent of the religious population vote for the religious parties. 5
Second, the religious population cuts across ethnic as well as class
lines.

It

is

noted,

for

example,

that the Oriental Jews vote

disproportionately more for the National Religious Party.

According to

Smooha, the socioeconomic gaps between religious and nonreligions can be
accounted for by ethnicity.

6

It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that

the discrepancies in the expressed attitudes toward the Arabs between
the religious and the nonreligious may also be understood as ethnically
based.
The finding that Orientals are more hostile to Arabs than are
Ashkenazim was suprising even to veteran students of Israeli society.
Commenting on the results of his survey on Jewish differential attitudes
toward the Arabs in 1971 Peres wrote, "this discovery seems to be
astonishing." 7 In 1971 when was asked about marrying an Arab in a state-

5

Elyakim Rubinstein, "The Lesser Parties in the Israeli Elections of
1977". In Howard Penniman (ed.)
Israel at the Polls: The Knesset
Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research,
Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 177.
6

See Smooha, 1978, p. 149 & p. 178.

7

Peres, 1971, p. 1038.
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wide sample of the adult urban population only 8 percent of Orientals
said they 'agreed' or 'agreed but prefered a Jew' compared with 24
percent Europeans.

Twenty seven percent of the Orientals compared to 40

percent of the Europeans expressed readiness for friendship with Arabs;
and, 40 percent of Orientals compared to 48 percent of the Europeans
expressed readiness to share a neighborhood with Arabs. 8 Furthermore, 85
percent of the Orientals compared to only 64 percent of the Europeans
agreed with the proposition that 'Arabs will not reach the level of
progress of Jews'.

And, 78 percent of the Orientals compared to 53

percent of the Europeans did not want to have an Arab as a neighbor.

9

Attitudes among the Jewish population toward the Arabs were also
found to show significant diff irences when they were examined along the
religious-nonreligious axis.

In 1970 Zuckerman-Bareli, reported that as

many as 94 percent of the religious and 89 percent of the partly
observant, compared to 76 of the nonreligious, thought that the Israeli
government did much or too much for the Israeli Arabs.

10

While the data,

unfortunately, do not identify the ethnic origin of the respondents
ethnicity can, nonetheless, be assumed to be a factor in the reported
results.

8

See Ibid., Table 11, p. 1039.

9

See Ibid., Table 12, p. 1039.

10

Zuckerman-Bareli, C., 'The Structure of Religious Concept-ion of
Youth in Israeli Society', doctoral dissertation, Jerusalm: Hebrew
University. Cited in Smooha, 1978, p. 199.
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A substantial and ethnically differentiated antagonism continues to

An

characterize attitudes of the Jewish population toward the Arabs.
unpublished study by the Van Lear Institute (a prestigious public

opinion polling institute) reports that 40 percent of young Israelis are
sympathetic to Meir Kahane or his ideas.

11

These ideas, which advocate a

total expulsion of the Arabs from the state, are the most extreme ever
expressed in public against the Arabs in Israel.
Generally speaking, most interpretations of this phenomenon rely on
socio-psychological models which are at best ahistorical and do not
account for variation and change.

Smooha, for example, is not sure

whether the heightened hostility of Orientals toward the Arab5,

is

"largely a result of their lower socioeconomic status." 12 According to
him,

"it is possible that anti-Arab emotions and scapegoating are

particularly intense among the Oriental lower classes as a result of the
interaction of poor education, deprived status and blocked mobility." 13
He further asserts that "the tensions generated by the conflicts among
Jews are partially dispelled by scapegoating the Arabs.

Lower-class

Orientals are seemingly disposed to enhance their status within the
Jewish quasi-cast by taking a harder line than the Ashkenazim against
the Arabs." 14

11

New Outlook, July, 1985, pp. 11-14.

12

Ibid., P· 103.

13

Ibid.,

l"

Ibid., p. 104.

p. 104.
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Such interpretation is in line with the thought that Orientals aspire
to be like Ashkenazim.

This line of thinking negates reality which, if

anything, shows an increase in Orientals' awareness of and rediscovered
pride in their cultural heritage.

This kind of thinking was dominant in

the sixties and provided perhaps a framework upon which Peres (1971)
based his analysis.

Peres, a pioneer in the area of Arab-Jewish

relations, asserts that "the Orientals feel that they must reject the
remaining traces of their Middle Eastern origin to attain the status of
the dominant European group.

By expressing hostility to Arabs, an

Oriental attempts to rid himself of the 'inferior' Arabic element in his
own identity and adopt a position congenial to the European group which
he desires to emulate" 15
It is true that the cultural heritage carried by the Oriental Jews
was detested by Ashkenazim during the fifties and sixties.

It was

feared that the impact of immigration from Middle-Eastern countries
would have the effect of downgrading the Israeli society and many
leaders articulated those fears in public, emphasizing the superiority
of Ashkenazi culture and criticizing the culture, customs and values of
the Orientals.

Orientals were called primitive, ignorant and a people

'with a 16th century level. '

15

16

16

Peres, Y., 1971, p. 1040.

See quotes by Ben-Gorion, Israel's Prime Minister during the first
decade and half; Eban, for a long time Israel's Foreign Minister; and,
Golda Meir, and an expanded discussion of this point in Smooha, 1978,
pp. 87-89.
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Such an atmosphere may have generated certain feelings of inferiority
among Oriental Jews.

Furthermore, these feelings may have been even

exacerbated by the fact that compared to Ashkenazim the contribution of
Orientals to the establishment of the state was very limited.

It should

be recalled that most Orientals immigrated after the state had already
been established.

Hence, the burden of Israel's wars fell upon the

shoulders of Ashkenazim who also reaped the glories of victory.

Until

1967 the Arab-Jewish wars (1948,1956) had produced Ashkenazi 'heroes'
only.
From this perspective the war of 1967 offered the Orientals an
unprecedented opportunity because it offered them the chance to
participate fully in the actual fighting and pay their dues to the
system, so to speak.

Furthermore, the occupation of vast and densely

populated Arab areas (West-Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights) had
two additional consequences.

First, to communicate with and control the

newly occupied Arab masses knowledge of the Arabic language and Arabic
culture proved to be expedient.

The fact that Orientals mastered these

skills and were readily available to fill the newly opened positions
highlighted their usefulness and contribution to the system, for the
first time

in the history of the state.

Second, the continued

occupation of these Arab areas also resulted in the expansion of the
system which offered an opportunity to accomodate part of the Oriental
elite without any loss to Ashkenazim.

These developments capitalized on

the early experiences of the system with the Arab minority prior to
1967.
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The early experiences show that the continuation of the state of war
between Israel and the Arabs since 1948 coupled with the continued
emphasis on the Jewish sectarian character of the state played a major
role in solidifying the Arab-Jewish division.

In and of itself the

division gave Orientals the opportunity to stress their membership in
the superior Jewish group, a status with which the Orientals were not
familiar and had never experienced before and therefore were eager to
emphasize.
Nonetheless, while the status of superiority over the Arabs which is
ensured by membership in the Jewish majority is not insignificant, the
economic benefits which accrue to the Orientals as

a result of

maintaining a rigid Arab-Jewish division are no less important.

These

advantages for the Orientals are ubiquitous and serve all classes well.
First, the agencies which either serve or control the Arabs provide many
jobs for educated Orientals.

This function cannot be overemphasized if

one considers the fact that these agencies include several departments
in the government ministries, in the Histadrut, political parties,
Arabic-speaking schools and mass media, the internal security services
and the police and most importantly the military government apparatus.
While the last was abolished in 1966, in 1967 it was reinitiated in a
much expanded version over the occupied territories of the West-Bank and
the Gaza Strip.

This provided, and continues to provide, considerable

employment opportunities to Oriental Jews who speak the language and
know the culture and whose loyalty to the state is never questioned.
The support of Orientals for the continuation of the status quo in the
occupied territories should be understood against this background.
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Second, the continuation of exclusionary policies which translate
into discrimination against the Arabs gives the Orientals an edge over
the Arabs both during periods of recession and in times of full
employment.

During a recesssion the Arabs are the ones who are fired

first, while during full employment the Arabs take up manual and low
paid jobs, which has the effect of upward displacement of Orientals in
the occupational hierarchy.

17

Recent comparative data show that Jewish

in-mobility to the occupational category of office administrators
between the years 1969 and 1982 was almost twice as high as Arabs, while
out-mobility from unskilled labor of Jews and Arabs was about 3: 1
ratio.

18

Furthermore, the authors also show that whereas Ashkenazim have

experienced the highest in-mobility into the occupational category of
professional, scientific and technical work, Orientals' mobility into
the middle rungs positions as office administrators was the highest.

19

The process of upward displacement of Orientals was further enhanced
by the entry of the Arabs from the occupied territories, but it is
significant to note that, irrespective of the findings of the study, the
public in Israel perceives this to be the case.

This perception was

captured magificently in a monologue of a North African Jew recorded by
the famous Israeli novelist Amos Oz:

17

Stock, 1968, pp. 22-3.

18

Lewen-Epstein, N. & Semyonov, M., 'Ethnic Group Mobility in the
Israeli Labor Market'.
American Sociological Review, 1986, vol. 51
June, Table 1, p. 345, and p. 348.
19

Ibid.
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If they give back the territories the Arabs will stop coming to
work, and then and there you'll put us back into the dead-end jobs
like before .... Look at my daughter; she works in a bank now, and
every evening an Arab comes to clean the building. All you want is
to dump her from the bank into some textile factory, or have her
wash the floor instead of the Arab. 20
Third, as a result of exclusionary policies, ethnic gap (pa'ar adati)
has come to mean Oriental-Ashkenazi differentiation in the public minds
as well as in government circles.

Hence, programs designed to promote

ethnic equality whether initiated and financed by the government or
other Jewish institutions such as the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut and
others are devoted completely to the Orientals.
exclusionary policies

~ome

Under less rigid

of these funds would have to be redirected to

the Arab areas which are no less needy.
However, while there are clear advantages to the Orientals, the
policy of exclusion has had

its drawbacks.

For Orientals

the

continuation of the state of war has made full equality between them and
Ashkenazim less imperative. The study by Epstein-Semyonov shows that
while both Orientals and Ashkenazim experienced occupational upward
mobility, "the two Jewish groups retained their relative (emphasis in
original)

hierarchical position in the occupational structure. " 2 1

Furthermore, as a consequence of rigidity in the Arab-Jewish division,
Arabs have been concentrated in the lower ranks of the occupational
hierarchy where they present direct competition to the basically
Oriental

lower classes.

20

Ibid., p. 344.

21

Ibid., p. 350.

Orientals and Arabs have a much higher
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concentration in unskilled occupations than do Ashkenazim who exit these
occupation at a greater rate than either group. 22
The Ashkenazim have also benefited from the system of exclusion.
First, whereas the implementation of equality between them and Orientals
would have resulted in a real loss to Ashkenazim, the maintenance of a
rigid division between Arabs and Jews has resulted in the expansion of
the system through which certain of the Oriental demands are met without
any significant loss to Ashkenazim.

Yet a complete exclusion of the

Arabs would have limited employers' (basically Ashkenazim) access to
cheap Arab labor and would have resulted in making expensive Jewish
labor even more expensive.

Hence, only when employers' demands for such

r.heap labor were minimal were they inclined to tolerate a complete or a
near complete exclusion of the Arabs during the period 1948-1958.

When

their demands for such labor increased, however, the disadvantages of
exclusion outweighed the benefits and therefore had to be relaxed.
The system of exclusion was not cancelled altogether, however.

Under

the influence of labor it was only transformed to a caste-like system
limiting the Arabs to certain positions and job-categories.

These

dynamics were set forth in the Employment Service Law which was passed
in

1959.

Through

two

of

its

provisions

the

law

legitimized

discrimination on security grounds and provided protection to local
workers.

These two provisions were clearly directed against the Arabs

since they are the ones considered security risks and also against whose
'intrusion'

22

local employment,

i.e. Jewish employment, needed to be

Ibid., Table 1, p. 345 and p. 348.
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protected, since no significant employment opportunities exist in the
Arab sector (see further details on the law and its provisions in
chapter 6)
It is clear, therefore, that both Orientals and Ashkenazim benefit
from the Arab-Jewish division.

While the gains of Orientals are

greatest under a policy of exclusion, the Ashkenazim can benefit most
from treating the Arabs as caste-like segregation.
however, result in oppression of the Arabs.

Both systems,

By way of interpolation,

furthermore, it must be added that while the occupied West-Bank and the
Gaza strip are not the subject of this analysis one dares say that the
political attitudes of Israel vis-a-vis these occupied territories are
not completely divorced from the influences of such dynamics.
On the basis of the foregoing it should be expected that Orientals
more than Ashkenazim support those parties which advocate hard line
policies toward the Arabs.

In the following section ethnic voting

trends will be documented showing the relationships between shifts in
party politics and corresponding shifts in ethnic voting.
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JEWISH ETHNIC VOTING PATTERNS AND
THE ARABS
- --It cannot be claimed that the status of the Arab minority occupies a
central role in election campaigns.

That is not to say, however, that

the issue of the Arabs is one which has no effect whatever on voting
decision.

It constitutes

one of those undercurrents which also

characterize the Jewish inter-ethnic rift.

The Oriental-Ashkenazi

division, which by all accounts constitutes a central domestic issue, is
hardly raised as a campaign issue by any political party as one
deserving public debate. 23 To the contrary, the issue has hardly ever
gone beyond general declarations of all parties emphasizing the need for
greater integration without specifying a program or programs to achieve
such an end.

Even in internal discussions at party conferences the

issue of ethnicity is suppressed because of its explosive nature. 24
In general it must be emphasized that many factors influence voting
decisions in Israel.

While these factors are interrelated, not all are

articulated as issues to be raised during an election campaign.
other hand,

On the

issues which are raised in election campaigns are not

neccessarily determined on the basis of their saliency.

An issue may be

raised because it appeals to the greatest margin of voters.

Most

central to all election campaigns, for example, have been defense and

23

Efraim Torgovnik, 'Party Factions and Election Issues". In Arian
(ed.), The Elections in Israel-1969, Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1972, p.
16.
24

See a discussion of the Labor Party's conference in 1971 by
Arone ff, 1979. pp. 126-29. Also see an excellent review of the
determinants of an issue which is to be raised in election campaign, how
it is formulated and the issues which were raised in the 1969 Israeli
elections,in Torgovnik, 1972, pp. 21-40.
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foreign affairs, two issues over which criticism of the position of the
Labor Party is least tolerated by its leadership. 25 To a lesser degree
the economy has also been raised as an issue during some election
campaigns.
Despite the lack of public debate among political parties during
election campaigns the influence on voters of issues pertaining to
ethnic division can hardly be overemphasized.

The mass switch of the

Oriental vote from Labor to the Likud in 1977, which played a major role
in the defeat of Labor and gave the Likud the opportunity to form a
government for the first time in the history of the state, is mostly
attributed to the disenchantment of Orientals with the slow pace with
which Labor was implementing their integration.

In fact, the Oriental

support for the Labor party had been waning since the early sixties and
in the mid-seventies it reached its highest proportions. 26
On the basis of this discussion it should hardly be expected that the
status of the Arab minority would be publicly debated during election
campaigns.

Nor can the extent to which a party's

'Arab' policy

influences voting decisions of its constituency be determined.

Hence,

rather than seeking causal relationships between Jewish support for a
specific political party and that party's declared policies toward the

25

Aroneff, M., 'The Decline of Israeli Labor Party: Causes and
Significance'. In: Penniman, H., (ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset
Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research,
Washington, D. C., 1979, pp. 115-45.
26

See Arian, A., 'The Electorate: Israel 1977' . In: Penniman, H.,
(ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, Amexican
Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, pp.
59-89.

74
Arab minority, non-causal ethnic voting trends will be discussed and
documented in this section.
Mapai, which following several alignments became the Labor Alignment,
has won every single election from 1949 to 1973.
occured in 1977.

Its first defeat

Between 1948 and 1977 the party was in control of the

government and other Jewish institutions.
vote in the Histadrut.

It still holds the majority

Hence, the party can be considered responsible,

or take credit, for the policies toward the Arabs.
On the other hand, between 1948 and 1977 Likud was in the opposition.
In fact, during the first two elections the Likud,

o~

Herut (freedom) as

it was known, was not the biggest of the opposition parties (see Table
3 .1 below).

And, until 1964 it was not part of the Histadrut.

The

party was formed in 1948 by the leaders of the Irgun Tsevai Leumi
(National Military Organization known as Etzel) which was one of three
Jewish underground groups that operated in Palestine during the years of
British rule and was known for the brutality of the atrocities committed
by its members against Arabs and British.

Menachem Begin, who had been

the leader of Irgun since 1942, became Herut's leader.

In 1977 he

became prime minister, a position he held until his resignation in 1984.
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TABLE 3.1
Distribution of Seats, First Through the Ninth Knesset
1949-1977

Party

1st
1949

Mapai

46

2nd
1951

3rd
1955

4th
1959

45

40

47

42 }

}

45 }

10

7

}
}
8 }

Achdut
Ha'avodah
Map am

5th
1961

19

15

9

9

9

14

8

15

17

17 }

Rafi

6th
1965

7th
1969

8th
1973

Labor Alignment

}
}
}
8 }
}
10 }

56

51

Gahal
He rut
Liberal
Indep
liberal

7
5

20
4

13

8 }

5

}
6 }

}
}
}
17 }

the

early

years

of

32

Likud

26

26

39

45

5

4

4

1

Source: Abridged from Penniman, H., (ed.)
Israel
American Institute, Washington, D. C. 1979, p. 310.

During

9th
1977

statehood

Herut

at

the

adopted

Polls.

extreme

nationalistic stands and according to Akzin, "came to be recognized as
the foremost nationalist party in Israel". 27 Hence, it could not have

27

Akzin, B., 'The Likud'. In: Penniman, H., (ed.), Israel at the
Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, p. 93.
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been

expected

to

object

to

Mapai's

(representing

the

government)

policies of Arab land confiscation, and indeed no such objection was
ever raised. 28
On the other hand, on economic matters Herut stood for the broadening
of private enterprise; compulsory arbitration of labor conflicts; and,
curtailment of preferential treatment of collective and Histadrut-owned
enterprises. 29 These stands have, rightly, been perceived as anti labor,
i.e., Jewish labor.

Their consistency is further evidenced by the fact

that Herut opposed the policy of movement restriction on the Arabs. 3 0
These stands
labor.

were neither popular

among nor supported

by organized

According to Akzin, Herut's supporters and voters during those

early years "came from both
within the population".

middle-class

and working-class

elements

31

Following a series of alliances during the sixties between Herut and
other parties (see Table 3.1) Likud was formed and entered the elections
of 1973 under that name.

Since then, the greatest difficulty which

faces the party prior to an election campaign has been the formulation
of the socio-economic plank in its platform.

The difficulty is embedded

in the need to reconcile differences separating the different factions
of the party, those who support the encouragement of private initiative

28

See Chapter 4 for details.

29

See Akzin, 1979, p. 94.

3 0

See Chapter 5 for more details on Begin's speech in the Knesset
and his subsequent comments on the outcome of a vote against the
military government which fialed to abolish it in 1964.
31

Akzin, 1979, p.105.
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and freedom from government controls

and those labor-minded groups who

are anxious to preserve the cooperative and collectivist features of the
Israeli

economy.

living

standards

while

An

of

preserving

advanced

strata.

problem

the economically

the

32

additional

interests

of

is

and
the

Paradoxically, while

the

desire

to

raise

the

educationally disadvantaged
wealthier

the

Likud

and

educationally

sought in

1977

to

limit the role of the Histadrut 33 this move, unlike its similar position
during the fifties, was not perceived by the lower classes as being anti
labor, let alone anti-Oriental.

Hence, whereas during the early years of statehood the party (Herut)
advocated certain liberal
the

later

years

disadvantaged,
party's

it

(inclusionary) policies toward the Arabs, in

has

shifted

mostly Orientals

stands

vis-a-vis

the

its

attention

somewhat

and the exclusion of
status

of

the

to

the Arabs.

occupied

The

territories

following the 1967 war provide further testimony to this trend.
advocacy of harsh measures against the Arabs,

the

Its

the control of all the

occupied territories with minimum political and civil liberties for the
inhabitants (which is what the 'Autonomy'
contrasts

sharply

compromises.

with

Labor's

advocated by the Likud means)

advocated

position

of

territorial

The latter policy, of course, would result in an increase

in the number of enfranchised Arabs in the state and the closing off of
many agencies which deal with the Arabs

and the loss of many jobs by

middle-cless Jews (mostly Orientals) who man these positions.

32

See Ibid., pp. 105-6 for a detailed account of these conflicting
views and their solutions by the party prior to the elections of· 1977.
33

Ibid., p. 106.
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These shifts
support the

in policies of the Likud contributed to the increased

party received

among the Orientals.

On

the other hand,

Labor, which had administered the most exclusionary policies toward the
Arabs, was also supported by Orientals.
policies

and

leadership

among

Jews

The waning of support for its

correspond

liberalization in its policies toward the Arabs.
'The

Electorate:

Israel 1977',

Asher

to

the

beginning

of

In an article entitled

Arian presents a

tabulation

of

actual election results and data collected through surveys following the
elections of 1969, 1973 and 1977.

Tables 3-2, 3-8 and 3-10 show a clear

shift in ethnic voting and support
average in

for both parties.

1969 Labor received over

Whereas on the

half of the Oriental

vote,

this

proportion dropped to about 40 percent in 1973 and to about 30 percent
in 1977.

By contrast, support for the Likud by Orientals has increased

from about 27 percent in 1969 to about 44 percent in 1973 and about 60
percent in 1977 with more profound increases among the young Orientals
than among the old.

34

In sum, while these shifts in voting trends have been significant,
they cannot be directly attributed to shifts in Party's stand toward the
Arabs.

As

noted at the beginning of this section many

precipitated this shift.
represent

what

we

might

We can conclude,
expect

if

our

however,
ongoing

factors have

that such changes
analysis

of

the

relationship of attitudes of Orientals toward the Arab population has
some

validity.

These

attitudes,

as

I

have maintained

so

far,

are

motivated by the Orientals' economic interests as they are conceived to

34

See Arian, A., 1979, pp. 62-66.
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be best served by the maintenance of a more rigid division between Arabs
and

The

Jews.

upshot

of

such

division

is

on

the

one

maintenance and even the expansion of control agencies,
employment opportunities

to middle-class Orientals and,

hand

the

which offer
on the other

hand the limiting of the competitive potential of Arab labor against the
Jewish lower class which is composed mostly of Orientals.

SUMMARY
In this chapter I have shown that the interests of Orientals and
Ashkenazim did not, and do not,
coincidence

is derived

differentiation.

from

the

always coincide.

This lack of

inter-ethnic Jewish

rift

and

Whereas Ashkenazim occupy mostly managerial and elite

positions in the occupational heirarchy Orientals occupy mostly the
middle and lower positions.

Despite continued demand by Orientals for

equality the inter-ethnic Jewish differentiation has persisted.
Differentiation between the two Jewish ethnic communities was also
reflected in ethnic variations in attitudes toward the Arabs.

While

both Jewish groups were shown to benefit from an Arab-Jewish division,
their respective benefits vary with the extent of rigidity in this
division.

Whereas Orientals gain most from a rigid division, one which

views Arabs as outsiders and therefore must be kept under control and
prevented from participation in the social, political and economic life
of the state, Ashkenazim gain more from allowing certain elasticity in
the dividing

line,

one which allows Arabs

at

least a minimal

participation in the economic sphere so that they are more accessible to
Jewish business under least favorable conditions.
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As expected, these conflicting interests were expressed through
different attitudes adopted by each Jewish ethnic group and through
voting trends to political parties in accordance with these attitudes.
Hence, many changes in policies toward the Arabs were the result of the
interplay of these dynamics.

The next three chapters will describe

these dynamics in more details.

In these chapters it will be shown that

opposition to policies and practices against the Arabs was mostly
related to the interests of the opposing group.

For example, whereas

hardly any Jewish opposition was raised against confiscation of Arab
lands, opposition against the military gover.nment particularly the
policy of movement restriction

was progressively intensified in

accordance with economic expansion and demand for Arab labor.

CHAPTER IV

LAND POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS
According to the split labor market theory an initial discrepancy in
the price of labor can be a result of differences in resources which are
available to two ethnically distinguishable groups of labor.
also true of the Arab-Jewish contrast in Israel.

This is

Arabs began losing

control over a major economic source through land purchases by the
Zionist Organization during the pre-state period as well as through land
confiscation following the establishment of the state.

No other single

factor has contributed as much as the confiscation of Arab land to the
generation of cheap Arab labor and eventual total economic dependence of
Arabs on the Jewish sector.
The exodus of the Palestinians in 1948, as a result of the ArabJewish war and its atrocities, left Israel in control of large areas of
cultivable

land.

Despite this,

Israel enacted

laws and set up

mechanisms which allowed it to continue to confiscate Arab land.
since 1948, hundreds of thousands of dunums

Thus,

(a dunum is equal to a

quarter of an acre) of Arab owned cultivable land have been confiscated
by the Israeli authorities. Since the Palestinians depended on the land
for their subsistence, this loss brought about a total transformation of
the Arab occupational structure.
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Since the establishment of Israel, the decline in the proportion of
the Arab labor force who are employed in agriculture has been dramatic.
Available data show that in 1955 almost half (48.8 percent) of the Arab
labor force was employed in agriculture. This proportion dropped to 44
percent in 1962, 30.9 percent in 1968, 1 19.9 percent in 1972 and by 1981
had dropped to a mere 11.5 percent (Tables 4.2,4.3,4.4).
No doubt, general modernization of agricultural methods and the
introduction of technology to agriculture are partly responsible for
this decline. But the central factor responsible for this decline has
been the confiscation of Arab land.
In this chapter I

examine

Israel's

land policies and their

consequences on the Arab occupational structure from three vantage
points:

first,

I examine the extent to which land expropriation is

responsible for the decline in the proportion of Arabs employed in
agriculture; second, the extent to which this labor was channelled into
the Jewish labor market and under what conditions; and third, I examine
the respective benefits of Jewish labor and Jewish capital as a result
of these developments

and, conversely, the extent to which these

benefits were instrumental in determining the status of Arab workers.

1

See Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, Monthly Review Press, New
York, 1976, Table 13, pp. 304-5.
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The Acquisition of Arab Land £y the Israeli Government
Following the 1948 war Israel was in control of almost four-fifths
(4/5) of Palestine's area (21 million out of 26 million dunums).

Eighty

percent of the area which fell under Israeli control represented land
abandoned by the Arab refugees. 2 Within this area many villages were
emptied and destroyed. Out of 585 Arab villages only 107 remained: the
rest were destroyed and their population scattered within, as well as
outside of, the territory that became Israel.

3

This abandoned property (referred to later on as absentee property),
represented, according to Peretz, "one of the greatest contributions
toward making Israel a viable state. 114 Both movable and immovable
properties were immediately put to use by the Israeli authorities. The
immovable property consisted of millions of dunums of Arab land, citrus
orchards, olive and orange groves, apartment buildings, shops, offices,
storehouses and the like.

In 1954, more than one-third of Israel's

Jewish population lived on absentee property and nearly a third of the
new immigrants, (250,000 people), settled in urban areas abandoned by
Arabs. The Arabs left whole cities like Jaffa, Akka, Lydd, Ramleh,
Baysan, Majdal. In all, 388 towns and villages, and large parts of 94
other cities and towns containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings

2

Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, The Middle East
Institute, Washington, D. C., 1958, p.143.
3

T. Zayyad, "The Fate of the Arabs in Israel".
Studies, 6 (Autumn), pp. 92-103.
4

Don Peretz, 1958, p. 141.
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in Israel 5 were abandoned.
In order to manage this property, Israel created mechanisms and
enacted special laws to provide the 'legal' basis for formal control
over the property.

The first regulations concerning absentee property

were published on December 12, 1948 by the Provisional Government. 6 The
regulations,

known

as

the

Absentee

Property

Regulations,

were

promulgated by the Finance Minister in accordance with the powers
bestowed upon him by the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948. 7 In
addition, the Minister of Finance appointed a Custodian of Absentee
Property to replace the Custodian of Abandoned Property.

On March 14,

1950, the Knesset replaced these regulations with the Absentee Property
Law.
The interest of this study in these regulations stems from the fact
that, as promulgated, the regulations had a far reaching effect on the
Arabs in Israel. Over 81,000 out of 160,000 Palestinians who remained in
Israel and became citizens were defined by the regulations,

and

subsequently by the law, as absentee and consequently their property was
confiscated.'

5

Haaretz, June 15, 1951. Cited in Peretz, 1958, p. 143.

6

Kovetz Ha-Takanot (Official Gazett) 37 Dec. 12, 1948, p. 91.

7

Jerusalem Post, Dec. 19, 1948. Cited in Peretz, 1958, p. 150.

8

Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 174.
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The Regulations defined all persons who held property in Israel as
absentees if, on or after November 29,

1947 (the date of the United

Nations Resolution on the Partition of Palestine), they were:

"a)

citizens or subjects of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Iraq or the Yemen, or b) were in any of these countries or in any part
of Palestine outside the area of the regulations, or c) were Palestine
citizens and left their places of habitual residence." 9 Thus, every Arab
in Palestine was liable to be classified as an absentee under the
regulations. As Peretz notes:
All Arabs who held property in the New City of AcrP., regardless of
the fact that they may never have traveled farther than the few
meters to the Old City, were classified as absentees. The 30,000
Arabs who fled from one place to another within Israel, but who
never left the country, were also liable to have their property
declared absentee. Any individual who may have gone to Beirut or
Bethlehem for a one day visit, during the latter days of the
Mandate, was automatically an absentee. 10
Indeed, over 40 percent of the land owned by legal Arab residents of
Israel was confiscated by the authorities as part of the absentee
property policy.

11

The Arabs, Israeli citizens who lost property as a result of the
regulations' stipulations, were of three categories: about 15,000 Arabs
from Galilee who for whatever reason were "not at their place of
residence" when the area was occupied by Jewish forces; about 31, 000
Arabs from the Little Triangle in the center, who became Israeli
residents as a result of the Armistic agreements in 1949 between Israel

9

Peretz, 1958, p. 151.

10

Ibid., P. 152.

11

Peretz, p. 142.
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and Jordan; and about 35, 000 Arabs who, during the first years of
Israel's existence, either infiltrated back across the borders or were
legally admitted as part of a limited family reunion program.

12

Expulsions of Arabs from their villages and homes - long after
hostilities had subsided - and the confiscation of their property was
another method by which Arabs were deprived of their lands.

In some

cases whole populations were evicted and scattered in neighboring
villages

and their property confiscated.

In others,

part of the

population was scattered in different villages while others were forced
to cross the armistic lines to the neighboring countries. In still
others, only some of the inhabitants were rounded up and sent across the
borders.
Representing the first category are the villages of Ikrit whose
inhabitants were expelled on November 5, 1948, 13 Khasas, Qatiya and
Yanuh which were emptied of their Arab population on June 5, 1949, and
the village of Ghabsiya whose inhabitants were expelled in January 1950.
All of these villages are located in Western Galilee in the north.

12

See Lustick, 1980, pp. 173-74. For a detailed account of the court
battles between the Custodian and an Arab, resident of Jaffa, who was
. legally admitted back through London only to find his property
confiscated, see Don Peretz, 1958, p. 177.
13

For a detailed account of the eviction of the people of Ikrit, and
the legal and popular struggle for the return of its inhabitants, see
Elias Shakour, Blood Brothers, Chosen Books, Grand Rapids, Michigan,
1984.
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The second category is represented by Kufr Anan in the Triangle which
was emptied of its inhabitants on February 28, 1949, and the inhabitants
of Majdal in the south who were expelled over a three-week period across
the Egyptian borders, to the Gaza strip, on August 17th. And on November
17, 1951, the inhabitants of Khirbet Buweishat in the Triangle were
expelled and forced to cross the Jordanian border to the West Bank.
Representing the third type, i.e., selective expulsion, are the
villages of Rihaniya in Galilee from which seven families were expelled
in October 1953, and on October 30, 1956 the Baqqara tribe was forced to
cross the northern border to Syria.

14

As late as 1959, Bedouin tribes

were expelled to Jordan and Egypt and their return to Israel was later
secured only after United Nations intervention.

15

Between the years 1953 and 1954, the Bedouins in the south were
particularly harassed by the army.

Haaretz reports that:

16

The Army's desert patrols would turn up in the midst of a Bedouin
encampment day after day dispersing it with a sudden burst of
machine-gun fire until the sons of the desert were broken and,
gathering what little was left of their belongings, led their camels
in long silent strings into the heart of the Sinai desert.
Many other villages were either partly or completely demolished with
many of their inhabitants now living in various parts of Israel but with
no access to their 'former' property. Among these villages are Batat,
Amqa, Saffuriya, Mijdal, Mansura, Ma'ar, Kuweikat, Berwa, Damun, and

14

See a more detialed description of these expulsions in Sabri
Jiryis, 1976, pp. 81-92.
15

Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p.82.

16

Haaretz, Nov. 19, 1959.
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Ruweis, to mention only a few.
Few Arab land owners were saved from some kind of confiscation
procedure.

Those Arabs who escaped the Absentee Property Regulations

and expulsion orders were hardly missed by other laws and regulations.
From the early 1950' s

until the

late 1970 's,

numerous laws

and

regulations provided the legal basis for land confiscation. Among these
were:
1.

The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, upon which the
military government was based. Article 125 of the regulations
was particularly designed to address the issue of land.

17

It

empowered the military governors to order any area closed.
Upon the issuance of such an order access to such areas became
restricted,

for "security reasons", to holders of special

permits, the issuance of which were to be approved by the army
chief of staff or the minister of defense.

A few years later

the land in a closed area or parts of it were confiscated and
given to Jewish farmers and later declared open.

18

Even the High Court for Justice (Supreme Court) could not
challenge the authority of the military government. And when
such a challenge was presented and the Court ordered the
government to allow the villagers to return to their homes and
property, the military made sure there were no homes to which
the inhabitants could return.

17

It either dynamited the homes

See the remarks of Shimon Peres and Shmoel Segev concerning the
function and use of Article 125 in chapter 5.
18

See Lustick, 1980, pp. 178-179.
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in the villages, such as the case of Ghabsiya, or attacked and
destroyed the village through air strike as was the case of
Birem and then the village and the land surrounding it were
ordered closed areas.
2.

19

Regulations which were promulgated by the minister of defense
in 1949; the Emergency Regulations (security zones). These
regulations were renewed periodically by the Knesset until
December 1972 but no renewal requests have been submitted
since. The regulations empowered the minister of defense, with
the approval of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security
Committee, to designate certain areas along the borders as
"security zone". Exploiting his power the minister declared
almost half of Galilee, all of the Triangle, an area near the
Gaza Strip in the south, and another along the Jerusalem Jaffa
railway as security zones. 20 All of these areas cover large
tracts owned by the Arabs.
Once an area was declared closed the defense minister was
empowered to order, if he saw fit, any permanent resident of
such an area to leave the security zone within fourteen days
of the order. Large areas of land were confiscated by this
method. Some of the expropriated lands were later sold to the
Jewish National Fund (JNF) (also known as Ha-Keren Ha-Kayemet

19

For a detailed account of the legal battles between the villagers
of Ghabsiya and the military government, see Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp.
89-90.

° Kovetz Ha-Takanot (Official Gazett), 18, June 8, 1949, p. 230;
215, November, 2, 1955, p. 144.
2
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Le-Yisrael), in accordance with an agreement made earlier with
the government's legal advisor in a meeting near the end of
1948. 21
3.

The

Emergency

Regulations

for

the

Expropriation

of

Uncultivated Lands (also known as the Cultivation of Waste
Land Ordinance), is another law which enabled the government
to confiscate Arab land.

Passed in October 1948, 22 the law

empowers the minister of agriculture to take possession of
uncultivated land or of any lands in cases where the minister
"is not satisfied that the owner of the land has began or is
about to begin or will continue to cultivate the land."
(Article 4) This law was used extensively in conjunction with
Article 125 of the Emergency Regulations.
4.

The Emergency Land Requisition Law, passed in 1949, gave the
government the right to expropriate land whenever a "competent
authority" (appointed by the government) determines that the
land "is required for the defense of the state, the security
of the people, to safeguard essential provisions or services,
or to absorb immigrants or settle retired soldiers or men
disabled while on active service". 23

21

Joseph Weitz, Diaries and Letters to the Children, Tel-Aviv, 1965,
3, pp. 373-4. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p. 91.
22

Laws of the State of Israel, 2 (1948/1949), p. 72.

23

Ibid., 4, p. 3.
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5.

In

1953 the Land Acquisition

(Validation of Acts

and

Compensation) Law was passed. The law empowered the finance
minister to make a list of lands that had been confiscated, in
whatever manner, from the establishment of the state on May
14, 1948, to April 1, 1952. If the minister certified that
these lands were "used or assigned for purposes of essential
development, settlement or security" and were "still required
for any of these purposes," then,

as a result of this

certification, these lands would automatically become the
property of the Development Authority. 24
The purpose of this law, according to the finance minister
who proposed the bill was "to legalize certain actions taken
during the war and after it ... when the government began to
take over absentee property ... " 2 5 That is to say, the aim of
the government in proposing this bill was to legitimize the
massive land transfer that had taken place from 1948 to 1952
and to preclude legal attempts by Arab residents to take
advantage of loopholes in the laws or the absence of due
process

in order to press their claims

in the courts.

According to Lust ick, 2 6 "Under the terms of this law fully
1,250,000 dunums were expropriated".

24

LSI 4, p. 43, Land Aquisition (Validation of
Compensation) Law, Section 2, article (a).

Acts

and

25

Knesset Debates, June 3, 1952, p. 2202. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p.

26

Lustick, 1980, p. 175.

96.
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6.

In 1958 yet another law dealing with land expropriation was
passed. This law, known as the Prescription Law, amended the
older Ottoman law so that occupiers of unregistered land were
required to demonstrate unchallenged possession, not for ten
years as had been the rule, but for fifteen to twenty-five
years. 2 7 Under the terms of this law Arabs were forced to
produce records from the British Mandate period.

According to

Oded, the government lawyers who drafted this law knew that
the British Mandatory authorities had undertaken
the systematic survey and settlement of title to land, aimed
inter alia at establishing the occupier's rights on more
exact and secure foundations; but in view of the need to
adjudicate first of all the area where Arab and Jewish claims
conflicted, the all Arab parts of Palestine were left till
last, and the process of settlement of title only began in
most of Arab Galilee after Israel's establishment. 28
In the context of its overall survey of land registration in
Israel, according to Oded, the government has made a point of
challenging every Arab claim to land ownership, no matter how
small the plot of land involved. As a result the government has
become a "major land holder in every village .... endowed with
thousands of separate plots, some of them tiny, with which it can
do very little. 1129 However, the aim of the government by such
action was

soon cleared by the

following bill which was

introduced to the Knesset but was not passed.

27

LSI, 12, p. 129, Law of Prescription.

2 8

Yitzhak Oded, "Land Losses Among Israel's Arab Villages," New
Outlook, 7, no. 7 (September 1964), p. 13.
2 9

Ibid. , p. 15.
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7.

The Land Concentration bill which was proposed to the Knesset
on November 7, 1960. Although the bill was rejected by the
Knesset

its mere proposal sheds

government's Arab land policies.

further

light on the

When proposing the bill the

minister of agriculture argued that:
The state, the development authority and Ha-Keren Ha-Keyemet
Le-Yisrael are the legal owners of hundreds of thousands of
dunums in Galilee, the Triangle, and Wadi Ara (all are Arab
areas, ed. note). There are more than 250,000 dunums divided
into small plots which are swallowed up among the plots owned
by the Arabs. In this form it is impossible to make use of
the land for settlement or development. We need government
intervention to concentrate this land and the proposed bill
would enable the state and the development authority to merge
the plots they own into larger areas which could then be
s<~ttled or developed or improved according to the needs of
the nation. 3 0
In order to accomplish this concentration, the bill proposed
empowering the minister of agriculture to declare a given area 'a
land concentration area' and the authority to exchange plots or
pay compensation depending on the availability of state land as
is decided by the minister.
It is clear from the foregoing that under the guise of an elaborate
legal code the Israeli government has utilized every means to gain
control of Arab lands. The ease with which the government got the
Knesset to pass the laws and regulations needed for this purpose has
more to do with the Israeli political system than with fairness and any
apparent consensus.

30

31

The fact that the laws which deal with land enable

Knesset Debates, November 7, 1960, p. 132. Cited in Jiryis, 1976,

p. 100.
3 1

According to the Israeli political system for any party or
coalition of parties to be able to form a government it is essential to
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the government to gain control of privately owned Arab land under every
possible circumstance shows that this policy was systematic, consistent
and with clear goals and objectives.
Land Losses and Arab Labor
Since the data with respect to the extent of land losses by Arabs to
the

Israeli

authorities

and

hence

to

Jewish

individuals

and

institutions, are scarce, it is very difficult to provide exact figures.
However, a few examples can illustrate the pattern.

According to the

table below (Table 4.1) over 68 percent of the total land privately
owned by Arabs was expropriated. Tb.at is to say only one third of the
land owned by Arabs before 1948 remained under their control.

have control in Knesset (the legislature). The fact that the Knesset
members do not represent a specific constituency and are members of
specific parties, makes voting follow party line more often than not.
Such a system guarantees the support of the parliament for any laws
and/or policies the government wishes to introduce and pursue.
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Table 4.1
Expropriation of Arab Land Since 1948 (Selected Villages)
(Dunums)

Name of Village

Area Possessed
in 1947

Area Possessed after
Expropriation

Total Area #
Expropriated

Aksal @
Abu Snan @
Ara-Arara *
Arrabe *
Baka el-Ghrbiyeh *
Beisan-Ein al Assad @
Beit Jann *
Buqaia'h@
Deir-el-Assad, Binah
and Nahaf *
Deir Hana *
Jaljuliah *
Jatt *
Kf ar Bara *
Kfar Kara' @
Kfar Kassem *
Maghar @
Maker @
Mi' lya @
Majd el-Krum *
Qalansawe *
Sakhnin *
Taibeh *
Tamra (Acre) @
Tira *
Um el-Fahm *
Yirka *

13,666
12,871
26,000
95,000
22,000
25,594
26,000
10,276

4,396
5,434
7,000
11, 350
7,000
10,204
13,000
3,500

9,270
7,437
19,000
83,650
15,000
15,390
13,000
6,776

16,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
4,000
14,543
12,000
45,590
8,661
19,136
20,000
18,850
55,000
45,000
30,549
40,000
125,000
55,000

7,000
9,500
0,800
9,000
2,000
2,618
9,000
12,227
3,884
2,997
7,000
6,780
30,000
13,000
14,489
8,000
25,000
18,000

9,000
6,500
13,200
3,000
2,000
11, 925
3,000
33,363
4,777
16,139
13,000
12,070
25,000
32,000
16,060
32,000
100,000
37,000

Total:

793,012

246,679

546,333

Source: * Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, 1980, p. 179. @ Sabri
Jiryis, The Arabs in~ei-:- 1976, (Table ~pp. 292-95 (data presented
by Jiryis do not include expropriations after 1963).
# Numbers are calculated on the basis of the information in the first
two columns.
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In addition to material loss to the Arabs, confiscation of land has
had other consequences on the Arab population living in Israel, the most
important of which has been the transformation of the Arab labor force
from self-employed farmers to unskilled hired labor.

As can be seen

from the three tables below (Tables 4.2,4.3,4.4) most of the Arab labor
force

(57%)

in 1931, was

employed in agriculture.

This proportion

declined to 38 percent in 1963 and to about 20 percent in 1972. By 1981
the percentage of the Arab

labor force employed in agriculture had

declined to mere 11.5 percent. This decline corresponds to an increase
in the category of unskilled labor.
figures we find that over a
employed in construction.

quart~r

Furthermore, if we examine the 1972
of the Arab labor force (26.4%) are

Combining this category with the category of

miners and craftsmen (for comparative purposes), we find that while in
1963 39.3 percent of the Arab labor force was employed in this category,
by 1972 this proportion increased to 42.8 percent.

This represents an

increase of 3.5 percent or about 10 percent of the 1963 figure.
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Table 4.2
Employed Arabs and Jews by Category of
Employment (Percntages) *
1931
Arabs

Economic Sector
Agriculture
Industry, crafts, construction
Transportation
Commerce
Liberal professions
Public service
Domestic service
Rent, others
Total

Jews

57.1
12.0
6.0
8.2
2.7
3.9
3.2
6.9

18.1
33.5
6.4
19.1

100.0

100.0

11. 6

2.2
3.5
5.6

Source: Y. Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Israel
Universities Press, 1966, p. 19. Cited in Zureik, The Palestinians ... ,
1979, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 123.
* Sample size is not provided in original.
Table 4.3
Employed Arabs and Jews by Category of
Occupation (Percentages)

Occupation
Professional, scientific, technical
Administrative, executive,
manegerial, clerical
Traders, agents, salesmen
Farmers, fishermen and related work
Workers in tarnsportation and
communication
Construction, quarrymen
miners, craftsmen, etc.
Service, sport and recreation
Total (percent)
Abs. (thds)

*

1963
Arabs
Jews

1972
Arabs
Jews

5.5

12.9

6.6

17.6

2.0
4.7
38.0

16.8
8.4
11. 8

3.9
8.2
19.9

19.0
8.4
6.9

4.3

5.5

6.6

39.3
6.2

32.1
12.5

26.4
18.4
10.0

5.0
6.7
24.0
12.4

100.0
66.2

100.0
747.0

100.0
94.6

*

100.0
902.5

The 1972 Israeli census separates construction workers, quarrymen and
miners, etc. Thus among the Arabs 26.4% are in construction and mining
(unskilled jobs), compared to 6.7% among Jews. (Zureik, p. 123)
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Table 4.4
Employed Arabs and Jews in Israel
By Occupation (Percentages)
1981
Jews
Occupation

Born in
Israel

Born in
Asia-Africa

Born in
Europe-Amerca

Arabs

Total

133.0
100.0

1,144.5
100.0

451.5
100.0

313.7
100.0

379.3
100.0

Scientific &
academic wrkers

2.8

8.8

9.5

2.7

13.0

Other Prof. ,
technical &
related workers

9.4

15.5

19.5

9.0

16.1

Administrators
& managers

1.2

4.0

4.1

2.5

5.2

Clerical & rel.
workers

5.5

20.4

24.1

15.8

19.8

Sales workers

7.0

7.7

6.2

8.5

8.8

Service workers

10.7

11. 2

8.0

19.0

8.6

Agricultural
workers

11.2

4.9

6.2

5.4

2.9

Skilled workers
in industry,
building, trans
& other skiled
workers

38.2

24.4

20.7

31.9

22.8

Other workers
in indust, buil
& trans. &
unskilled wks.

13.7

3.2

1.8

5.3

2.9

Total (thds)
Percentage

Source: Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Jerusalem, No. 33, 1982, pp.
333-349.
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One cannot conclude on the basis of

these data alone that such a

shift in the occupational undertakings of the Arabs was a
land loss.

function of

After all, many contemporary urban societies were still at a

rural stage

forty or fifty

years ago and such

a shift was

not only

natural but was considered desirable and economically rational.
case of the Israeli Arabs,

however,

In the

the relatively high rate of such

transformation coupled with the rate and extent of land losses to the
Israeli authorities make the argument concerning a possible link between
land losses and occupational transformation tenable.
Over a period of less than 20 years (from 1963 to 1981), 32 the Arab
labor force employed in agriculture declined from 38.0 percent to 11.5
percent.

In comparison with the figures from 1931 -i.e. over a fifty

years period- the figure in 1981 constitutes only 14 percent of the 57.0
percent in 1931, a decline of 86 percent.

The same pattern of decline holds even if we limit the analysis of
data

to

the

period

which

covers

the

years

since

Israel

came

into

existence in 1948. Despite the initial loss of property by thousands of
Arabs during the 1948-49 period,

as a

Law,

labor

50

percent

of

agriculture in 1950.
employed

in

the

Arab

result of the Absentee Property
force

was

still

employed

in

Thus, 80 percent of the Arab labor force which was

agriculture

in

1950

was

eventually

diverted

sectors, mainly as unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

to

other

A survey of the

construction industry in 1975 in Haifa showed that only 36.5 percent of

32

The 1963 is taken as base because it is the year when restrictions
on the movement of Arabs were relaxed considerably. This gave Arab labor
the opportunity to seek employment as hired labor.
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those

who

worked

in

construction

were

Jews,

working

primarily

in

supervisory positions, while 42.9 percent were Israeli Arabs, and 20.5
percent were Arabs from the West Bank.

33

While this decline in the proportion of the Arab labor force employed
in agriculture is very significant, one can further argue that the rate
of decline would have been even greater had it not been for some Jewish
land

'owners'

who were either leasing the land to Arabs or employing

Arabs on farms

as hired labor, a practice which was denounced by many

Jewish officials as well as some journalists 34 (see below pp. 108-111).

This suggests that while the relationsr·ip between the rate of decline
in the Arab labor force employed in agriculture and the rate of land
expropriation may not be highly correlated it is, nevertheless,
that

a

certain

relationship

does

appear

to

exist

between

clear

the

two

variables.

The fact that access of dispossessed Palestinians to labor

sites

controlled

was

through

travel

restrictions

by

the

military

government (see chapter 5), from 1948 to 1966 (the years during which

33

Y. Waschitz,
1975' p. 46

'Commuters and Enterpreneurs', New Outlook, vol.

18,

34

Habib Kanan was among the first journalists to call attention to
such practices by the Jewish settlers. Writing in Haaretz on December 7,
1964, Kanan complained that
When a Jewish farmer hands over the work on his land to Arab
peasants, he is supporting one of the important claims of Israel's
enemies, namely, that the Jews in Israel do not have deep roots in
the land they claim as their father land. They have the support of
facts when they point to the Jews as city dwellers whose only
interest is the exploitation of Arab labor. Nor would it be
difficult to describe the Jews as a negative element turning back
the social clock several decades to the time when the landowning
effendis (landlords, ed.
note) lived in the cities while the
peasants did the farming on their land.
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most land confiscation occured), makes it almost impossible to evaluate
the extent to which land confiscation resulted in Arab labor for hire
because under these circumstances unemployed Arab labor seeking work was
invisible.

Furthermore,
institutions

the

(JNF,

continued

restriction by

the

so-called

Jewish Agency, Histadrut etc.)

national

against hiring Arab

labor, coupled with the lack of data on Arabs who were willing and able
to work, further distorts the real impact land confiscation has had on
the transformation of Arab labor.

Whether this lack of reliable data on

the number of Arabs who became hired labor as a result of dispossession
was

part

of

publicity

an

attempt

inside

as

by

well

the
as

Israeli

outside

authorities
the

country,

to prevent
remains

to

bad
be

determined.

Since it has been established that confiscation of Arab land resulted
in the generation of Arab labor for
question

then becomes:

Jewish markets?

to what

hire in the Jewish markets,

extent was

Arab

labor

needed by the

Stated differently, to what extent did the need of the

labor market for unskilled labor influence confiscation policies?
were

the

the

beneficiaries

and

who

were

the

losers,

among

the

Who

Jewish

population, as a result of this policy?

The

importance

of

these

questions

stems

from

the

fact

that

by

establishing a connection between government policies and meeting the
labor needs one can demonstrate government responsiveness to the needs
of

employers, . i.e.,

owners

of

the

means

of

production.

Hence,

the
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relations between the

government,

employers and labor will be better

understood.

A satisfactory answer to these questions, however, would entail the
availability of: a) detailed data on the supply of Jewish labor and the
demand of the labor market at specific historical periods; b) detailed
data on the extent and period of expropriation and the amount of labor
generated as a result of each expropriatory act.

Unfortunately, these

data are not available. But even if these data were available, one would
still

have

to

consider

a

third

factor

before

reaching

any definite

conclusions, namely the proportion of Arabs who were channeled to the
labor

market.

As

will

be

pointed out

in

chapter

5,

throughout

the

1950's until the mid 1960's the flow of Arab labor to employment sites
was controlled by the military government.

Nevertheless, on the basis of existing data one can safely say that
expropriation of Arab land resulted in no
Jewish population.
generation
workers,

of

a

Al though,

large

loss to any segment of the

theoretically

army of

reserve

one

labor

could
must

argue

have

that

hurt

the

Jewish

in reality that did not happen. While this army of Arab labor

was ready and willing to work, its movement was restricted and therefore
its

potential

curtailed.

Thus,

as

a

possible

in reality

competitor

the Arab

in

the

labor force

labor

market

lacked the

was

minimal

'offensive weapon' necessary to present any threat to Jewish workers,
namely, free movement to and from employment sites, and free negotiation
for

work

conditions

and

salaries.

One

has

to

remember

that

most

expropriation of Arab land occured during the years 1948 and 1966 which
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correspond to the period during which the Arabs were under the control
of the military government.

The fact that Arab labor did not materialize as a threat to Jewish
labor does not mean that other segments of the Jewish population did not
benefit from

the availability of

Jewish population was

concerned,

'cheap'
this

labor.

was

Thus,

not

a

as

far

as the

zero-sum game.

The

continuously expanding Israeli economy and its need for labor found in
the Arabs an easy reservoir from which to fill its needs cheaply.

The

efficient mechanism of control over the flow of such labor and the fact
that Arabs were not members of the Histadrut (labor union) whereas most
Jews were, (which meant Arabs, almost by definition, were the last to be
hired and the first to be fired), undermined the Arab labor bargaining
position

for

higher

salaries

and

better

work

conditions

which

contributed in turn to an ideal situation for both the Israeli economy
as a whole and the individual employer, without any real cost to Jewish
labor.

That is to say, all three factors combined -- the generation of Arab
labor through confiscation of land, the regulation of the flow of Arab
labor through the restriction on their freedom of movement, and the lack
of

union-protection

to

the

Arab

worker

forced

Arab

labor

into

accepting a position inferior to Jewish workers in terms of work status
and

pay.

On

the

other

hand,

union-protected

Jewish

labor

was

not

threatened by the availability of Arab labor because the flow of the
latter

to

'threatening'

employment
potential

sites
was

was

limited.

restricted
Thus,

the

and

therefore

its

development .of what
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could be envisioned as a class conflict between Jewish labor and Jewish
capital over the status of cheap Arab labor was avoided.
That

these

policies

were

calculated,

systematic

and

with

clear

objectives can further be supported by the following episode. Toward the
end of 1961 the authorites announced the confiscation of 5, 100 dunums
from the Arab villages of Deir el-Assad, Bi'nah, and Nahaf, in Western
Galilee.

In the early years of Israeli statehood, these villages lost

3,500 dunums of cultivated land.

This time the regime, as part of its

continuing efforts to "Judaize the Galilee," decided that more village
lands were needed
Carmiel.

The

in order to build a new Jewish development town,

lands e.'Cpropriated included quarries

and orchards

from

which the bulk of the villages' workers made their living. Although the
inhabitants suggested that other of their lands in the area be used for
the construction of the new town so that they would not be forced to
travel to Jewish cities for employment, their requests were refused.
Rather, the government indicated that the

industries to be built in

Carmiel would create jobs for those Arabs left unemployed as a result of
the expropriation.
The villagers'

35

complaints were brought before the Knesset Finance

Committee by two Knesset members: Moshe Sneh (member of the Communist
party) and Yusef Khamis (an Arab Knesset member of Mapam party). In its
draft report the minority on the committee stated that "the Committee is
not convinced that there is no alternative to the expropriation of the
agricultural

35

land

belonging

to

the

three

villages.

Lustick, 1980, p. 177; Jiryis, 1976, pp. 109-111.

There

is

no
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justification for this land seizure, not only because the government has
no means of compensating the owners with comparable land (there is no
land of this quality in the area), but because there is no need for the
land for the establishment of the town, since the planning authority has
no intention of constructing any buildings on the site. 1136
After

the

establishment

of

Carmiel,

residence or investment in the town.
work on

construction sites

37

for new

Arabs

were

denied

either

On the other hand, Arab labor, to
housing and

road pavement,

was

welcomed.
I

have

noted elsewhere the

military governor's

concern with the

'overflow' of Arab labor to Jewish colonies and the extra restrictive
orders issued by the governor to

limit such an overflow.

While the

Carmiel episode is not unique, 38 it nevertheless illustrates a pattern
which was used over and over again, a pattern in which everybody gained
except the Arabs. The Arabs were forced out of their lands and out of
their occupations as independent farmers,

to become landless laborers

for hire without the advantage of fair competition in the open labor
market.

36

Knesset Dates, October 31, 1962, p. 24. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, pp.

109-10.
3 7

The minister of housing is quoted as saying, in response to an
Arab applicant to live in Carmeil, that "Carmeil was not built in order
to solve the problems of the people in the surrounding area. 11 Knesset
Debates, Dec. 2, 1964, p. 485. In Jiryis, p. 110. For the objection to
an Arab contractor to invest in industries in Carmeil in which both
Arabs and Jews will be employed, see Maarive, Jan 30, 1972.
38

Jewish Upper Nazareth by the old city of Arab Nazareth and Ma'alot
by the Arab village of Tarshiha in the north provide other examples.
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Even the

Islamic waqf

(an

Islamic

endowment)

was

confiscated as

absentee property and put under the control of the Custodian despite the
fact that God can hardly be considered an absentee (especially in the
holy

land),

endowed-

and

did

not

the

Moslem

disappear.

community
This

-for whose

action

by

the

sake

the waqf was

Israeli

government

enraged the Arabs and was the basis of a poem by Rashid Hussain, an Arab
poet, in which he declares, sarcastically:
God has become a refugee sir!
Expropriate then, even the rugs of our mosques.
The significance of the property of the Islamic waqf lies in its size.
It is estimated that one eighth (1/8) of Palestinian wealth belonged to
the waqf.

In terms of fertile

land it was estimated to be somewhere

between 750,000 and 1.1 million dunun,s, half of it inside Israel.

39

This

was in addition to many businesses and shops which had they been left to
the

Islamic

community to

manage

would have

provided

employment

and

income for thousands of needy Arabs. Such a possibility, however, would
have meant the forestallment of the Israeli policies (or part of them)
toward the Arabs.

Thus, the fact that the Israeli government chose to

take the extra step and expropriate this property, despite the outrage
of

the

Arabs

and

certain segments

of

the

Jewish population, 4 0

and

despite reservations expressed by the Supreme Court as to the legality
of the government's action, 41 provides further evidence that the Israeli

39

Yaacov Shimshoni,
Palestine Arabs, Tel-Aviv,
1947, p.
90.
(Hebrew), and Atallah Mansour (an Arab journalist), in Haaretz, Dec. 13,
1965.
40

See Habib Kanan, Haaretz, April 21, 1951.

41

See Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p. 118.
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government

was

following

its

policy

with

consistency

and

clear

objectives.
Arab and Jewish Opposition to Land Expropriation
Although most segments of the Jewish population benefited from the
government's policy of confiscation, this policy was not always welcomed
by all these segments.

Both Arabs and Jews, for different reasons,

fought against the expropriation of Arab lands. As can be seen from the
following discussion, no clear pattern can be discerned from the Jewish
opposition to certain of these policies. Even members of the ruling
party (Mapai), and members of the Herut party, which is known for its
extreme views against the Arabs, objected at one point or another to
certain of these policies.
Opposition to government's policies concerning the expropriation of
Arab lands was apparent from the early stages and was expressed
Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population.

by both

The first signs of

opposition to the government's handling of Arab property were manifested
against the proposed Absentee Property Law in 1950. While the law
closely resembled the emergency regulations which had dealt with
absentee property since December 1948, the proposal of the law to the
Knesset offered an opportunity for Knesset members and others to voice
their opposition. During the Knesset debates over the provisions of the
law several Knesset members, Arabs as well as Jews, spoke against the
law. Most opposition was raised against provisions which dealt with the
Arab citizens of the state.
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There was a general feeling among those opposing the law that
depriving the Arabs of their property: a) would poison relations between
the Arabs and Jews of the country; b) would hamper any future prospects
of integrating Arabs into the life of the state; and c) could undermine
security.

Some Knesset members expressed the belief that the law was

not free from racial discrimination. The following quote from the daily
Haaretz 42 summarizes the arguments. Haaretz called for the return of
property or payment of just compensation to Arab residents.
We have nothing to be proud of in rejection of Dr. Sneh's and Mr.
Elyashar's amendment .... We are not at war with the Arabs who are
established citizens of the state ..... A law which automatically
makes them absentee is insufferable. . . . . This is a matter of
conscience and political understanding.
The newspaper warned that

there would be little possibility of

integrating Arab farmers into the state "if Israel condemns them to a
life of perpetual poverty."
David Elston, a columnist for the Jerusalem Post, also expressed his
opposition to the law. Writing in Haaretz on July 8, 1951, Elston
described the

law as

"perhaps the most serious

embitterment among all Arabs."

factor creating

He pointed out that in Galilee twenty

villages had been deprived of their property by Jewish collectives,
which "arrogated to themselves, through long-term leases granted by the
Minister of Agriculture, lands of Arabs who were free from any guilt or
wrong doing."

42

Haaretz, March 20, 1950, and July 2, 1951. Cited in Peretz, 1958,

p. 172.
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The excessive powers and freedom the law accorded the Custodian of
absentee property were particularly singled out for criticism by other
members of the Knesset. Ben-Ami of the Sephardim party (a party which
later disappeared), argued that the law's definition of absentee harmed
the whole community. The two sections most objected to by Ben-Ami were
the section which classified as an absentee any individual who had moved
from one section of the country to another, and the section which gave
the Custodian the full power to determine who was and who was not an
absentee. Eliahu Elyashar, another Sephardim member, believed that the
law violated the rights of non-absenr.ees, both Jews and Arabs, because
it was "arbitrary" and "un-Jewish".
The powers of the Custodian were also criticizP.d on different
grounds.

Members of Herut and the General Zionist parties, for example,

saw party favoritism in the appointment of the Custodian by the Mapai
Minister of Finance. The concentration of a quarter of Israel's wealth
and most of its lands in the hands of the Custodian and his authority to
reallocate such wealth without any parliamentary control was feared for
furtherance of party influence.
Many amendments

to the different provisions of the

law were

introduced by different Knesset members, all of which were defeated by
the Mapai-Religious Bloc Government coalition. The amendment by Moshe
Sneh (of the Mapam Party and later of the Communist Party), and Eliahu
Elyashar (of the Sephardim Party), to protect the Arabs legally residing
in the state, was defeated by the smallest margin of 8 votes (26 against
and 18 for the proposed amendment). It received a cross-section of party
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support. Members of the General Zionist, United Religious, Mapai, Arab
members from Nazareth associated with Mapai and the Communist party
voted for it. Two-thirds of the members present abstained. 43
Absentee property handling was also criticized by the Hebrew author
and columnist Moshe Smilanski who was known for his prestate activities
in behalf of the Zionist Organization. Writing in the independent
newspaper Haaretz, he said " The authorities had taken too long to
remember their obligations to protect occupied property ...... Sometime we
will have to account for its theft and despoliation not only to our
conscience but also to the law".

"Where", he asked, "were the

authorities wh1-m the theft began?" 44
Moshe Keren, then Arab-Affairs editor for Haaretz, also criticized
the land acquisition of the late 1940's and early 1950's and called them
"wholesale robbery in legal guise". In 1955, Keren wrote "Hundreds of
thousands of dunums were taken away from the Arab minority.... The
future student of history will never cease to be astonished at how it
happened ... " 4 5

43

See discussion on the amendments and vote in Peretz, 1956, pp.
168-70.
44

Haaretz, July 26, 1949. Cited in Peretz, P. 154.

45

Moshe Keren, "Have We an Arab Policy?"

Haaretz, January 1, 1955.
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The Leasing of Land to Arabs
As a result of economic expansion beginning in the late 1950's and
early 1960's many employment opportunities in industrial and other works
were opened up

(see Chapter 5).

Jews who had been working in

agriculture began seizing upon these opportunities, leasing their lands
to Arabs, and moving to a different line of work.

As noted earlier,

however, the practice of leasing lands to Arabs or hiring Arabs to work
on the land was strongly denounced and steps to eradicate the practice
were undertaken by the government. These practices by Jewish individuals
and collectives were referred to as "irregularities".
In 1966 Haaretz published an article in October entitled "Ishmael's
National Fund" (a pun on the Hebrew name of the JNF), in which the
author quoted the director general of the JNF as

labeling the

"irregularities" in the use of public land a "national sin". The author
went on to say, "If Arab labor is not completely eradicated then the
development plan for the Northern region will prove to be an empty
dream". In the article the author quotes the deputy director of the
Israel Land Administration to the effect that "only a clearly formulated
law will solve the problem. 1146 In a second article on the same day
Haaretz reports that in many cases individual Arabs have been sublet, or
have been hired to work, the very same lands which were expropriated
from them.

46

"Ishmael's National Fund," Haaretz, October 14, 1966.
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Two weeks later the Agricultural Settlement Law (Restriction on use
of Agricultural Land and Water) was introduced in the Knesset and was
passed on August 1, 1967. According to the Law those who break it, i.
e., continue to lease lands to Arabs and/or employ Arabs on their farms,
would be deprived of their rights to use the land. 47
Commenting on the law, Uri Avenery, an independent opposition member
of the Knesset said:
There are two conflicting trends to this law; it is a Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde law. To all appearances what we have is a law with an
extremely positive social aim; the landlords, who, through various
kinds of favoritism, have succeeded in obtaining from the Israel
Land Authority state land on cheap and easy terms, are to be
compelled to return that land to the Israel Land Authority if they
transfer their right to cultivate it to others ....
What they really aim at are the Jewish ~ffendis (emphasis in
original), and the Arab cultivators. What is meant is the land that
was confiscated from the Arabs and handed over through favoritism to
Jews who then leased it back to the Arabs who have thus become its
cultivators. 48
Ten years later the practice was still going on, and along with it
the anger of the Israeli officials and the search by those officials for
ways

to

'eradicate'

the practice.

According to Chomsky, 4 9

"Ten

settlements were recently fined 700, 000 Israeli pounds" because they
were leasing land to Arabs, and the Minister of Agriculture warned that
'anyone caught leasing land to Arabs will be punished'. The Minister,
according to Chomsky, gave an estimate of 10,000 dunums that have been

47

Laws of the State of Israel, 21, (1966/67), p.105.

48

Cited in Zureik, 1979, p. 117.

49

N. Chomsky, 'The Interim Agreement', pp. 24-5. Cited in. Amal
Samed, Palestinian Women: Entering the Proletariat', Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. VI, no 1, 1976, pp. 159-68.
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leased to Arabs and commented that it is 'a very serious phenomenon
which must be fought in every way possible'.

In addition to the

minister's warning, the Director of the Galilee region of the Jewish
Agency also announced 'that his office has sent a circular to all
(Jewish) settlements in which they are warned that leasing of national
lands for cultivation by Arab lessees or rental of orchards for fruit
picking and marketing by Arabs is in violation of law, regulations of
the settlement authorities, and the settlement movement'.
Two questions which must be asked are: why do the government and
other 'national institutions'

interfere with the practice of Jewish

individuals and settlements who control the land?; wh:r are Arabs who are
'full-time' citizens of the state not allowed to lease or rent land in
the open market, from Jewish individuals and collectivities?
Clearly,

this

consequences:

practice by

the authorities

has

two

definite

a) it prevents the Arabs from developing into independent

workers making more of them available to Jewish employers; and, b) the
policy had the effect of sharpening the Arab-Jewish division separating
the insiders (Jews) from the outsiders (Arabs).

This emphasis on the

Arab-Jewish division is further supported through the use of concepts
such as 'nation', 'national lands' and the 'division of labor' between
the Israeli government and the national institutions.

The concept

"nation" does not mean people who live in Israel, which includes Arabs
and Jews.

Rather it means the Jewish people including those Jews who

reside anywhere in the world as well as those who live in Israel.
Consequently, "national land" is the land which belongs to the. Jewish
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nation 50 which, properly speaking, includes only that land registered as
owned by the JNF, the most prominent of the national institutions with
regard to the land question.

However, the JNF controls, either directly

or indirectly, over 92 percent of Israeli land area. 51
The recognition of the value of control over the land since the early
days of Zionism is not untypical of colonial settlers elsewhere.

Hence

endowing the land to the Jewish rather than to the Israeli people and
giving control over its management to non-Israeli organization (JFN) is
designed to guarantee a continued control over the land without which no
colonial settler project can ever hope to succeed.
Since the JNF had been the major land purchasing Zionist Organization
during the pre-statehood era,

it is necessary to investigate its

purchasing activities, its regulations of both Jewish and Arab labor,
and the necessity for its

continued existence as an independent

institution even after the Jewish state was established.
The JNF and its Land-Purchase Activities
On the eve of the 1948 war and the establishment of the state of
Israel the total Jewish land holdings did not exceed 7 percent.

52

Most

larids were purchased from Arab landlords, some of whom did not even

° For more elaboration on these definitions, see Uri Davis, 'Land
Ownership, Citizenship and Racial Policy in Israel'. In: Sociology of
Developing Societies-The Middle East, Talal Asad and Roger Owen (eds.),
pp. 145-58; Lustick, 1980, pp. 106-7.
5

51

Lustick, 1980, p. 107.

52

A. Grannot, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London: Eyre

& Spottiswood, 1956, p. 28.
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reside in Palestine. 53 The Jewish National Fund (JNF) was one of two
Jewish organizations most active in land purchase in Palestine, besides
individuals, the other was the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association
(PICA).

Founded with the financial

support of Baron Edmond de

Rothschild, PICA allotted its lands to tenants who were primarily
private farmers obliged to defray their capital debt overtime. 54 Most of
these lands were eventually sold to Jewish farmers and registered as
their private property. 5 5 The JNF, by contrast, was founded by the
Zionist Organization in 1901 and therefore was buying land on behalf of
the

'Jewish people'

as their

'inalienable property'.

Thus,

its

allocation method differed from that of PICA. Here the allocation was on
the basis of leaseholds to individual Jewish farmers, to companies, or
to collective settlements.

The agreements of such leases were usually

drawn for 49 years. 56 During the 1930's and 1940's the JNF intensified
its land purchase activity and in 1947 it became the largest Jewish
landowner, owning more than a half of the Jewish-owned land in Palestine
(see Table below).

53

According to the Statistical Department of the Jewish Agency, as
of March 1936, 52. 6~~ of Jewish owned land was purchased from "large
absentee landowners", 24.6% from "large resident landowners", 13.4% from
"various sources" such as the government, churches and foreign
companies, and only 9.4% from small Palestinian farmers. Cited in Lehn,
"The Jewish National Fund". Journal of Palestine Studies, 3 (Summer),
19 74, pp . 74- 91.
54

Lucas, 1974, p. 112.

55

Granott, 1956, p. 28.

56

Ibid., p. 143.
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Table 4.5
Jewish Landownership (in Dunums)
By Year and Purchaser (1882-1947)

Year

P.I.C.A.

J.N.F.

1882

Private
Purchaser

Total

22,500

22,500

73,000

218,000

1900

145,000

1914

235,000

16,000

167,000

418,000

1927

323,000

197,000

345,000

865,000

1936

435,000

379,000

426,000

1,231,000

1947

435,000

933,000

366,000

1,734,000

Source: A.

Granott, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London:

Eyre and Spottiswood, 1965, p. 28.

Following the establishment of the state the JNF continued to operate
its own fund raising apparatus under the direction of the World Zionist
Organization.

In 1950 the Knesset passed the Development Authority Law

which according to Granott, the chairman of the board of directors of
the JNF from 1945 to 1960:
expressly states
alienate land ...
the State of
institutions for

that the Authority shall not be able to sell or
in any manner except to the following four bodies:
Israel;
the JNF;
Local Authorities; and the
settling landless Arabs.
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In Practice only two of these bodies are of concern - the state
and the JNF, since the body for settling landless Arabs has never
been established. Thus a great rule was laid down, which has a
decisive and basic significance - that the property of absentees
cannot be transfered to ownership to anyone but (the ) national
public institutions above, either the state itself, or the original
Land Institution of the Zionist Movement. 57
The law gave priority to the requirements of the JNF.

In Granott' s

words: "Every area must first be offered to the JNF and only if it gives
notice in writing that it is not interested, may it be transfered to
others, whether by sale or lease." 58
The JNF shares responsibility for another body, the Israel Land
Admnistration, with the Ministry of Agriculture.

In this context it

exercises administrative control over all state lands, which
with JNF holdings equal 92 percent of Israel's land area.

combin~d

59

According to Lustick there are two reasons why the official status of

JNF

the

is

kept

'philanthropic'
American

nongovernmental:

first,

as

nongovernmental

agency the JNF enjoys a tax-exempt status from the

Internal Revenue

Service

which

allows

it

to

collect

contributions in the United States and other countries. The second
reason, which has a greater significance to this analysis, is the fact
that by not being formally part of the Israeli government, the JNF does
not have to serve a constituency of Israeli citizens. In Lustick' s
words: "although the government of Israel is bound according to its own

57

Granott, 1956, pp. 103-4.

5 8

Ibid, p. 106

59

Joseph Weitz (former Director of the Development Authority of the
JNF), "Land Ownership", Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 99.
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democratic norms to address itself, in the laws it promulgates, in the
programs it sponsors, and in the services it provides, to Jewish and
Arab citizens alike, the Jewish Agency (another of the so called
national institutions), and the JNF are mandated to operate only in
regard to Israel's Jewish population." 60
As indicated earlier, this is not to say that the government and the
JNF act in total independence from each other. Nor does it mean that the

government does not subscribe to the JNF principles. It only means that
the JNF can apply those principles with greater freedom and under less
pressure from inside as well as outside the country. Few laws were
passed by the Knesset which are completely in accord with the )rinciples
of the JNF. The Agricultural Settlement law refered to earlier is only
one example.

In 1960 the Knesset enacted Basic Law:

Israel Lands

according to which state land was defined as the 'inalienable' right of
the Jewish people, a definition which conforms to the principles held by
the JNF.

The two most important principles of the original constitution

of the JNF, which were resented by the Arabs are: 61
(i) the principle that Jewish property is inalienable; no Zionist
settler may dispose of his lease to anyone but a Jew, (ii) the
principle carefully safeguarded by the powerful Jewish Federation of
Labor, that only Jewish labour may be employed in Zionist colonies.
The net result is that, when the Jewish National Fund makes a
purchase the Arabs lose not only the land itself but also any chance
of being employed on this land.

60

61

Lustick, 1980, p. 106.

Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1945, Information paper No. 20,
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, p. 36. Cited in
Zureik, 1979, pp. 118-19.
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True to these principals an official of the JNF declared in an interview
with Lustick in 1979 6 2 that "The economic impact of our land purchases
and our activities on Arabs is not considered .... The government would
have to look after all citizens if they owned the land; the JNF owns the
land, let's be frank, we can serve just the Jewish people."
It is very difficult in light of statements such as these to argue
that the JNF (the biggest land owner in Israel) and the Israeli
government, are not aware of the consequences of land policies on the
Arabs.

As early as 1930 the Hope-Simpson Inquiry of 1930, a British

committee set up to investigate the causes of the Jaffa riots of 1929,
addressed the threat posed by Jewish land acquisition to the indigenous
Arab population. The Committee stated that
The result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish
National Fund has been that land has been extraterritorialized. It
ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage now or
in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate
it, but by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish
National Fund he is deprived forever from employment on that land. 63
The fact that Zionist sources tend to underestimate the impact of
land purchase by Jews on the Arabs by presenting low figures of
previously cultivated areas and of displaced families provides further
evidence that the Zionist institution then as now, and with it the
Israeli government were aware of the real consequences of their actions
on the Arabs and were attempting to distort these facts systematically.

62
6 3

Lustick, 1980, p. 106.

J. Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation". In: I. Abu - Lughud. (ed. ) ,
The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1971, p. 130.
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Thus, Miller, 64 relying on Zionist sources, gives a breakdown of lands
sold to Jews in the plains of Isdraelon (Marj-Ibn-Amer) and Acre alone
by previously tenated area and number of tenants. From those two areas
alone Miller's figures show that 688 Arab tenants were affected by the
sale.
These figures, however, tell only part of the story.

While they may

account for tenants, they ignore completely the laborers who also worked
on, and lived off, the sold land.

In contrast to the 688 families which

were displaced from the two areas, according to Miller, a figure of
8,000 is quoted by Hirst 65 as the number of peasants, living in twentytwo villages, who were displaced as a result of the sale of the (MarjIbn-Amer) plain alone. Hirst emphasizes that "the fate of the 8,000
peasants was never determined".
The number of laborers who worked on the land becomes significant
when one considers the fact that most large tracts in Palestine which
were sold to Jews, were owned by landlords many of whom did not even
live in Palestine proper. The figures in Table 6 show the distribution
of land ownership according to a 1936 British Government investigation
of 322 villages. 66

64

Y. E. Miller, "Administrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The
Impact of British Norms on Arab Community Life 1920-1948. in J. S.
Migdal, (ed.), Palestinian Society and Structure, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980, p. 260.
65

Hirst, The Gun and Olive Branch, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, p.

29.
66

R. Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, London:
Zed Press, 1979, P. 31.
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Table 4.6
Land Ownership in Palestine in 1936

Owners as % of
the population

Size of holding
(in dunums)

Area owned as % of
total cultivated land

Above 5,000

0.01

19

1,000-5,000

0.20

8

100-1,000

8.00

36

91. 80

37

0-100

Source:

R.

Sayigh,

Palestinians:

From

Peasants

to

Revolutionaries,

London: Zed Press, 1979, p. 31.

According to the figures in the Table,

91.8 percent of the population

either did not own land at all or their land holding did not exceed 100
dunums. The total holdings of this category amounted to only 37 percent
while 19 percent of the total owned land were held by 0.01 percent of
the

population.

The

breakdown of the

last

picture

becomes

(0-100 dunums)

even

more

category.

clear

by

a

further

According to Sayigh 6 7

27.6 percent of the population owned plots of less than 40 dunums, while
21. 9 percent owned plots of less than 5 dunums.
than

40 dunums

subsistence.

67

68

were

far

smaller than

the

These plots of

minimum needed for

less

family

68

Ibid., p. 32.

The Hope-Simpson Report of 1930 defined the minimum amount of land
needed by a family of five to sustain itself without other sources of
income:
130 dunums of unirrigated land; 100 dunums of rich land with
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SUMMARY
In this chapter .I have attempted to untangle one of the most
complicated and least documented subjects which touches upon Arab-Jewish
relations in Israel.

I have shown that the multiplicity of laws,

regulations, and institutions which deal with the subject of land were
designed to dispossess the Arabs of their land in a systematic way.
Entrusting control over the land to a

Zionist, non-Israeli,

and

nongovernmental agency (the JNF), which subscribes to discriminatory
principles was done by the government (and the Knesset) for the purpose
of

avoiding

legal

and

political

(national

and

international)

ramifications.
Clearly, control over the land is of major importance to any colonial
settler society, and without it no settlement project can ever hope to
succeed. Israel, being no different, started the process of control over
the land through purchase,

before the turn of the century.

The

availability of cheap Arab labor seems to have been secondary during the
initial stages of statehood to the objective of controlling the land.
The loss of property by the Arabs, on the other hand, had two major
consequences: first, since Arabs could no longer continue working as
self-employed farmers they turned to hired work as the only means to
earn their livelihood; and second, the very absence of this major
economic resource to the disposal of Arabs forced them into accepting
menial jobs and lower wages than their Jewish counterparts.

livestock; 40 dunums of partially irrigated land with dairy farming; 15
dunums of tree plantation. Ibid., p. 32.
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However, as will be pointed out in the next two chapters, during the
initial stages the Jewish economic sector in general and Jewish
employers in particular were not allowed to make full use of this cheap
labor power.

Furthermore, through a combination of denying Arab labor

access to Jewish labor sites by the military government (Chapter 5) and
a denial of union membership to Arabs by the Jewish labor union (the
Histadrut, Chapter 6) the development of a competitive labor market was
prevented.

Hence, the initial conditions which set the stage for a

discrepancy in the price of labor were reproduced and no 'equalization
effect' on wages was allowed to take place.

CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT
Whereas limiting the availability of economic resources to Arabs set
the

initial conditions

Government"
instrumental

or
in

for

"Military

a

split

labor market the "Military

Administration"

reproducing

these

(Memshal

conditions.

It

Tzvai),

was

provided an

'identifying ideology' through the claim that its very existence was
necessitated by the security risk to the state posed by Arabs.

It

continuously curtailed the availability of political resources to the
Arabs.

It controlled the flow of Arab labor to Jewish employment sites

through restriction orders on the movement of Arabs which had the effect
of limiting the development of a competitive labor market.

And it

controlled a host of political, educational and even social activities,
which would have resulted in a more independent Arab labor force.
According to Lustick, the military government was the most important
instrument used by the Israeli government to control its Arab citizens.
The military government was also used for land confiscation.

1

While

it was not the sole mechanism through which confiscation of Arab lands
was, and continues to be, made possible (see Chapter 4)

the military

government's methods, the legal basis under which it operated, and the

1

See Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a
National Minority, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1980, pp. 123-25,
178
124
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system of justifications used,

made land confiscation a smoother

operation than it would have been otherwise.
In this chapter I describe the military government's methods of
operation, the legal basis upon which its activities were predicated,
and the spheres of Arab's daily lives over which the military government
had a jurisdiction.

I also examine the validity and function of the

national security argument which was used to justify the existence of
the military government, describe the struggle for its abolition, paying
a special attention to the role played by the different Jewish groups in
this

struggle and outline the respective benefits

(economic and

political) of those Jewish groups who supported as well as those who
opposed the continuation of the military government.
Chronology of Events
Military government over the Arab areas in Israel was formally
established on October 21,

1948. The measure, which was signed by

Brigadier General Elimelech Avner, gave official recognition to the de
facto role which the Jewish units had been playing in those areas since
their capture - that of an occupation army. According to the order, five
military governors were named in the predominantly Arab districts
conquered by Jewish forces

in the course of the fighting.

These

districts consisted of Nazareth, western Galilee, Ramle-Lod, Jaffa, and
the Negev - all of which fell in the area projected as the Arab state
according to the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine. The
treatment of the Arabs in those areas seems to have varied widely,
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according to the inclination of the local military governor. 2
Following the end of fighting, and the subsequent signing of ceasefire agreements between the Israeli government and the Arab governments
of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which determined the Armistic
lines, Israel retained large areas beyond those alloted to the Jewish
state by the Partition Plan of 1947. About 160,000 Arabs remained in
those areas and subsequently became citizens of the state of Israel (see
Chapter 2).
The military government over these areas was eventually reorganized
and reformed. In January 1950, the military government was formally and
legally established on the basis of the Defense (Emergency) regulations
of 1945, which gave the miltary governors the power to appoint military
commanders, while judicial powers were entrusted to military courts
appointed by the army chief of staff.

3

After formal adoption of the emergency regulations, the minister of
defense used the powers granted him to appoint military governors for
the

three

principal

regions

corresponding

to

the

geographical

concentration of Israel's Arab inhabitants - the Northern Command,
encompassing the Galilee and the Haifa area; the Central Command, with
responsibility for the

'Little' Triangle; and the Southern Command,

2

G. Shamir, "The Establishment of the 'Military Administration' over
the Arab Population in Israel during the War of Independence" (seminar
paper: Tel-Aviv University, 1973), pp. 12-13 (Hebrew).
3

For a detailed description of the composition and authority of
those courts, see Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs In Israel, Monthly Review
Press, New York, 1976, pp. 15-17
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responsible for the Bedouins of the Negev (see Chapter 2).

In 1949

these areas contained over 90 percent of Israel's Arab population, and
even in 1958 fully 85 percent of all Israeli Arabs still lived in areas
assigned to the Military Administration. 4
From the beginning, however, the military government, and the Defense
regulations in particular, came under attack from many different groups
for very different reasons.

Some of these attacks took the form of

demonstrations, articles in the newspapers, and even motions for the
complete abolition of the military government, which were introduced
occasionally in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament).

Under continuous

pressure and criticism from the left, represented by the Communist
Party, and from the right, represented by the Herut Party of Begin, the
military government was forced to make continuous changes and reform.
On November 8, 1966, Eshkol (the Prime Minister at the time), announced
in the Knesset that the government had decided "to consider the military
government apparatus abolished as of December first of this year, and to
transfer the responsibilities it has shouldered until now to civil
authorities." 5
With this announcement,

the struggle for the abolition of the

military government came to an end although many of its activities and
actions in the Arab sector have had a long lasting effect on the ArabJewish relations the consequencies of which are still felt until this
day.

4

Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 123.

5

In Jiryis, 1976, p. 63.
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Policies and

Practices

It is very difficult, based on an analysis of the various articles of
the Defense regulations, to comprehend the full scope of the military
government activities and their real consequences. These statutes,
consisting of 170 articles divided into fifteen sections, were inherited
from the British mandate.

The British had originally enacted these

regulations to deal with the Palestinian Arab revolt of 1936-39. The
regulations

which

gave

the

Mandate

government

the

legal

and

administrative freedom of action it might choose were to be invoked only
when a state of emergency had been declared. Thus, in a period of
relative calm the regulations were rarely activated. 6
Until 1945, however, the regulations were continuously being modified
and changed. Although originally promulgated to deal with the Arab
uprising, the regulations were soon to be used against the Jews of
Palestine, particularly against the Lehi organization (Lochamei Herut
Yisrael - Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, otherwise known as the
Stern Gang).

Consequently, Jewish opposition to the regulations was

voiced on many occasions and in different

forms.

The following

declaration by the Hebrew Lawyers' Union in 1946, is a typical one.

7

The powers given to the ruling authority in the emergency
regulations deny the inhabitants of Palestine their basic human
rights. These regulations undermine the foundation of law and
justice, they constitute a serious danger to individual freedom and
they constitute a regime of arbitrariness without any judicial

6

7

See Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 9-11.

See an excellent review of Jewish criticism of the regulations by
Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 11-13.
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supervision.•
Since the regulations, as they were originally promulgated by the
Mandate authorities,

could be

situation" had been declared,
'emergency

situation'

was

invoked

only after an "emergency

in Israel, according to Lustick, 9 "an

declared

immediately

following

the

establishment of the state and that declaration is still in force."
This declaration gave the rationale for invoking the regulations and
consequently setting security as the most frequently cited reason for
the maintenance of the military government.

Arabs have consistently

been portrayed as enemies of the state and therefore the military
government was needed to control and suppress any attempt by the Arabs
for sabotage before it takes place. In March of 1956, for example, a
report issued by a special committee, which was appointed by Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion to examine the military government and make
recommendations, stated that "the areas under military government and
the scope of the activities of the military commander should not be
abolished or reduced, because
these areas are one of supreme importance from the security point of
view, and need to be kept under control, since they might be made
use of by the enemy in an emergency. 10
As late as 1963, in a speech on February 20th during a Knesset debate on
the abolition of the military government, Ben-Gurion expressed his
determination to maintain the military government. The indispensibility

8

Cited in Emanuel Dror, 'The emergency regulations', in Arie Bober
(ed.), The Other Israel, New York, Doubleday, 1972, p. 134.
9
10

Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 124.
Quoted by Jiryis, 1976, p. 35.
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of the military government, in Ben-Gurion's views, stems from the fact
that
three regions, Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev, are hotbeds of
hate and conspiracy, and therefore always a potential danger. Acting
openly under cover of communism, there are elements in these areas
who could instigate disturbances among the Arabs themselves, or
between Arabs and Jews, in any moment of tension. 11
Since security-related reasons were always given as justification for
the activities of the military government, one would assume that
invoking any of the 170 articles of the regulations is somehow related
to security measures. Far from it.

Article 125, for example, was among

the most frequently invoked. This article "grants the military governor
the power to proclaim any area

o~

place a forbidden (closed) area ....

which no one can enter or leave without ... a written permit from the
military commander or his deputy ...... failing which he is considered to
have commited a crime. " 12 Thus the article empowered the military
commander to close areas which could include whole villages or districts
and prevent anyone from either entering or leaving. By doing so, the
military commander was able to control the flow of people on a daily
basis to and from any area in the country.

On the surface such actions

could be explained on security grounds claiming that the security of the
people entering or leaving such areas was at stake. Or, conversely, it
could be claimed that by entering such areas the Arabs jeopardized the
security of the state.

As the following quotes will show however, it is

doubtful that the security and the safety of the people (Arabs in

11

Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1215 as quoted by Sabri Jiryis,
1976, p. 44.
12

Quoted in Jiryis, 1976, p. 17.
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particular) who live in or near such closed areas were of concern to the
military governor when he ordered those areas closed. Instead, one of
his

primary interests

(although there were others which will be

discussed later) was the confiscation of Arab land.
Before a vote in the Knesset on the military government's abolition
in 1962, Shmoel Segev, who was familiar with the work of the security
services, wrote:
The repeal of Article 125 which deals with the "closed areas" - the
most important article as far as the military government is
concerned - would mean in practice the abolition of the legal power
to declare flreas closed .... The closing of an area by virtue of this
article means that it is being prepared for Jewish settlement,
(emphasis added), which is becoming more and more urgent with the
increasing waves of immigration. 13
Adressing the same subject Shimon Peres, then deputy minister of
defense, wrote:
It is by making use of Article 125, on which the military government
depends to a large extent, that we can directly continue the
struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration ..... In
Galilee ... today, there are hundreds of thousands of dunams of
unsettled land which are earmarked for programmed settlement. 14
In his speech on Feb. 20, 1963, Ben-Gurion declared that "the military
government came into existence to

protect

settlements in all parts of the state.

15

first public indication of some of the

the right of Jewish

These remarks were perhaps the
intended consequences and

functions of the military government, i.e. the confiscation of Arab land
which amounted to hundreds of thousands of dunams (see Chapter 4). As

13

Maariv, Dec. 29, 1961.

14

Davar, Jan. 26, 1962.

15

Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1217. Quoted by Sabri Jiryis,
1976, p. 53.
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described by Lustick, 16 the scenario worked in the following manner:
A closed area encompassing Arab-owned agricultural lands is declared
a "closed area". The owners of the land are then denied permission
by the security authorities to enter the area for any purpose
whatsoever, including cultivation. After three years pass, the
Ministry of Agriculture issues certificates which classify the lands
as uncultivated. The owners are notified that unless cultivation is
renewed immediately the lands will be subject to expropriation. The
owners, still barred by the security authorities from entering the
"closed area" within which their lands are located, cannot resume
cultivation. The lands are then expropriated and become part of the
general land reserve for Jewish settlement. Eventually permission to
enter the "closed area" is granted to Jewish farmers; alternatively
the classification of the area as "closed" is lifted altogether.
Arab as well as Jewish controlled areas were subject to the practice
of i.;losure by the military government.

Although a "closed area" in

theory applied to both Arabs and Jews,

in practice only Arabs were

required to carry permits for entering or leaving such an area. This
practice was described by the state controller in a report in 1959 in
which he wrote:
An order from the military governor declaring an area closed is, in
theory, applicable to all citizens without exception whether living
in the area or outside it. Thus anyone who enters or leaves a closed
area without a written permit from the military governor is in fact
committing a criminal offense. In practice, however, Jews are not
expected to carry such permits and in general are not prosecuted for
breaking the regulations in Article 125 .... There is something wrong
in this law, which was drafted to apply to all citizens in the
country but is in fact enforced only against some of them. 17
The state controller may or may not have been aware of all the
consequences

of

such

discriminatory

practices

by

the

military

government.

16
17

Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 178.

State Controller's Report on Security for Financial Year 1957/58,
Feb. 15 1959, pp. 57-58. Quoted in Jiryis, 1976, p. 26
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Although

these policies

may

have

been designed

to

enhance

confiscation of Arab lands as an important goal, other goals were served
equally well by these policies. One of these goals was the regulation of
the flow of Arab labor to Jewish labor markets. This was made clear
through an order by the military governor of the northern region issued
to all the Arabs in his area to stay out of the Jewish settlements. The
reason for such an order according to the governor was that "he could
not control the increasing infiltration of the agricultural colonies by
minority laborers who were becoming permanently employed in various
fields".

18

In fact travel permits were very hard to come by in times of

high unemployment. This prevented Arab laborers from reaching their
place of work in the cities,

thus securing work for the Jews.

19

Furthermore, "until 1953 the military government determined the wages of
Arab laborers in the areas under its control" because, according to Levi
Eshkol, minister of finance, "there are no labor offices in the area." 20
It would be misleading to conclude that this was the extent of the
military government's intervention in Arab lives. Indeed the regulations
gave the military governor dictatorial powers over the Arabs. His
activities,

according to the regulations

did not

fall under the

jurisdiction of any civil court including the High Court for Justice.
The military governor answered directly to the chief of staff and the
minister of defense. Thus, many of the appointed governors' activities

18

Haaretz, Oct. 11, 1955.

19

Yorma Ben-Prath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, (Jerusalem, The
Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1966), pp. 51-52) 55.
20

In Jiryis, 1976, p. 274
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went unchecked. 21 Of particular interest to this study is their power to
restrict travel, since such restrictions seem to have been directed
mainly against travel for employment purposes. In fact Lustick reports
Israeli government statistics for the year 1953-1954 which show that 80
percent of all travel permits to have been "issued in connection with
employment, the rest being for medical treatment, contact with courts
and legal advisors, and contact with Government departments." 22
It does not follow, however, that permits were handed out freely and
on demand. Although statistics showing the ratio of those granted
permits to the number of applicants are impossible to find, 2 3 some
observations are indicative of the limited number of permits issued at
any particular time.

As late as 1958, and at a time when this practice

was supposed to have been liberalized, only one out of every three Arabs
living in a military zone held a travel permit, with half of those
permits granted for a short period. 24

In 1956, according to the

Jerusalem Post, only 800 of the inhabitants of Um-el-Fahm, the largest

21

Sabri Jiryis, p. 40, quotes an ex-military governor as saying:

(The military government) interferes in the life of the Arab citizen
from the day of his birth to the day of his death. It has the final
say in all matters concerning workers, peasants, professional men,
merchants, and educated men, with schooling and social services. It
interferes in the registration of births, deaths, and even
marraiges, in questions of land and in the appointment and dismissal
of teachers and civil servants. Often, too, it arbitrarily
interferes in the affairs of political parties, in political and
social activities, and in local and municipal councils.
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Ian Lustic, 1980: 124.
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I do not believe that such statistics in fact exist.
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of the Arab villages, held such permits. 25 Considering the village's
demographic composition -- over 60 percent of its 6,000 inhabitants at
the time were internal refugees from neighboring villages which were
destroyed during the 1948 war -- one can only wonder as to the real
number who were in need of and applied for such a permit for employment
purposes.
The few permits which were issued specified the initiation and
expiration dates and the destination and route to be travelled.

The

implications of such a policy of specification on the Arab worker were
many.

First, since these permits were only periodic and their renewal

was never to be taken for granted, the stability and reliability of the
Arab worker was, naturally, questioned by the Jewish employer. Thus,
irrespective of qualifications, Arab workers were typically assigned to
the secondary job sector performing unskilled work in dead-end jobs
which paid minimum wages and carried no benefits.

Secondly, the

limitations on destination and travel route by the issued "permit"
affected the Arab worker's ability for a wider job hunt and compromised
his bargaining power for better wages,
quality.

job conditions and/or job

Such a practice, on the other hand, impeded the development of

a competitive labor market because Arab labor, due to their dependence
on travel permits whose continuation of issuance was never guaranteed,
were seen as unreliable.

Hence,

the stereotypes of "cheap" and

"unskilled" were typical yet unjustified descriptions of the Arab
laborer which contributed to a further erosion in his status and image.

25

The Jerusalem Post, April 4, 1956.
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Third,

by also applying the restrictions to travel between Arab

villages, the military government prevented any organization of Arab
workers which may have struggled for better conditions.

Such a policy,

coupled with the fact that the Arabs were not permitted to join the
Israeli labor union (the Histadrut) until 1959 (see chapter 6) left the
Arab labor force fragmented, with each worker facing his situation by
himself. These practices provided fertile grounds, politically as well
as ideologically,

for Jewish employers to use arbitrary measures in

order to benefit from a fragmented, disoriented and cheap Arab labor
force, assigning them to low status and menial work.
Low status occupations for the Arabs seems to have been a matter of
official policy,

also justified on the basis of security. The following

quote by Lubrani (then advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab affairs)
articulates this policy rather well.

In April 1961, Lubrani declared,

in a lecture to a Jewish audience in Tel-Aviv, that the Arabs were the
"sworn and everlasting enemies" of the state.
that time, become routine by state officials.

Such declarations had, by
What was not routine,

however, was his acknowledgement that:
With one hand we take what we give them with the other. We give them
tractors, electricity, and progress, but we take land and restrict
their free movement. We give them high schools, but we prevent their
graduates from entering honorable occupations ....... were there no
Arab students perhaps it would be better. If they would remain
hewers of woods perhaps it would be easier to control them. 26
Needless to say, the statement does not refer to a fair and negotiated
trade-off between the state and its Arab citizens. Clearly, the 'taking'
of the land, the 'restriction' of movement, and the 'prevention' of Arab

26

Zeev Schiff, "If I Were an Arab," Haaretz, April 4, 1961.
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graduates from entering 'honorable' occupations were forced actions.
Such actions, one would assume, were designed to fulfil certain policy
objectives which, despite the official statements to the contrary, make
the 'security' explanation untenable.
It is

in the

light of such declarations

that the military

government's behavior towards the Arabs are to be interpreted.

The

harsh and indiscriminate methods of the military government were
continuously being justified through statements such as the one
mentioned above.

While such practices

and

declarations provided

ideological justification for differentiating Arabs, the continued
existence of the military government

and the system of travel

restrictions were handicapping the efforts of Jewish employers to make
full use of Arab labor because of the limited access to this demoralized
and cheap labor.

One would assume, therefore, that those who benefited

the least from such policies and practices were among those who opposed
the military government.

Stated differently, certain segments of the

Jewish population who opposed the military government did so because
they would have benefited from its abolition.

In general, those who

could have used "cheap" Arab labor, for example, would have benefited
from the abolition of the military government and the easy access to
such labor which would have come as a result.

And in the late fifties

when the need for unskilled labor intensified (see Chapter 6) so did the
campaign for the abolition of travel restriction against the Arabs.
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The Struggle for the Abolition of the Military Government
The significance of the struggle for the abolition of the military
government lies in the fact that it lasted too long.

It was no earlier

than 1966 (18 years after the military government was established) that
pressure against the government could produce total abolition.

This

suggests that the forces which benefited from its continuation and,
therefore supported it, were far greater and more powerful than the
forces against it.

Clearly, that segment of the Jewish population which

benefited the most as a result of continued operation of the military
government opposed its abolition.

These are:

labor in general and

unskilled labor in particular, employees of the military government's
bureaucracy and its derivative agencies (see Chapter 3), and the ruling
party because it can claim that its policies are designed to protect
labor and therefore it desrves the support of labor, i. e., Jewish
labor.

The next three sections will describe this struggle,

waged and by whom.
the

struggle

how it was

I will also describe critical periods during which

intensified,

the

facilitating

events

for

this

intensification and the validity of the rationale used in the defense of
the continuation of the military government.
Both Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population struggled
against the military government either for modification of the emergency
regulations, the "legal" basis for its operation, or for total abolition
of the system.

The struggle against the military government was a hard

and continuous one. However, since this study is not concerned with the
detailed history of this struggle, only a synopsis of these struggles
will be discussed here.
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The Arabs' opposition to and struggle against the military government
can be understood in light of its activities in the Arab sector.
struggle

for

its

abolition

symbolized

a struggle

government's policies with regard to the Arabs.

against

The

the

Arabs felt that with

the abolition of the military government and all that it symbolized,
their lives as citizens and as Arabs within the Jewish state could only
be improved.
Among the Jewish population, however,

different

groups voiced

opposition to the military government for different reasons.
be grouped into five categories:

These can

a) opposition to the military

government for humanistic reasons; b) opposition as a result of concern
for Israel's image in the international arena; c) opposition to the
military government as a result of its political activities in terms of
rallying Arab votes for Mapai, the ruling party; d) opposition to the
military goverrllllent and struggle for Arab equality as part of a general
struggle for the character and future of the Israeli society; e)
opposition by the business community which was seeking an easier access
to the "cheap" Arab labor force.
Opposition to the military government were expressed in a variety of
forms, the most visible (and perhaps least sanctioned), of which are the
motions

introduced in the Knesset

abolition.

for

As early as July 1949, the minister of Justice introduced a

bill to repeal the emergency regulations.

27

p. 32.

the military government's

27

The bill was not approved,

Knesset Debates, July 12 1949, pp. 975-78.

Cited in Jiryis, 1976,
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however, because "of objection to it in the Knesset and among the
people", according to the minister. 28 In May 1950, Zisling, a member of
the United Workers'

Party (Mapam), which served in the opposition,

proposed a bill to repeal the defense regulations within three months.
When his

suggestion was turned down by the Knesset Committee on

Constitution, Law, and Justice, Zisling proposed that the military
government be abolished altogether within one year, on the ground that
"its existence is not in the best interests of the nation nor conducive
to better administration of the areas under its control, being a
restriction on the freedom of the people. 29
This time the proposal was turned over to the Knesset Foreign Affairs
and Security Committee. After declaring that " the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations,

1945, .... are

incompatible with the principles

of a

democratic state", the committee asked the Committee on Constitution,
Law, and Justice, to "present a new bil 1 on the defense of the state,
within two weeks. 1130 The new bill was never prepared and on Feb. 12,
1952, the Knesset approved the conclusion of the Foreign Affairs and
Security Committe, which had been presented to it on Dec. 3, 1951. The
Committee had concluded that "as long as the present security situation
between the state of Israel and its neighbors continues, the military
government has to be maintained for the protection of the nation". 3 1

28

Ibid., Nov. 21 1950, p. 283. Cited in ibid., p. 32.

29

Ibid., May 16 1951, p. 1787. In ibid., p. 32.

30

Ibid., May 22 1951, pp. 1828-33. In ibid., p. 32.
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Ibid., Dec. 3 1951, p. 1322. In ibid.' p. 33.
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Subsequently,

proposals dealing with the military government were

crossed off the Knesset agenda. For example, on Dec. 1, 1954, Meir
Vilner of the Communist Party proposed the abolition of Article 125 and
the system of closed areas on the ground that "the military governors
have lately made a habit of declaring whole villages and stretches of
land 'closed areas'

within the larger closed area under military

government, in order to prevent Arab peasants from working the land". As
noted, his proposal was crossed off the Knesset agenda.

32

Six months

later two bills for the abolition of the military government, were
introduced by the Communist Party and Mapam (United Workers' Party). 33
The fate of these two proposals was not dissimilar to the earlier
proposal by Vilner, i.e., both proposals were crossed off the Knesset
agenda.
Clearly, the government in general and Mapai in particular had the
vote in the Knesset and the support of the public (manifested by
election results, see Chapter 3) which enabled it to continue in its
refusal to alter either its policies toward the Arabs or the activities
of the military government.

Hence, only when public support declined

did the party agree to review this policy.

This came toward the end of

1955, following the results of the third Knesset elections. Mapai (the
party which had been in power since the establishment of the state), won
only 40 of the 120 seats Knesset.

This was lower than the 46 and 45

seats they had won in the first and second elections respectively. 34 In

32

Ibid., Dec. 1 1954, p. 241. In ibid., p. 33.

33

Ibid., May 18 1955, p. 1664. In ibid., p. 34.
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order to form a government, Mapai had to form a coalition with two
smaller parties: Achdut Haavoda and Mapam. Both parties were based in
the Kibutzim movement which employed Arabs, and, generally speaking, had
an Ashkenazi constituency. Upon forming the coalition, both parties
insisted on a review of the government policy toward the Arabs. Only
then did Prime Minister Ben-Gurion appoint a committee (headed by
Professor Ranter of the Technion, the Institute of Applied Technology in
Haifa), to study the question of the military government and make
recommendations. But, as noted earlier, the Committee came out in total
support of the military governmnet, attributing the need for such a
system to the security requirements of the country.

Nevertheless, some

relaxation of travel restrictions was announced in 1957.
Other major reforms in the military government were announced on
August 5, 1959, on the eve of the fourth Knesset elections. These
reforms constituted a relaxation of travel restrictions on the Arabs to
certain Jewish urban centers.

Further reforms and relaxation of travel

restrictions took place in 1964. As noted earlier, toward the end of
1966 the system of the military government was abolished completely.

As

will be shown in the next chapter these periods (1959, 1964) witnessed
great economic expansion

and a decline in the rate of immigration which

increased the demand for Arab labor.

34

Richard Scammon, 'Knesset Election Results, 1949-77', in: Howard
Penniman (ed.), Israel At The Polls, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, p. 310.
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It should be emphasized that the parliamentary activities discussed
here so far constitute only one manifestation of the public (Arab and
Jewish) opposition to the military government. One should note however,
that inasmuch as it conveys the seriousness with which the military
government was perceived, the presentation does not provide the most
dramatic picture. Nor does this presentation provide a complete account
of all the motions which were presented in the Knesset for the reform
and/or abolition of the military governement. I only tried to highlight
some of the basic attitudes and policy guidelines which guided the
military government and tts actions, and to provide some of the interparty dynamics which characterized the struggle over the military
government.
Other

forms

of

protest

included

such

tactics

as

public

demonstrations, letter writing, petitions, editorials and others which
were

expressed

intellectuals,

by

people

ranging

from

political

parties

to

to university professors and kibbutzim members

as

evidenced by the following statement signed by "representatives of
twenty kibbutzim and about two hundred intellectuals including seventy
professors

and

lecturers

at the Hebrew University.

35

The signed

statement reads as follows:
About 200,000 of the inhabitants of Israel, belonging to another
religion and with a different nationality, do not enjoy equal rights
and are the victims of discrimination and repression. The over
whelming majority of Arabs in Israel .... have neither freedom of
movement nor of residence. They are not accepted as members with
equal rights and obligations in the Histadrut or as employees in
most concerns ..... The continuation of this situation could seriously

35

Jiryis, 1976, p.38.
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endanger the security of the nation.

36

However, despite such wide opposition the military government continued
to operate using national security as a rationale for the continuation
of its existence. The next section will examine the validity of such a
rationale.
The National Security Argument
Since national security seems to have been the most cited reason for
the imposition and continuation of the military government, it is
important to investigate the validity of this argument. That is to say,
to what extent did the Arabs in Israel constitute a security problerr for
the Jewish state? And secondly, to what extent were mechanisms such as
the military government and the accompanying defense regulations needed
to combat such a threat?
For several reasons it is clear that no entirely satisfactory answer
can be offered to either of the two questions.

The subjectivity

attached to the meaning of the concept of security, for example,
it

all the more difficult

makes

to operationalize and thus measure.

Furthermore, even if it were possible to define the concept objectively
and to operationalize it, the data needed for its investigation is
usually classified and unavailable to researchers.
One cannot,

for

example, examine the validity of the security

argument by showing the rate of violation over a period of time.
Assuming that such statistics are available their interpretation can be

36

Ner, July-August, 1958. In ibid., p. 38.
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totally misleading. Consider,

for example, an Arab who was caught

working in what had been declared a closed area. Such an Arab would have
been tried and convicted on the ground of violating security regulations
irrespective of the fact that he may have done nothing to harm the
security of the state and/or the people. The fact that, regardless of
whether the person was tried in a military or a civilian court, the
military government did not have to supply any details to the court
except stating that the individual in question was engaged in activities
harmful to the security, 3 7

makes

such statistics all

the more

meaningless.
Beyond this, however, suclo statistics cannot be argued to show the
extent to which the Arabs constituted a security risk. Such statistics
can perhaps be used more adequately to show either the efficiency of the
military government in apprehending violators, the extent to which Arabs
obeyed the law, or both things combined.
This is no justification to avoid tackling the two questions posed at
the beginning of this section.

The importance of these questions stems

from the fact that if the answers to both questions were in the
affirmative, one would be led to conclude that it was indeed national
security which dictated to the military government its actions and
methods. The maltreatment of the Arabs could then be analyzed as merely

37

Sabri Jiryis, 1976, quotes a ruling by the High Court of Justice
(Supreme Court) in Appeal 50/46 in which the court declared that "The
responsibility of protecting the higher interests of the state rests on
the military commander (emphasis in original), and it is up to him to
decide whether these interests prevent him from revealing any additional
details explaining the basis for his orders." p. 21
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unintended consequence.

Conversely, if the answer to either question is

negative, one can reasonably conclude that the system of military
government was created to serve something other than the declared
security requirements.
The difficulties inherit in the answer to both questions, therefore,
make the discussion on the basis of statements made by Israelis who were
as familiar with the security problems and the military system as those
who advanced the security argument, an adequate strategy.
As early as 1957, the influential newspaper Haaretz, for example,
wrote:
It is impossible to accept the claim that it is thanks to the
watchfulness of the military gov~rnors that there has been no
political sabotage and no serious attempt by the Arab population to
organize an underground movement. If there are extremist groups
among the Arabs willing to risk hostile acts against Israel, no
military government will be able to stop them. The military
government is not a solid organization and its manpower is limited.
The physical presence of military rule in the Arab areas is not on a
scale to prevent hostile acts on the part of the local population;
it is rather the fear of the state's power to punish that has
prevented deeds harmful to the nation, and this fear will remain
even if the military government is abolished or its powers
curtailed. 38
A ministerial committee headed by Pinhas Rosen, the minister of
Justice, which was appointed to reevaluate the military government, had
come to the same conclusion.

Although its official report was not

submitted to the Knesset until 1962, the news about the committee's
intentions to recommend "extensive improvements for the Arab minority",
had been leaked to the press earlier. 39 In its report to the Knesset,

38

Haaretz, Feb. 11, 1957.
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the committee declared:
.... Yet even if we assume that sections of the Arab population have
not yet resigned themselves to the existence of the state of Israel,
it does not necessarily follow that the Arabs in Israel will be
prepared to engage in organized mass action against the state. Only
such a threat on a mass scale could justify the existence of the
military government and the normal resources of the security
services are sufficient to control individuals..... If this
nationalism, insofar as it exists at all, has not yet exploded, it
is not due to the deterrent factor of the military government but to
the lack of sufficient motive. 40
Four things are made clear by the statement of the ministers: a) the
statement defines "organized mass action against the state" on the part
of the Arabs as a security concern; b) it sets this condition as the
only justification for the existence of the military government; c) the
statement determines that the Arabs do not have "sufficient motive" for
such organized action; and d) the committee determines that outside the
military government there are 'normal' resources which are "sufficient
to control individuals". Pinhas Rosen who chaired the committee and was
minister of justice at the time, declared later that "on the basis of
what he had learned as chairman of the Ministerial Committee ..... the
military government was not necessary for security purposes. 41 Despite
such an unequivocal determination, however, the military government
continued for another five years.
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Davar, March 26, 1959.

40

Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1962, p. 1319. Cited in Jiryis, 1976,
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In his book Curtain of Sand, Yigal Allon (1960), a previous commander
of the Palmach (a pre-state military group), a leader of Achdut Haavoda
party (which formed a coalition with the government), a minister and
deputy prime minister in many governments, and a member of Kibbutz
Dgania in Galilee, wrote:
There is absolutely no connection between effective control of the
borders and the existence of the military government .... It is an
error to believe that the existence of the military government can
prevent espionage or that it can prevent the Arab population from
harboring infiltration. This task can only be undertaken by a
competent security department and an intelligence network worthy of
the name .... Because it has no direct security task, the military
government concentrates on internal political activities, such as
the .... establishment of a counterforce to prevent the formation of
undesirable political organization. 42
Two other members of

th·~

Achdut Haavoda Party spoke in opposition to the

military government during a Knesset debate on Feb. 20, 1962.

Bar-

Yehuda, an ex-minister of the interior, argued that the military
government must be abolished because "for a long time, it has performed
no real security function and has indeed become a factor greatly
increasing the insecurity of the state." 43 Moshe Carmel, another member
of Achdut Haavoda and ex-cabinet member, also expressed his views on the
military government. He said:
This institution is no longer essential to the security of Israel,
and its continued existence may well harm the establishment of
heal thy relations
between Israel's
Jewish and Arab
inhabitants ..... It blocks any genuine feeling of citizenship among
the Arab population, and it damages Israel's reputation abroad. The
military government .... no longer performs any positive functions in
protecting the country from within, and its existence does more harm
than good. 44

46.

42

Yigal Allon, Curtain of Sand, Tel-Aviv, 1960, pp. 327-8.
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Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1962, pp. 1322-3. In Jiryis, 1976, p.
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Similar views were expressed by the Mapam Party through the statement of
Yaakov Hazan, the second man in the party. He announced that:
We are convinced that the military government does no service to the
security of the state of Israel and it is incompatible with the
principles of justice and law ..... The military government is making
the Arab minority feel more and more strongly that it is despised,
rejected, and discriminated against as race apart, and this can only
breed hatred." 5
Right wing parties such as Herut and the Liberal Party (which was formed
in 1961 by a union between the General Zionists and the Progressive
Party) expressed similar views in opposition of the military government.
As was resolved by a conference of the Herut movement in January 1962,
and expressed by Menachem Begin in the Knesset in February of that year,
"the adminifitrative system called the military government no longer
full filled any real security functions."" 6 This position by Herut and
the Liberals should not be surprising since the two parties who later
combined to

form the Likud,

advocated free

enterprise and the

curtailment of collective bargaining (see Chapter 3).

These positions

represent a clear support of capital and against labor.

Advocating

abolition of the military government is, therefore, in line with these
stands since such abolition provided an easier access of Jewish
employers to Arab labor.
In 1965, less than a year after becoming prime minister (replacing
the retiring Ben-Gurion), Eshkol ordered a review of the military
government. The man Eshkol appointed for the job was Isar Harel, for

""Ibid., Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1211. In Ibid., p. 46-7.
"

"

5

Ibid., Feb. 20, 1962, p. 1317. In ibid., p.47.

6

Ibid., Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1209.
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years the head of Israeli military intelligence.

It could be argued

that this appointment by Eshkol was designed to emphasize that the
military government was being kept for national security reasons only,
for to admit otherwise would have been bad politics nationally and
internationally.
In the middle of December 1965 Hare! presented his recommendations.
Although there were no official announcements, the speculation was that
Harel recommended the abolition of the military government. 47 However,
these speculations were confirmed two months later when spokesman for
the prime minister stated that "1966 will be recorded in the history of
the Arabs in Israel as the year of the abolition of the military
government for all practical purposes, and the elimination of all other
sources of discontent among the Arab population of the country." 41
Six months later, on July 10, 1966, in a rare press conference in
Tel-Aviv Hare! stated that
The military government is not a necessity on security grounds and
could be dispensed with. The army should not be concerned with our
Arab citizens; it is a blot on our democracy .... that this is so.
Even if there were a need for restrictions, they should be applied
individually.
This collective restraint is a violation of the
feelings of the Arabs. It should be far better to put individuals
under stricter observation than to cast doubts on the whole Arab
population in the state, and thus humiliate them. 49

47

Haaretz, Dec. 3, 1965.
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Clearly, if these statements do not dispel the security argument as
the major reason for the continuation of the military government they,
nevertheless, weaken such an argument considerably. Based on such
evidence the national security cannot be accepted as a satisfactory
explanation for the continuation of the system of military government
for as long as it did. In fact the swift victory of Israel, in June
1967, over three major Arab countries (Egypt, Syria and Jordan), only
six months after the abolition of the military government, reduced the
alleged threat of the Arabs in Israel to the state's security to a mere
joke.
Alternative Interpretation
There are other explanations for the continuation of the military
government, which must be examined. Clearly, the military government was
instrumental in confiscating Arab lands.

But lands continued to be

confiscated by the Israeli government after the military government was
long abolished.

Furthermore, the Israeli legal code contains enough

clauses which provide a 'legal' justification for the confiscation of
Arab land.

This suggests that the confiscation of Arab land could not

have been a major reason for the continuation of the military government
although gaining control of Arab land was a primary objective of the
Zionist organization and the state of Israel (see Chapter 4).
Another reason given for the continuation of the military government
was its ability to stack Arab votes for Mapai, the ruling party at the
time. Indeed, there is some evidence which points in this direction.
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First, despite the harsh measures taken by the government (represented
by Mapai Party), against the Arab population, Mapai received the lion's
share of the Arab vote during Knesset and local elections from 1949 to
1965.

For example, in the first knesset elections, Mapai and its

affiliated Arab lists received 61.3 percent of the Arab vote in the allArab localities.

The results of the second through the sixth Knesset

elections -i.e., 1951, 1955, 1961, and 1965 - show the percentage of the
Arab vote for Mapai and its affiliated Arab lists to be 66.5, 62.4,
52.0, 50.8, and 50.1 respectively.

50

Naturally, accusations were leveled by other parties against Mapai
for its utilization of the military government to swing Arab votes.
Aharon Cohen of Mapam argued that
The refusal of Mapai, the main party in power, to give up this
position of strength (the military government), was .... because the
party secured for itself in this way both the majority of Arab votes
for the Knesset elections and the possibility of exerting pressure
on Arab electors supporting contending parties. 51
Similarly, when in 1963 a close 57 to 56 vote

in favor of

continuation of the military government was received with two Arab
members linked to Mapai voting in favor,

Menachem Begin of Herut

commented that "the military government safeguards a special corner in
this house (a place for the Arab members linked to Mapai), and today ....
this corner will safeguard the survival of the military government." 52
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This activity of the military government on behalf of Mapai seems to
have intensified the opposition of other parties. According to Moshe
Unna, 53 a former Knesset member and a member of the National Religious
Party, Achdut Haavoda and Mapam played an influential role in the
government's periodical reforms of the military government. In 1961 when
both parties entered a coalition agreement with Mapai to form the
government, both parties insisted on reserving the right to vote against
the government, if necessary, over the military government.
Such service by the military government to Mapai should not be taken
lightly, considering the fact that the Arabs constituted between 11 and
14 percent of the population, with no less than 70 percent turnout on
election days of those eligible to vote. This means an average addition
of between 5 to 8 Knesset members to Mapai, which is a large enough bloc
to relieve Mapai of the need to seek unnecessary coalition partners.
Needless to say, the selected Arab members who ran on Arab lists
affiliated with Mapai were chosen, financed and campaigned for by the
Mapai Party machine in cooperation with the military government. Thus,
Arab Knesset members who were linked to Mapai owed their political
positions to the party and were dedicated to its service.

Such Arabs

had never developed a constituency of their own and therefore could not
have made it to the Knesset without the help of the party.

Nor could it

be claimed that they represented the interests of the Arabs.

Arab MK's

who decided to run on their own after being purged and replaced by Mapai
stood no chance. 54
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No other party, since the abolition of the military government has
ever managed to command such a political 'support' among the Arabs and a
total control over 'their' Knesset members.

However,

it would be

mis leading to conclude that this benefit was limited to Arab votestacking.

This would have been too obvious to the other Zionist parties

who would have been more successful in fighting against it.

The greater

benefits of Mapai and one against which it was very difficult to fight
is the role played by the military government in protecting the
interests of Jewish labor through the military government's ability to
limit the access of Arab. labor to Jewish employment sites.

These

policies for which Mapai could claim credit were in line with the wishes
of Jewish labor and earned Mapai the support of the labor vote, which
was proportionally far more significant

thru~

the Arab vote.

The segment of Jewish labor which was more threatened by a free entry
of Arab labor to employment sites was unskilled and semi-skilled labor,
because it is this sector which has continuously absorbed most Arab
labor.

54

The best example of this is the case of Salih Khneyfes, a Druz
from Shfa Amr (one of the only two all-Arab cities), and Mas'ad Qassis,
a Christian from Miilya, a small village in northern Galilee. Both were
MK's on the eve of the fourth Knesset elections when Mapai decided to
replace them, despite their objections and protests. They both then ran
as independents, enlisting every possible support from their hamulas
(extended families), and neighbors. Both MK's failed to gain their seats
back and received less than .5 percent of the Arab vote. (See Mansour,
'Israel's Arabs go to the polls', New Outlook, Jan. 1960:23. Schiff,
'Israel's Fourth Elections', ibid. Jan. 1960: 15-23)
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According to Table 5.1 below in 1963, 77.3 percent of the Arab labor
force was concentrated in three main job categories.

These were: a)

farmers, fishers and related workers; b) construction workers, quarrymen
and miners; c) craftsmen, production process and related workers. Among
the Jewish population, the table makes

it clear that those who

immigrated from Africa-Asia (Orientals) were concentrated more heavily
in those three job categories than those Jews who immigrated from
Europe-America (Ashkinazim).

The figures from the table add up to 61.1

percent for those who immigrated from Africa-Asia during the years
1948-1954 and 64.9 percent for those who immigrated during the 1955-1963
period.

The corresponding figures for

the immigrants from Europe-

America for the two immigration periods are 39. 4 percent and 45. 4
percent respectively. It is also interesting to note that the lowest
concentration of the labor force in these jobs is found among the
Israel-born (Jews) with 35.8 percent.
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TABLE 5.1
Jewish And Arab Employment By Occupation, Continent
Of Birth And Period Of Immigration (1963)
(Percentages) 55
Immigrated from
Europe-America

!Immigrated From
IAsia-Africa

I
I
I Israel ITotal Arabs
!Born !Jewish
Sincel1948-IUp tol ISincel1948-IUp to!
I
OCCUPATION
1955 11954 11947 11955 11954 11947 I
I
I
Professional,
I
I
I
I
I
Technical &
5.5
3.2
21.2 I 12.9
21.1 I 11.91 16.61
5.31 4.1
Related Wrk.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Administrative
I
I
I
Executive,
I
I
I
Managerial &
6.6
7.2 15 .1
21. 7
16.8
2.0
11. 7 I 18.ll 26.2
Clerical Wrks.
I
I
I
Traders,Agents
I
And Salesmen
5.8 12.81 10,9
4.9
6.4 13.8
4.2
8.4
4.7

__ ,__ ,__ ,

,__ ,_

Farmers, Fishe
rs And Related
Workers

12.0

7.1

8.3

24.3

17.6

6.8

Workers In
Transport And
Communication

1.4

5.3

5.6

3.31 4.3
I
I
I
12.91 12.4
I
I
I
27.71 31.1
I
I
I
I
17.ll 15.7
I

7.5

Construction
Workers Quarry! 4.6
Men And Miners!
I
Craftsmen,
I
Production
I 28.8
Process And
I
Related Wrks. I
I
Services,Sportl
And Recreation! 14.6
Wrkers
I
Total %
Abs. (Thds)

7.6
I
I
24.71
I
I
I
I
12.51
I

I
I
5.01
I
I
I
18.ll
I
I
I
I
9.31
I

10.9

22.4

18.8

10.7
I
9.11
I
I
I
4.71
I
I
I
20.41
I
I
I
I
8.11
I

11.8

38.0

5.5

4.3
I
}

7.8}
}
} 39.3
}

24.3}
I
I
I
I
12.51
I

6.2

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1100.01100.01100.01 100.01100.01100.01 100.0 I 100.01100.01
I 55.0l147.4l168.9I 51.31163.61 30.01 130.81 747.01*66.21
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The

Orientals

would

have

been hurt

the

most

by

liberalization of movement for the Arab labor force.

any

policy of

In addition, as

noted in Chapter 3, middle-class Orientals were also likely to suffer as
a

result

of

dismantling

the military

because

these

government

agencies

apparatus

were

mostly

and

manned

its

supporting

ideology,

by

Orientals.

One would expect the Orientals, therefore, to have been more

antagonistic toward the notion of abolishing the military government.
This cannot be ascertained, however, from the available data.

No

recognizable all-Oriental group which supported the military government
or opposed its abolition can be identified.
support

of

Orientals

for

Mapai

(later

However, the overwhelming

the

Labor

Alignment)

which

controlled both the government and the Histadrut (see Chapter 3) co1Jld
be

seen as

exclusionary

an

expression of

policies

toward

support
the

for,

Arabs.

among
And,

other things,
as

noted,

the

the
two

institutions, the government and the Histadrut, were already doing more
than adequate job in minimizing the 'threat' of Arab labor toward the
Orientals.

In fact, following the abolition of the military government

in 1966, Mapai and its partners lost 7 mandates in the 1969 elections
and its power decreased from 63 MK' s in 1965 to 56. 5 6 This
significant

in light of the fact that two years

loss is

earlier (1967)

the

leadership of Mapai gave the state its biggest victory ever over the
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Source: Data for the Jewish population were obtained from the CBS
Statistical Abstract of Israel, Jerusalem, 1965, p. 319. For the Arab
population data were obtained from Y. Porath, The Arab Labor Force in
Israel, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1966, p. 22.
* The total for the Arab population was calculated as the difference
between total employees and Jewish workers. CBS, 1965, pp. 317-19.
56

See Penniman, H., 1979, p. 310.
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Arab states, a record which was used extensively during the election
campaign.

However, the loss in 1969 (as well as a further decline in

Mapai's power in 1973, and 1977) is partially attributed to a decline in
the support among Orientals (see Chapter 3) who constituted the bulk of
unskilled labor against whom the Arabs were competing (Chapter 6).
A Final Note
Evidence indicates that the national interest, i.e., the Jewish
interest, was seen by the state authorities and its agencies as best
served by a total control over the Arab population.

This control was to

be achieved partially through confiscation of Arab lands to be deposited
in Jewish hands, and increased economic and political dependence of the
Arabs on the Jewish sector. 57 The military government was used as the
mechanism to enhance such goals.
These policies, including the restrictions imposed on the Arabs in
general and Arab labor in particular, were an extension for the ArabJewish conflict waged for several decades prior to the establishmnet of
the state.

Attempts to restrict employment of Arabs

in Jewish

enterprises as a substitute for Jewish labor date as far back as the
second wave of immigration (1904-1914) (see Chapters 1&6).

The practice

which came to be known as "conquest of labor" and meant rather the
replacement of Arab workers, employed in the Jewish farms and factories,
by Jewish workers was eventually spearheaded by the Histadrut (after its

5 7

According to Ian Lustick, the mechanisms of control involved
segmentation and fragmentation, along geographical, religious and
communal lines, economic dependence, and cooptation of leadership. See
Lustick, 1980, ch. 4, 5.
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founding in 1920) and adopted by all Jewish institutions (see Chapter
6).

Together

these

institutions

represented

the

organizational

apparatus of the Zionist movement which was committed to the creation of
homeland in Palestine, for the Jewish people.
With the establishment of the state these institutions continued to
function and their commitment to the basic tenets of Zionist ideology
remained intact.

When considering the position of the Arab minority in

Israel, therefore, one must remember that the organizational ideologies
of these institutions and the personal commitments of the individuals
who controlled them are rooted in hostile attitudes

toward the

Palestinian Arabs for, among other things, land cont"."ol and ownership,
and Jewish labor. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that
the men and women who filled the bureaus and agencies of the Israeli
government, as well as those who remained at the helm of the 'national
institutions', continued,

after 1948,

the fight

against the Arab

minority that they had waged in the decades before against the Arab
majority of Palestine.

Only now these struggles were sanctioned and

encouraged by the Israeli government.
The Histadrut, for example, continued in its refusal to accept Arabs
(Israeli citizens) as members and/or employ Arabs in its economic
institutions (see chapter 6). And the J.N.F. continued to consolidate
its hold on Arab land and lease it to Jews only. The fact that the
Israeli leadership which was responsible for the formulation of policies
towards the Arabs, are alumni of these institutions is reflected in the
biographies of the following individuals.
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David Ben-Gurion, a cofounder of the Histadrut and its

first

secretary - general in 1921, also presided over the formation in 1930 of
Mapai. From 1935 to 1948 he served as chairman of the Jewish Agency and
for most of Israel's first fifteen years as a state, he was both prime
minister and defense minister.
Moshe Sharet, was head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department
from 1933 to 1948. From 1948 to 1956 he served as foreign minister and
as prime minister during Ben-Gurion's brief retirement in 1954. In 1960
he became the chairman of the Jewish Agency and served in that capacity
until his death in 1965.
Levi Eshkol, was Israel's prime minister from 1964 to 1969 and its
defense minister from 1964 to 1967. He had been very active in the
1920's and 1930's in the financial affairs of both the Histadrut and the
Labor Party (Mapai). Selected as the director of the Land Settlement
Department of the Jewish Agency in 1948, he continued to serve in that
capacity while holding, until 1963, the post of minister of finance.
Golda Meir, worked as the head of the Political Department of the
Histadrut in the late 1930' s and 1940' s. In 1946 she took over as
director of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency while Moshe
Sharet was under British arrest. In 1949 she was appointed minister of
labor and later foreign minister, a post which she held from 1956 to
1965. In 1965 she became secretary-general of the Labor Party. After
Eshkol's death in 1969 she became prime minister and held that post
until 1974.
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Clearly, these individuals represent the highest levels of Israeli
officials under whose auspices policies regarding the Arabs, including
but not

limited to the

implemented.

military government,

were

devised and

Before the establishment of the state, these individuals

and others were the leaders of organizations which had fought for Jewish
labor and against Arab labor. It is inconceivable, therefore, that such
individuals

would have

changed their

attitudes

and

ideological

commitments upon the establishment of the state. Thus, one cannot escape
the conclusion that the question of Arab labor in Jewish enterprises
must have been under consideration especially when the new state and its
leadecs were facing grave economic problems compounded with the task of
absorbing massive Jewish immigrants (see Table 5.2) to the new state.
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TABLE 5.2
Yearly Immigration By Continent of Birth
(1948-1966)
Period

Absolute Numbers
Total

1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

Asia-Africa

101,819
239,076
169,405
173,901
23,375
10,347
17,471
36,303
54,925
69,733
25,919
22,987
23,487
46,571
59,473
62,086
52,193
28,501
13,451

12,931
110, 780
83,296
123,449
16,725
7,760
15,493
33,736
47,617
29,361
11,490
7,635
6,801
22,004
46,677
43,054
21,831
n.d
n.d

Grand Totalll,231,023

640,640

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Europe-AmericalNot Known

I
I 11, 856
I 5,199
I 1,471
248
I
3
I
13
I
12
I
5
I
3
I
609
I
1
I
4
I
2
I
3
I
3
I
4
I
0
I
n.d
I
n.d
I
I

77, 032
123,097
84,638
50,204
6,647
2,574
1,966
2,562
7,305
39,763
14,428
15,348
16,684
24,564
12,793
19,028
30,362
n.d
n.d

I
I
Source: CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, Jerusalem, 1967, 18. p. 89.
Thus, while the commitment of the leadership to give preference to
Jewish over Arab labor must have been a real one, this preference could
not have been expressed in any conventional way.
of

Israel

in

the

international

institutionalize

'apartheid-like'

entering

employment

Jewish

sites

arena

did

conditions
and/or

The fragile position
not

allow

preventing
limiting

Israel
Arabs

to
from

private_ Jewish
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enterprises from hiring Arab labor,

unless Arabs

disloyal and a national security risk.

were stigmatized as

Otherwise, such actions against

the Arabs would have been too obvious to the international community,
where Arab delegations at the United Nations were already complaining
about the "complete absence of security for the Arabs in areas under
Israel control in violation of guarantees provided for minorities under
the partition plan .... 1158 As a result of these complaints, the United
Nations

Conciliation Commission

for Palestine

(UNCCP),

undertook the

examination of some of the Arab demands such as the abrogation of the
Absentee Property Act, the requisition and proscription of Arab houses
and lands, the reunion of families, and the freezing of Waqf property.

That the

Israeli government was concerned about

its

59

international

image and reputation with regard to its treatment of the Arab minority
is further
Israel's
elaborate
Arabs,

reflected in the fact

ambassador

to

the

on the Israeli

with more

than

a

that in May 1949

United

Nations)

found

Abba Eban
it

(later

necessary

government's

objectives with regard

passing note

during his

to

to

the

address before

the

United Nations Ad Hoc Political Committe which was evaluating Israel's
second application for

membership in the United Nations.

Eban stated

that
The government of Israel reaffirms its obligation to protect the
persons and property of all communities living within its borders.
It will discontenance any discrimination or interference with the
rights and liberties
of individuals or groups
forming such

5 8

United nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, General
Progress Report and Supplementary Report, December .!_!, 1949-0ctober 23,
1950, P. 12. Cited in Ian Lustick, 1980, p.61.
59

Ibid., p. 16. In ibid., p. 61.
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minorities.
The government of Israel looks forward to the
restoration of peaceful conditions which might enable relaxation of
any restrictions on the liberty of persons or property.' 0
With Israel still struggling for international legitimacy having had
its first application for membership to the United Nations rejected, it
would not have been conceivable or clever for it to incorporate
apartheid conditions within its legal system without finding the 'right'
rationale for it. The military government system, therefore, and the
subsequent security argument as the justification for its existence,
seemed the best solution. Although the military government fulfilled
many functions, Arab labor was one of its main concerns.
Summary
In this chapter I highlight some of the activities of the military
government.

I have shown that its activities with regard to land

confiscation fits well with the general policy discussed in Chapter 4.
While dispossession resulted in the emergence of Arab labor for hire
which furthered the dependence of Arabs on the Jewish Sector the
military government was used to make the operation of land confiscation
a smoother one.
One of the most important of the military government's activities was
the restriction of the movement of Arabs.

Through these restrictions

the access of Arab labor to Jewish business and enterprises was

0

Aubrey S. Eban, Israel: The Case for Admission to the United
NAtions (address delivered before the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the
United Nations, May 5, 1949, published by Israel Office of Information),
p. 41.
'
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controlled and monitored by the military government in accordance with
the demands of the Jewish labor market, i., e., only when the demand for
labor was greatest did relaxation of travel restrictions begin to
appear.

From 1948 to

1959,

when unemployment among the Jewish

population was high, restriction orders were most rigid.

A significant

drop in Jewish unemployment rates and immigration patterns, on the other
hand, resulted in a gradual relaxation of travel restrictions.

It is

safe to conclude, therefore, that one of the major roles played by the
military government was the protection of Jewish labor against Arab
competition.

Taken together these distinctions created what Bosewell

calls 'the identifying ideology' which has been responsible for the
reproduction of split labor market conditions.
Furthermore, the military government was shown to have played a
direct role as Arab vote-stacker for Mapai (the ruling party at the time
and later the Labor Alignment) which claims to be the representative and
protector of labor's interests.

That its policies with regard to the

Arabs were supported by labor in general and Orientals in particular is
evidenced by the heavy support the party enjoyed among both groups and
the subsequent decline of such support following changes in these
policies.
These dynamics, in addition to other evidence presented throughout
the chapter

refute the argument that national security was

underlying reason

the

for the existence of the military government.

However, the use of such an argument in defense of the military
government and its operation seems to have fulfilled other functions.
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It weakened the struggle of Arabs against the military government and
limited the support of Jewish elements to their struggle, and it
disarmed

critics

of

the

military

government

both

nationally,

particularly Jewish employers, and internationally.
It is these functions which enabled the military government to
continue operating for as long as it did.

A major consequence of the

military government's operation and the subsequent national securtiy
argument was that it highlighted the Arab-Jewish division.

Accordingly,

society appeared divided into two distinct groups: those who are loyal
(Jews) and those who are disloyal (Arabs); those whose liberties and
freedom are to be protected (Jews) and those whose freedoms are to be
curtailed; those whose economic and political interests are to be
safeguarded and furthered (Jews) and those whose economic and political
interests are to be forsaken and controlled.
As noted, the major beneficiaries from such policies and rational
have been labor and Mapai, labor's representative.

The struggle of

Jewish labor against Arab labor will be discussed and detailed in the
next chapter.

As will be shown, the identifying ideology proved to be

instrumental in limiting the Arabs

to certain positions and

categories, despite the abolition of the military government.

job-

CHAPTER VI

THE HISTADRUT AND THE ARAB LABOR FORCE
Since the Arabs in Israel have been stripped of their property and as
a result they became totally dependent on hiring out their labor (see
Chapter 4), the status and well being of Arab labor becomes a reflection
of the status and well being of the whole Arab community.
The greatest 'enemy' of minority labor according to the split labor
market theory is 'white' labor.

As soon as the business sector begins

employing minority labor (which by definition is cheaper than "white"
labor) tension which develops into conflict erupts between expensive
labor and business over the status of minority labor.

While the

preferred outcome of this conflict for expensive labor is a total
exclusion of minority labor, which represents a complete victory for
labor, a caste-like treatment of minority labor benefits both expensive
labor as well as the business sector.

Either resolution , however, will

result in the continued cheapness of minority labor, limiting its access
to certain job-categories and/or specific geographic locations and
positions all of which contribute to the continuous reproduction of
split labor market conditions.
Whereas Chapter 5 examined the role of the military government in
terms of maintianing and enforcing exclusion of Arab labor, limiting its
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access to Jewish labor sites to the minimum possible, this chapter will
examine the role played by the Histadrut, representing Jewish labor, in
determining the status of Arab labor.
attitudes

Specifically, I will examine the

and practices of the Histadrut toward Arab labor;

the

relationship between those attitudes and the structure and extent of
demand for

labor in general

and Arab

labor in particular;

the

Histadrut's reaction to the relaxation of travel restrictions; and, the
effect of all of these on wages, occupational and hierarchical location
of Arabs.

I will begin with pre-state period.
The Pre-State Period

Throughout the pre-state period the question of Arab labor in Jewish
colonies was continuously debated and addressed by the Histadrut and
other Zionist institutions.

Typically, the employment of Arabs was

portrayed as a threat not only to Jewish labor but to the whole Zionist
design in Palestine.

The conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian

peoples made perpetrating such typifications easier.

The Histadrut

seems to have played a major role both in the conflict itself and in the
formulation of the Jewish perception towards Arabs in general and Arab
labor in particular.

Since its founding

in 1920 as

the General

Federation of Hebrew Workers, the Histadrut set out to organize Jewish
workers and waged a tireless campaign on their behalf.

The principle of

'conquest of labor' or '100 percent Jewish labor' seems to have been the
pillar of the Histadrut's activity throughout its pre-state history. To
implement this principle the Histadrut conducted extensive and sometimes
violent picketing of Jewish firms and farms that employed Arabs ..
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The implementation of the "conquest of labour" was practiced by all
Zionist institutions. The J.N.F., which was responsible for the purchase
of land and the leasing of such land to Jews, for example, prescribed
fines and even the eventual eviction of farmers breaking the rule
against employing non-Jewish labor.

1

Similarly, the Jewish Agency,

founded in 1929 as the representative of the world Jewry, stated in its
constitution that "The agency shall promote agricultural colonization
based on Jewish labour, and in all works by the Agency, it shall be
deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be
employed." 2
These policies by the other Zionist institutions were completely in
line with the demands of the Histadrut which played a major role in
their implementation.

Once founded the Histadrut declared that it would

aim to improve the conditions of the Jewish workers, whether cooperators
or hired workers.

The key element in this doctrine was "the assumption

that Jewish capital had no national value without Jewish labour".

3

The

importance of the "conquest of labour" was explained by Abraham Granott,
who was then chairman of the board of directors of the Jewish National
Fund (J.N.F.), this way:
Without Jewish labour even the ownership of the land could not serve
as a guarantee of the national character of the enterprise, and the
Jewish future would not be assured .... The extent of Jewish labour
in the old villages, ... was as a rule only limited, and even those

1

Ruedy, J. 'Dynamics of Land Alienation', in I. Abu-Loghud (ed.),
The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston, Northwestern University
Press, 1971, p. 130.
2

Cited in ibid., p. 130.

3

Lucas, 1974, p. 54.
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plantations which engaged workers, there was always a group of Arab
employees receiving low wages in comparison with the Jews. The
existence of such bodies of Arabs in Jewish villages was somewhat of
a danger to security in times of emergency, and even more to the
maintenance of a higher economic standards. 4
By the early 1930's the Histadrut succeeded in gaining control of a
large segment of the Jewish labour market through the enforcement of
hiring rules, stating that only Jewish labor be hired. 5 The Histadrut's
campaign against Arab workers went beyond mere declarations. According
to Flapan, 6 force was also used to evict Arab workers from Jewish
enterprises. He describes such campaigns which took place in 1933 this
way:
Specifically formed mobile units moved from place to place to
identify and evict by force, if necessary, Arab workers from
construction sites and other Jewish enterprises. Every single case
of removal of Arab workers - and in many cases the operation took
the form of an ugly scene of violence - was reported in the Jewish
press and reverberated in the Arab media creating an atmosphere of
unprecedented tension.
Clearly, such actions by the Histadrut were against the interests and
wishes of Jewish employers who prefered to continue benefiting from
cheap Arab labor.

Hence, to be more forceful the Histadrut described

its actions as being on behalf of the national, i.,e., Jewish interest,
rather than merely reflecting the interests of labor.

This was not very

difficult to do because since the early days of its founding the
Histadrut had involved itself in the conflict between the Zionist

4

Granott, A., Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London, Eyre
and Spottiswoode, 1956, p. 51.
5

Lucas, 1974, p. 153.

6

Flapan, S., 1979, p. 266.
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Organization and the Palestinian Arabs.

One of the Histadrut's most

notable activities in this regard was the creation and maintenance of
the Haganah, the underground army which fought against the Arabs and
British and became, in 1948, the foundation of the Israel Defense
Forces.

Hence, as a trade union the Histadrut's historical development,

political aims and economic practices set it apart from most labor
unions in the West. Having emerged as an integral part of a nationalist
movement (the Zionist movement), and not as a result of mass workers'
aspirations, the Histadrut was bound to adopt nationalistic, i. e.,
Zionist ideology.
The most important aspect of the ideology adopted at the time by the
Zionist movement and subsequently by the Histadrut was the exclusive
national rights of Jews over Palestine. This aspect of the ideology
resulted not only in the exclusion of Arab workers from membership in
the Histadrut but helped enlist its members for the 'struggle' against
the Arabs in general and the Arab workers in particular. As it was
articulated by Yago, the task of the Histadrut
was not solely to divert working class struggles, but to eliminate
part of the working class (the Palestinian Arabs) from labour market
competition in order to accomplish the two-pronged state building
program of the Zionist movement- 'conquest of labour/conquest of
land. I?
Thus, the emphasis by the Histadrut on hiring only Jewish workers was a
logical extension of its ideological commitments.

In 1935 the Histadrut

representatives on the Zionist Executive Council "promoted a motion

7

Yago, G., "Whatever Happened to the Promised Land? Capital. Flows
and the Israeli State." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 21, 1976-7, p.
126.
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(which was unanimously adopted) emphasizing the duty of all members of
the Zionist Organization to employ only Jewish labor.

Defiance of this

resolution would entail expulsion from the Zionist Organization."'
While hostility against Arab labor continued throughout the pre-state
history the establishment of the state in 1948 did not bring about an
immediate change in the Histadrut's orientation toward the Arabs.
The Post-State Period - (1948-1958)
The importance of examining the attitudes of the Histadrut toward
Arab labor lies in the power and influence of the Histadrut on the
Israeli economic, political and social life.
Since its founding in 1920 the Histadrut has grown into conglomorate
holding corporations, companies, banks, industrial concerns, and agroindustries.

Although the Histadrut represents over 80 percent of Jewish

employees, 9

its union activities, according to Davis, "constitute a

fraction of its interests,

concentrated in one of its numerous

specialized departments, the Department of Labour Union." 10

8

Zvi Sussman, "The Policy of the Histadrut with Regard to Wage
Differentials: A Study of the Impact of Egalitarian Ideology and Arab
Labour on Jewish Wages in Palestine", Jerusalem, Hebrew University
Press, 1969, p. 162.
9

S. Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978, p. 106.
·

10

p. 50.

Uri Davis, Israel: Utopia Incorporated, London: Zed Press, 1977,
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Industries controlled by the Histadrut employ 23. 3 percent of
Israel's total labor force and produce 20. 8 percent of Israel's GNP
(figures for 1968/69). The Histadrut has a virtual monopoly over health
insurance services (there is no national health insurance in Israel)
with an extended network of Histadrut-owned and operated hospitals,
dispensaries, and rest homes. It also operates mutual aid funds and
pension funds for its members.

Members of the Histadrut enjoy a variety

of services offered by the organization such as Histadrut-sponsored
vocational training programs, evening educational courses, social and
cultural clubs, and sports leagues. The Histadrut also publishes books
and periodicals, sponsors group tours abroad, and cond,1cts a host of
educational, technical, and propaganda activities.
and work conditions

The fact that wages

are negotiated between the Histadrut and the

Industrialists' Union and the government on a nation-wide basis further
extends the power, influence and prestige of the Histadrut.
following the establishment of the state, the Histadrut did all in
its power to preserve available jobs
immigrants.

for Jewish workers

and new

With a double-digit unemployment rate among the Jewish

population, (see Table 2.5) the Histadrut was not in the mood to 'talk'
Arabic. During this period (1948-1959), the preferred method of dealing
with Arab workers by the Histadrut continued to be exclusion.

Arabs

were only allowed to take those jobs which were undesired by Jewish
labor.

As Aharon Cohen, writing in 1964, testifies:

In the period 1948-58, the Arab worker
unskilled, manual jobs that were the most
paid, jobs shunned by the Jewish workers
cleaning jobs, unskilled jobs in quarries
like ...

was driven into the
exhausting and least well
such as mixing plaster,
and construction _and the
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Most office and other work in the state was closed to the
Arabs;....
when an Arab managed to "snatch" a few days on
construction job or in other city work, in some primitive workshop,
or on the margins of Jewish agriculture in some settlement, he was
inevitably fired for not being "organized". "Attacks" on the Arab
workers intensified during unemployment crises affecting the Jewish
population, when even the meanest jobs were in demand. 11
Two related conditions
against the Arabs possible:

aided the Histadrut in making exclusion
a) control over all labor exchanges making

them available to Histadrut members only (which excluded the Arabs as
non-members); and b) the restriction on the movement of Arabs imposed by
the military governemnt making Arabs unemployable in metropolitan areas.
In fact, according to Ben-Porath, the Histadrut exercised a veto during
this period over the granting of work permits by the military government
to Arab villagers wishing to work in metropolitan areas.

12

Even without the requirement of membership the Arabs would have been
given the lowest priority in job allocation by the Histadrut labor
exchanges.

All the characteristics which weighed heavily in giving

applicants priority worked against the Arabs. Among these criteria:
service in the Israeli and British armies, a year of imprisonment or
banishment in the Diaspora, or carrying out tasks for the Zionist
movement which led to a delay in immigrating to the country.

13

11

Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, Tel-Aviv, Merhavya, 1964,
pp. 530-32.
12

Ben-Porath, Y., The Arab Labor Force in
Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1966, pp. 52-55.
13

Israel,

Israel

Center of General Labor Exchanges, The Labor Exchange
Constitution: The Work Priority Constitution, Tel-Aviv, 1954, pp. 12-13,
(Hebrew). In Ben-Porath, p. 55.
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In addition to the Histadrut and the military government, the
Ministry of Labor was also involved in monitoring Arab access to the
general market. Until 1958 the Ministry of Labor had opened a sum of
nine labor exchanges in the Arab sector. Of these, three were opened in
rural areas in three of the villages of the Little Triangle; Um-el-Fahm,
Taibeh and Baqua-el-Gharbieh. The other six were opened in Nazareth and
the mixed towns of Haifa, Akka, Jafa, Ramleh and Lydd.
One should not get the false impression,

however, that these

exchanges were engaged in finding jobs for the Arabs. As Ben-Porath
argues, the exchanges "played no role in actually finding work for Arabs
in the Jewish sector". Because, he argues, "they (the exchanges), were
cut off from tbe general network of labor exchanges", (which, as noted
above, was controlled by the Histadrut), and "which objected to Arabs
entering the Jewish labor market." 14 The function of the exchanges seems
to have been twofold: a) the monitoring and regulati.on of Arab worker's
entry to the Jewish sector; b) the distribution of relief workdays
alloted to Arab workers by the government.

15

The number and geographic locations of these exchanges further
testify to their inadequacy in serving Arab workers.

Despite the fact

that the bulk of the Arab population resided in rural areas, only one-

14

15

Ben-Porath, The Arab ....

pp. 52-53.

The allotment of relief work days was used by the government to
relieve unemployment and construct public projects. This method was
discontinued in 1963. From 1953 to 1963 the average yearly allotment to
the Arabs was about 93,000 work days. The figurs for 1961 show that in
that year, for example, 35 work days were alloted per unemployed Arab
compared to over 100 work days alloted to unemployed Jew. See BenPorath, fn. 10, p. 53.
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third of these exchanges were opened in such areas. This may have been
due to the fact that the military government's use of restriction orders
on the movement of Arabs proved to be effective in regulating the Arabs'
entry to Jewish markets. As for the Arabs residing in mixed towns the
military regulations did not apply nor was the rule of localism 15
applicable

in their

case.

Since,

according to Ben-Porath,

"the

Histadrut exchanges refused to deal with Arab manpower", without the
labor exchanges of the ministry this manpower would have been left
unregulated.
The significance of those exchanges became clear when it was realized
that Arabs who found work on their own needed the consent of the
exchange for work permits.

This consent depended on the employment

situation in the intended place of work and on the applicant's right to
employment. This right for employment was determined on the basis of,
among other things, ownership of land.
for such

determination was

ever

Since no minimum amount of land

specified,

a person

could be

disqualified, in theory at least, for owning a very small plot of land.
As for the Labor Ministry's exchanges in the rural areas it is
important to emphasize that the three branches were all located in the
area closest to the economic center of Israel where workers would be
most in demand.

Thus, the demand that workers obtain the consent of the

labor exchange before accepting employment and the fact that those

16

The rule of localism stipulates that workers residing in one
geographic area have priority to jobs in their area over outsiders.
This, as will be explained, was used as a form of protectionism against
Arab workers who usually resided in all-Arab towns and villages with
very little employment opportunities.
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exchanges had the authority to withhold this consent seem to have been
designed to restrict rather than enhance the entry of Arab labor to the
Jewish sector.

Neither the villages of Galilee, where most of the Arabs

reside, nor the Negev in the South, where the Bedouins reside, had any
labor exchanges in their villages.

Applications for travel permits to

search for and accept employment by Arabs residing in those areas were
handled directly by the military government.

As noted earlier (see

chapter 5) the issuance of such permits not only was limited but took
into account employment conditions in the Jewish sector.
To summarize, during the first few years of statehood the entry of
the Arab labor force into the Jewish sector was not only monitored but
was controlled in order to give preference to Jewish labor. The three
agencies most responsible for this monitoring and control were the
military government and the Labor Ministry, both of which represent the
government, and the Histadrut, representing the interests of labor.
During this period both the government and the Histadrut were controlled
by Mapai.

The fact that Mapai enjoyed public support for its policies

whereas Herut and the Liberals who represented mostly employers and the
well educated, well to do middle-class, were politically weak (see
Chapter 3) made the Histadrut

'triumphant'

exclusionary policies toward the Arabs.

with regard to

its

Depressed economic conditions

coupled with high rate of unemployment among the Jewish population
during this initial period, seem to have played a decisive role in the
struggle over the status of Arab labor between the Histadrut and Jewish
employers tipping the balance in favor of the Histadrut.

The next

section will examine the labor market conditions during this period.
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Labor Market Conditions and Arab Labor
(1948-1959)
The economic conditions immediately following the establishment of
the state, coupled with a massive influx of immigration, made employment
opportunities extremely limited.

Between 1948 and 1964 the Jewish

population of Israel tripled (Table 1.1) and the increase in the Jewish
labor force was similar (Table 2.5).

The Jewish population grew from

about 649,000 in 1948 to about 2,239,000 at the end of 1964. Most of
this increase (67 percent) was due to immigration. In fact by the end of
1951 (only three years after the establishment of the state), the Jewish
population more than doubled, reaching 1,404,000 with 88 percent of the
increase due to immigration.
Between 1948 and 1951,

17

the

period during which the highest

immigration influx occured (see Table 1.1), the economy was dominated by
the need to furnish basic provisions for the large and continuing influx
of immigrants. According to Pack, consumer demands for all manufactured
goods were rapidly increasing but no commensurate increase in domestic
supply was forthcoming.

18

Pack also argues that this lack of domestic

supply was a result of "lack of capital with which to employ potential
workers and the immigrants unfamiliarity with industrial occupations." 19
Thus, a very high proportion of manufactured consumer goods was supplied

17

Friedlander, D. and Goldscheider, C., The Population of Israel,
Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1979, pp. 30-31, tables 2.1, 2.2.
18

Pack, H., Structured Change and Economic Policy in Israel, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 73.
19

Ibid., p. 74.

179
through imports.

Such economic conditions and activities were reflected

in a high rate of unemployment as shown in table 1.
As measured by several indices the economy began showing signs of
expansion after 1954. 20 A good proportion of imported goods started to
be manufactured locally under a policy of import substitution.
imports constituted

only 25. 8 percent

of the total

manufactured goods (domestic plus foreign)

By 1958

supply of

compared to 46 percent in

1951. 21
Not only did the ratio of import relative to domestic production
decline,

but the proportion of

exported domestic products

rose

considerably. In terms of manufactured goods the proportion rose from
5.2 percent in 1951 to 14.5 percent in 1958 and to 23.6 percent in 1964.
Export of agricultural output rose from 9.2 percent in 1951 to 18.3
percent in 1964. 22
The gross domestic product also showed a dramatic increase during the
period 1950-1965. In 1950 the gross domestic product was 1,160,000 IL
(Israeli Lira) compared to 1,884,000 IL in 1954, 2,719,000 IL in 1958,
and 5,245,000 IL in 1965, all calculated on the basis of 1955 prices.
The compounded rates of growth for these years was about 10 percent
annually.

2 3

20

Ibid., p. 75.

21

Ibid., p. 74.

22

Ibid., p. 65, table 3.6.

23

Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, pp. 140-41. In Pack, 1971,
p. 29, table 2.8.
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The

data also

show

inter

expansion. 24 This unevenness

and intra-sectoral

variations

in

in development among the sectors was

affected to a great extent by government decisions.

In formulating its

policies the government took into consideration the sector's capacity to
absorb the unemployed and anticipated growth in the labor

force

irrespective of productive efficiency. 25 Such policies should not be
surprising coming from a government headed by Mapai claiming to be
protector of labor's interests.

The results of this policy of economic

expansion were reflected in the decline of unemployment from almost 14
percent in 1949 to 5.7 percent in 1958 and to 3.3 percent in 1964 (see
Table 2.5).
The actual decline in the unemployment rate would have been even
greater had it not been for some distortion in the figures of the early
years.

Those figures do not include, for example, underemployment

estimated to have been around 5 percent, 26 nor do they include those
immigrants who were housed in temporary camps and were not required to
register in labor exchanges. 27 These facts help magnify the extent to
which the economy was able to absorb the numbers of job-seekers who, as
a

result

of

immigration,

were

proportionally and in absolute.

continuously

increasing

both

The exclusion of the Arabs enabled the

Histadrut to secure many jobs for Jewish immigrants, a task which also

24

for more detailes see Pack, tables 4.1, 4.2, pp. 74-77.

25

Ibid., p. 14.

26

Ibid., fn. 23, p. 13.

27

Friedlander, D., The Population ..... , p. 14; Ben-Porath, The Arab
Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, p. 48.
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proved politically beneficial to Mapai.

And, to be successful in its

efforts the Histadrut continued to play the nationalistic tune in
conjunction with the national security tune played by the military
government.
Other reasons can be pointed out to explain employers' acquiescence
with these policies manifested in the absence of any vigorous campaigns
for more access to Arab labor, although there was always a demand to
abolish travel restrictions.

For one thing the private sector was not

well developed nor was the need for labor particularly great.

2) The

travel restrictions were neither absolute nor unbendable legally and
illegally, which meant employers were, at least partially, enjoying the
henefits of cheap Arab labor. 3) Not all Jews, especially the newcomers,
were automatically organized through the Histadrut. That meant there
was, for a while at least, a pool of Jewish 'cheap' labor from which
employers could fill their needs, and those Jews were indeed earning low
incomes.

As Pack notes:

... during at least part of the 1950's, differences in pretax income
were widening; as might be expected the immigration lowered the
level of unskilled wages relative to skilled. 28 The intervention of
the Histadrut, which reflected their strongly egalitarian
philosophy, prevented actual differences in income from reaching
levels that would have occured solely through market forces.
Nevertheless, there were growing differences between incomes of
veteran (pre 1948) residents and new immigrants. 29

28

Uri Baharal, The Effect of Mass Immigration on Wages in Israel,
Jerusalm: Falk Project, 1965. In Ibid., p. 188.
29

Ibid. , p. 189.
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As the economy expanded around the mid-fifties, and demand for labor
increased with Arabs still excluded from the labor market, wages for
Jewish labor began rising.

Table 6.1 below shows a rate of increase in

wages of about 10 percent compounded annually.

Furthermore, the Table

shows that these increases in wages correspond to decreases in the
unemployment rate.
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TABLE 6.1
Nominal Wage Changes and Unemployment Rates
(1956-1965)
Wages
(Percentage from
Previous Year)
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

Unemployment
Percentage of Labor
Force
7.8
6.9
5.7
5.5
4.6
3.6
3.7
3.6
3.3
3.6

11.0
8.5
11.4
7.2
6.3
11.0
13.0
12.0
12.0
20.0

Source: Abridged from Howard Pack, Structural Change and Economic Policy
in l5rael, New Haven: Yale University Press, Table 7.10, p. 205.

Other consequences of the expansion of the economy were the opening
of new job opportunities in the industrial and construction sectors.
Having gained experience with the passage of time and gained command of
the language, the new immigrants set out to take advantage of the newly
created opportunities.

Since agricultural work was less rewarding (in

terms of wages and benefits) than industrial employment, a shift from
the former to the latter began to take place triggering a process of
decline in the percent of Jewish men employed in agriculture.
the period

1958-1962,

the greatest

rate of decline

During

in agricultural
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employment occured among immigrants from Asia-Africa.

(see Table 6.2).

As a result there was a change in both the supply and the structure of
demand for agricultural labor.

TABLE 6.2
Employed Jewish Men in Agriculture:
1958-1963 (percent of total Jewish employed men)

Year

All Jews

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Source:

Asia-Africa
(new immigrants)

16.5
15 .3
15 .3
14.7
13.0
12.4

Ben-Porath,

The

Arab

29.0
25 .8
24.2
22.2
n.d.
n.d.

Labor

Force

in

Israel,

Jerusalem,

Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.12, p. 32.

The mechanization of agriculture and the shift to specialization and
industrial crops resulted in a decline in the demand for farm workers as
a

whole,

increased.

while

at

Since

the

same

Jewish

time

workers

the

demand

were

able

for
to

seasonal
find

more

workers
stable

employment in industry the need for Arab workers to fill those seasonal
positions

intensified.

Similar

processes

of

mechanizatipn

and
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specialization were experienced by other branches of the economy. For
example, the construction industry which experienced rapid expansion due
to the increased need to house new immigrants, also chose the route of
mechanization and specialization. Consequently, the demand for unskilled
labor

intensified.

This

demand

was

ultimately

filled,

at

least

partially, through the hiring of Arab labor. The figures in Table 6. 3
show that the percent of Arab labor employed in construction between
1958 and 1963 increased from 19.4

to 25.6.

TABLE 6.3
Non-Jewish Employed men, by Industry:
1958-1963 (percent)
Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Source:

Agriculture
42.4
44.0
46.8
44.0
45.1
38.0

Ben-Porath,

Manufacturing

19.4
14.8
15 .4
18.0
20.l
25.6

16.1
17.2
15.7
16.7
14.3
17.7

The

Arab

Construction

Labor

Force

Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.11, p. 31.

Other
22.1
24.0
22.1
21.3
20.5
21. 7

in

Israel,

Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Jerusalem,
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The expansion of the labor market coupled with the anticipation of a
limited

expansion

immigration)

in

the

together

with

Jewish
a

labor

shift

force

in

the

(due

structure

to
of

decline
demand

in
for

workers in certain sectors and the rising cost of Jewish labor resulted
in an increase in demand for Arab labor.

It is at this time when the

demand for the abolition of travel restictions began intensifying (see
Chapter 5).

However, the fact that Arab labor, prior to its admission

to the Histadrut, operated more clandestinely meant that employers did
not

have

to

abide

by the

labor

union's

rules

concerning wages

and

benefits paid to Arab labor who were unorganized and vulnerable to such
exploitation due to their limited resources and employment alternatives.
Paradoxically,

this

weakness

of

the

Arab

labor

increased

their

competitive potential and 'threat' for Jewish labor who were members of
the Histadrut.

3 0

corresponding

fears

This competitive potential of the Arab labor and the
by

the

Histadrut

were

further

intensified

by

a

government dicision in 1958 to begin a process of relaxation on travel
restrictions

(see

Chapter

5).

The

next

section

describes

the

Histadrut's response to these and other developments.

The Opening of the Histadrut to Arab Membership

In 1959 the Histadrut announced its decision to open its ranks to
Arab membership. Such an event symbolized the end of an era for the Arab
labor force.

The argument that the decision by the Histadrut was a

result of an attempt to bridge the gap between its

3 0

'working-class'

See Chapter 1 and Bonacich argument concerning the relationship
between the weakness of minority labor and its threatening potential
against majority labor.
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'socialist-internationalist'

ideology and discrimination against the

Arabs is untenable. In the first place those who advance such an
argument present no data in support of their claim.

Secondly, if indeed

this shift in the policy of the Histadrut towards the Arabs can be
attributed to its egalitarian philosophy, then one would assume that
some precipitating event(s) must have occured to elicit such a shift.
Otherwise, how else can one explain the fact that for over 39 years the
Histadrut was able to reconcile the differences between this presumed
philosophy and its discrimination against Arab labor?
The fact that one can search in vain for such event(s) which,
suddenly, made the gap between a 39 year old ideology (1920-1959) and
practice unbearable and in need of abridgement weakens this argument
considerably.

What brought about this decision by the Histadrut, I

propose, was: a) the expansion of the Israeli economy and its need for
unskilled labor which could not be met by Jewish labor; and b) the
Histadrut 's desire to regulate the entry of the Arab

labor force

limiting its competitive potential through, among other things and in an
awkward way,

raising Arab wages so that Arab labor becomes less

attractive to Jewish employers.
The increasing demand for Arab labor, the result of increased demand
for labor which could no longer be fulfilled by Jewish labor, was
perhaps the most important factor percipitating a change in attitude of
the Histadrut.

As noted, the Histadrut was controlled by Mapai, which

also controlled the government.

Since Mapai was competing with other

political parties for Jewish constituency, a continued control. over
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business's access to Arab labor was neither in the best interest of the
country or Mapai.

Especially, that the near full employement among

Jewish labor weakened in part the argument of the Histadrut against
employing Arab labor.
Furthermore, the mounting pressure on the government to abolish
travel restrictions, indeed the whole military government system (see
chapter 5), made the relaxation on travel restrictions, which were first
introduced in 1958, a non-reversable process.

This action increased the

availability of Arab workers to Jewish employers. As non-union members
the Arabs were not in a good bargaining position, accepting whatever
wages and benefits they were offered.

These developments placed the

Arabs in a position of undercutting the Histadrut's efforts to secure
more jobs and better work conditions for its Jewish members.

Thus, with

the relaxation of restriction orders the policy of exclusion by the
Histadrut was no longer practical or enforcable.

It was replaced by a

policy of caste-like, restricting the Arab workers' mobility vertically
into subordinate positions as well as horizontally limiting their access
to certain job-categories.

This new policy was also a policy of

containment.
The passage of the Employment Service Law in 1959, furthermore, made
exclusion not only impractical but even illegal.

It set up the

Employment Service to which Histadrut labor exchanges were transferred.
The law also required both workers and employers to resort to labor
exchanges and prohibited discrimination on grounds of,

inter alia,
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religion, nationality or race. 31 The law's anti-discrimination measures
against the Arabs, however, were limited. The loopholes provided by
section 42(b) of the law left the Arab workers vulnerable to arbitrary
measures by the labor exchange officers.

This section states that "It

shall not be considered discrimination if the character or nature of the
task or considerations of state security prevents or prevent a person's
being sent to or engage in some particular work." 32
This clause seems to have provided the legal basis for disguised
discrimination against the Arabs who alone, as a group, were considered
high security risks.

Furthermore,

the law stipulates that

labor

exchanges had to be established everywhere, and the Employment Service
regulations recognized the link between the worker and the exchange in
his place of residence and gave priority and protection to local
workers.

Since the bulk of the Arab population lived in segregated all-

Arab towns and villages (see Table 2.3) it was possible through this
clause to restrict the Arab workers'

entry to Jewish settlements

whenever such an action was desired.
Hence, while the provisions of the law to control and expand labor
exchanges somewhat legitimized the entry of much needed Arab workers to
Jewish settlements and enterprizes, the clauses of security and localism
provided the legal framework for the closure of certain job categories
and positions in the face of Arabs.

Since both clauses amount to a

measure of protectionism for the Jewish workers it is likely (although I

31

Laws of the State of Israel, 1959, vol. 13, p. 34.

32

Ibid. p. 34.
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have no data to support this), that the two clauses of security and
localism were the result of a compromise negotiated by representatives
of business and the Histadrut representing the workers.
Nevertheless, the enact ion of the Employment Service law and the
relaxation of travel restrictions, two not unrelated events, resulted in
an increase in the participation of Arabs in the labor force.

As can be

seen from Table 6.4, between 1958 and 1963 the most dramatic increases
occured in the lower (14-17) and upper (55+) age-categories.

While the

participation of the former increased from 41. 5 to 60. 6 percent the
latter increased from 32.4 to 45.5 percent with the other age-categories
showing only modest increases.
The significance of these increases, particularly in the two extreme
age-categories, lies in the fact that in times of high unemployment
these age-categories are expendable and usually show a higher than
average rate of unemployment

(the former on the basis of lack of

experience while the latter on the basis of weakened physical ability).
It is when a labor shortage is experienced that those two age groups are
recruited to the labor force.

Furthermore, such recruitment could very

well indicate a rising demand for certain, unskilled labor especially in
the areas of agriculture and services, as the case is shown to have
been.
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TABLE 6.4
Labor Force Participation of Non-Jewish Men
by Age: 1958-1963

Source:

Year

14-17

18-34

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

41.5
49.2
49.7
58.4
60.7
60.6

90.1
92.0
92.9
93.9
94.4
94.8

Ben-Porath,

y.,

The

Arab

Labor

35-54

55+

88.6
86.8
86.9
90.0
91.4
93.6

32.4
36.9
39.9
40.3
41.1
45.5

Force

in

Israel,

Jerusalem,

by

Histadrut,

Universities Press, 1966, Table 1.10, p. 17.

The

change

in policy

toward

the

Arab workers

the

therefore, seems to have been an expression of accommodation to these
emerging economic as well as structural realities which in the long run
proved to be in the interest of its Jewish constituency.
from

occupational data

Jewish

labor

Orientals.

the

overall

effect of

displacement

has

been the

upward

These

dynamics

seem

initial period of the Arabs'

to

entry

the
of

As is evident

entry of Arabs
Jews

have been maintained
to the labor market.

on

particularly
beyond the
The recent

study by Epstein and Semyonov analyzing data on Arab and Jewish labor
between the years 1969 and 1982 concludes that the higher the status of
an occupation the more likely was the in-mobility of Jews relative to
Arabs (both citizens and noncitizens).

This led the authors to conclude

that

some upward mobility,

"although

Israeli Arabs

enjoyed

.the gap
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between them and Jews grew wider". 3 3 That the change in policy was
undertaken by

the Histadrut

as

a

strategy designed

to combat

Arab

labor's competitiveness, and not as a result of a genuine change in its
outlook toward Arab labor or indeed a desire to integrate Arabs,
further

evidenced by the

members

in 1959

it

was

fact

is

that although Arabs were accepted as

only in

1965

that

they were

permitted

to

participate in the election to the Histadrut convention. In fact, until
then (1965) the Histadrut continued to have as its official name as the
General Federation of Jewish (emphasis added) Workers of the Land of
Israel.
Furthermore, one can ahw argue that a genuine change in outlook on
the basis of egalitarian philosophy would have produced equality or at
least equality of opportunities. While in theory Arab and Jewish members
of the Histadrut are equal 34 in practice it has not been the case.

The

Arabs are still being dealt with through a special department (the Arab
Department).

This suggests that the Histadrut is still in favor of, and

accordingly continues to maintain, separation between Arabs and Jews.

A

quick look at the Histadrut institutions and economic activities reveals
that Arabs are still locked out of these institutions.

According to

Lustick, "Of the thousands of Histadrut-owned firms and factories, not
one was located in an Arab village in 1977 .... , 35 there were, in 1975,
only 5 Arabs on the 168-member Histadrut Executive (Vaad Hapoal) and no

33

Lewin-Epstein, N., and Semyonov, M., 1986, p. 350.

34

Even this statement can be contested in light of the fact that the
Histadrut still maintains a separate Arab Department.
35

To my knowledge this statement remains accurate even today.
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Arab members of the 18-member Central Committee of the Histadrut. Nor
were there any Arabs among the over 600 managers and directors-general
of Hivrat Ovdim industries. 113 6 This means not only that Arab input or
influence on the decision making process
nonexistent

but

more

importantly,

this

in the Histadrut is
suggests

a

almost

continuation

of

limited upward mobility for Arabs.
Jewish Labor Protected
I have shown, so far, that while expropriation of Arab land resulted
in an increase in the proportion of Arab labor, the system of military
government in conjuction with Histadrut pressures limited the access of
this labor to the general labor market. Furthermore, I have argued that
the expansion of the economy accompanied by an increase in labor demand
which could not be fulfilled by Jewish labor forced structural changes
(the eventual abolition of the system of the military government) as
well as changes in the dynamics employed by representative of labor, the
Histadrut (from exclusion to caste-like).
The discussion so far seems to indicate that leaders of both the
government and the Histadrut attempted, with great eagerness, to protect
Jewish labor and its interests. This eagerness may have been motivated
by nationalistic, i.e.,

Zionist and anti-Arab,

feelings as well as

determination on the part of those leaders to create and maintain a
Jewish working class in accordance with the original Zionist ideology
and aspirations. 37

36

Lustick, 1980, pp. 96-7.
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I propose, however, that part of the reason that Jewish labor needed
such protective measures lies in the competitive potential of Arab
labor. And one of the most important factors which made Arab labor
attractive and increased their competitive potential against Jewish
workers is wage differentials.

It must be emphasized at this juncture,

however, that while the initial differnces in wages are partly rooted in
the unequal development of the two sectors prior to the establishment of
the state, mostly reflected in differences in living conditions, style
of life and other matters (see Chapter 1), the continuation of wage
differentials between Arabs and Jews are partially an artifcat of
restrictions, land confiscation, the Histadrut' s practices and other
policies which continue to reproduce these conditions.
The next two sections will document Arab-Jewish differentiation in
terms of hierarchical location and wages.

Although systematic data with

regard to differences in wages do not seem to be available it is
possible, nevertheless, with the help of sporadic data and background
variables to shed some light on this aspect of Jewish-Arab relations.
In general, differences in wages can be manifested in two ways:

a)

differential in sectoral and hierarchical positioning, or b) differences
in wages for similar work within the same or similar sectors.

3 7

The coincidence between the government views and those of the
Histadrut may have been in part due to the fact that most leaders of the
government fulfilled important posts in the Histadrut prior to the
establishment of the state. And, until 1977, when the Labor Alignment
lost the elections to the likod, both the government and the Hi_stadrut
were controlled by Mapai.
(see further details on biographies of some
of the leaders in chapter .... )
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Sectoral and Hierarchical Positioning of the Arabs
While differences

in wages

and benefits on the basis of

job

differentiation and positioning are accepted norms in any stratification
system, it is the concentration of a certain category of people (whether
this category is based on race,

religion or ethnicity) which raises

questions. In the case of the Arabs in Israel, since the establishment
of the state they have been primarily concentrated in those sectors of
the economy which demand few skills and in which remuneration and work
conditions are among the lowest.

Table 6.5 below shows a rough

distribution of the Arab labor force between 1954 and 1963 by sector.

TABLE 6.5
Non-Jewish Employed Men by Occupation:
Year

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
Source:

Profess. & Traders
Administ.
workers
6.0
7.2
7.1
5.4
5.4
5.6
6.0
5.1
5.2
5.7
Ben-Porath,

6.5
7.7
7.3
5.4
7.0
6.8
6.6
5.3
5.8
5.0
y.,

Farmers

53.7
48.0
50.7
46.0
40.7
43.2
45.5
42.9
44.0
38.0

Transport
workers

2.3
4.3
3.7
2.8
4.1
3.8
4.4
3.9
5.1
5.0

1954-1963 (percent)
Manufac- Service Total
turing & Workers
Construct.
27.2
28.8
26.5
35.5
37.5
34.0
31.3
36.0
34.6
43.8

4.3
4.3
4.7
4.9
5.3
6.6
6.2
6.8
5.3
6.3

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

The
Arab
Labor
Force
- -- - - in Israel, Jerusalem,
- -

Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.8, p. 29.

196
The most striking piece of information presented in Table 6.5 is the
high concentration of Arabs

in agriculture and construction.

A more

careful examination of the Table would reveal that the annual decline in
the proportion of agricultural workers was absorbed almost entirely by
the construction branch.

The decline in agricultural workers was shown

in chapter 4 to have been, partially, a result of Arab land confiscation
policies.

The

difficulty

in

separating

self-employed

Arabs

in

agriculture from Arab wage laborers (on Arab and Jewish farms) makes it
also difficult to assess the exact implications of land confiscation on
the transformation of Arab labor. As noted earlier, however, during the
late 1950's some of the Arab labor was channeled to agricultural labor
in order to fill the vacancy created by occupational shifts of Jewish
labor from agriculture to industry.
Part of this Arab labor which was channelled to agriculture may have
also been employed in agriculture in the Arab sector, either as selfemployed land owners or as wage laborers. Had it not been for this fact
the rate of decline in Arab agricultural workers may have been even
greater.
It

is of sociological significance,

therefore,

to point out that

while occupationally some of the Arabs engaged in agricultural work did
not experience a shift, their status was, nevertheless, transformed from
independent to dependent workers;

from self-employed land-owners into

hired agricultural workers. The figures in the Table do not reflect this
reality.

Those

Arabs

did

not

only

experience

a

decline

in

their

occupational status but by going to agriculture they also over-crowded
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this sector which is partially responsible for the depressed wages it
offers in comparison with other employment sectors.

38

TABLE 6.6
Non-Jewish Employed Persons as Percent of All Employed
persons, by Industry: 1961-1963
Both Sexes

Agriculture
Manufacturing
Construction
Other Industies
All Industries
Source:

Men

1961

1963

1961

1963

22.1
4.9
13.5
3.4
7.9

22.0
5.4
18.0
3.6
8.1

23.3
5.8
13.8
4.5
9.2

23.2
6.3
18.3
4. 7
9.7

Ben-Porath,

y.,

The Arab

Labor Force in

Israel,

Jerusalem,

Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.3, p. 25.

Table 6. 6 shows that in comparison with the Jewish population the
Arab

labor

force

have

been

over

represented

in

agriculture

and

construction and under-represented in those job-categories which have
high pay and good job conditions. While the Arabs accounted for about 11
percent of
accounted

the total population
for

22

percent

of all

during the specified period 3 9
agricultural

labor.

38

See Chapter 1 for an expanded discussion on
crowdedness on the reproduction of split labor market.
39

Friedlander, The Population ... , TABLE 2.1, p. 30.

they

Similarly,

the

effect

in

of
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construction the Arabs accounted for about 18 percent in 1963.

1950

Between

and

1973

the

proportion

of

Arab

workers

in

the

construction sector rose from 6 to 25.5 percent. 40 This proportion would
have been even greater had it not been for Palestinian workers from the
occupied West-Bank and Gaza who were also channeled, in part, into the
construction industry. A survey of this industry, which was conducted in

1975 in Haifa, shows the proportion of the Israeli Arabs in construction
to be 42.9 percent compared to 36.5 percent of the Jews and 20.5 percent
of the Arabs from the West Bank.

Although

census

data

41

provide

an

indication

of

the

occupational

positioning of the Arabs it is very difficult to infer the sociological
In his 1969 study of Um

significance of the employer/employee status.

el-Fahm, an Arab village of about 11,000 people at the time (in 1986 the
village's

population

was

reported

to

have

reached

22,000

and

its

municipal status was upgraded to city), Garaisy reported that 92 percent
of his sample of 116 villagers working in Jewish settlements occupied
subordinate positions.

Only

8 percent were in

supervisory roles,

and

95. 8 percent of the respondents had Jewish supervisors while for 4. 5
percent the supervisors were Arabs.

42

40

Yachiel Harari, The Arabs in Israel: Facts and Figures, no. 4,
Givat Haviva, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1974, p. 20.
Cited in Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel, 1979, p. 124.
41

Y. Waschitz, "Commuters and Enterpreneurs", New Outlook, vol.

18,

1975, pp. 45-46.
4 2

S. Garaisy, "Arab Village Youth in Jewish Urban Centers: A Study
of Youth from Um El-Fahm Working in Tel-Aviv Metropolitan Area",
unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Brandeis University, 1971.
Cited in
Zureik, 1979, p. 125.
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Hence, the concentration of Arabs in those sectors (see Table 6.6),
despite the fact that they offer low wages and no mobility chances can
only

be

a

result

of

the

closure

of

other

possibilities.

Lack

of

interest by the Histadrut in integrating Arab workers in other branches
of

the

economy makes

affairs.

it

positions

for

this

state of

It is possible that by not integrating the Arabs the Histadrut

attempted to prevent
economy

particularly responsible

thereby
for

over-crowdedness in those other

protecting
its

Jewish

the

highly

desirable

constituency.

As

branches of the
occupations

the

following

and
quote

demonstrates, Arabs were not only pushed to menial jobs but even when
they became organized within the Histadrut they continued to work for
lower

wages

counterparts

and

were

(more

considered

on this

to

later).

work
Writing

harder

than

in 1962,

their

Jewish

Zeev Schiff

of

Haaretz notes:
Even when he is an organized worker registered with the Histadrut,
the Arab does not entertain great illusions, he comes primarily to
work. . .
Another reason for the Jewish employer's preference for
Arab worker is that his wages are generally lower. 43

Arab-Jewish Wage Differentials

Throughout the post-state period Arab labor was said to have been
willing to accept lower wages than Jewish labor, becoming, therefore,
cheaper than Jewish labor to employ.

One of the main reasons for the

'cheapness' of labor, according to Bonacich, is the lack of resources
available to this labor. I have shown elsewhere (see chapter 4) that as
a result of the 1948 war over half of the Arabs who remained in Israel

43

Haaretz, October 19, 1962.
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lost their land or a major portion of it.

Furthermore, I have shown

that through systematic expropriation of land many Arabs lost part or
all of their property. Thus, whether intended or not, the establishment
of the state coupled with certain governmental policies resulted in a
loss of much of the resources over which Arabs had control.
The same argument could be made with respect to political resources.
Although Arabs were never disenfranchised, their political activities
were confined within the existing Zionist parties. They were never
allowed to form their own political party or develop into a pressure
group.

The few attempts to organize politically and enter elections to

the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) in the late 1950's and early 1960's
were immediately suppressed and the leaders for the most part were
banished, detained or put under house arrest.

44

With little economic and political resources, and a lack of union
protection, the Arabs proved to be an easy target for exploitation. One
of the hardest to prove and most disguised form of exploitation,
however, is the existence of wage differentials between Jews and Arabs
doing the same or comparable work.

However, the best available data

suggest that between 1949 and 1952 Arab wages were roughly 35 to 70
percent of the Jewish wages for similar work. The smallest gap was
between Jewish and Arab skilled workers. 45 However, one should bear in

44

For a detailed account of these attempts, most notably the Al-Ard
(the Land) movement and the treatment its leaders received by the
Israeli authorities as well as the press such as continuous harrassment,
banishment, and house confinement, see Lustick, 1980; Jiryis, 1976;
Landau, 1968.
45

Ben-Porath, 1966, p. 70.
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mind that the latter category (skilled labor) encompasses a very small
proportion of the Arab labor force. As late as 1960 it was estimated
that Arabs working in agriculture earned half as much as Jews working in
similar jobs. 46 It is important to note that during that period almost
half of the Arab labor force was employed in agriculture (see Table
6. 5). And the ratio of Arab to Jewish workers working in "Jewish
agriculture" was estimated in 1975 by a study for the Ministry of
Agriculture to be 6:10. 47 That is to say, almost 38 percent of the total
labor engaged in agricultural work were Arabs.

This is far greater than

the 13 percent which represent the proportion of the Arabs in the
population.
Few studies have attempted to compare the average incomes of working
Arabs and Jews.

While family income cannot be taken as a direct measure

of wages it, nevertheless, sheds light on some of its aspects.

Ian

Lustick shows that in 1975/1976 the average per capita income among
Arabs living in urban areas was 572 IL (Israeli Lira), while per capita
Jewish income in these same areas was 1,687 IL, 48 almost three-times
that of the Arabs. Keep in mind that the great majority of the Arabs
live in what are classified as rural areas (see Table 2.3) and have
incomes that are, in general, much lower than urban employees.

With

regard to this fact, Lustick comments that "Judging from a comparison of

46

S. Zarhi and A. Achiezra, The Economic Conditions -of the
Arab
- --Minority in Israel, no. 1, Givat Haviva, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian
Studies, 1966, p. 12.
47

Waschitz, 1975, p. 48.

48

Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 7.
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living conditions in these villages with those prevailing in the towns,
there is every reason to think that had the large villages been included
in the survey, the gap between Jewish and Arab incomes would be shown to
be considerably wider." 49
A survey sponsored by the Histadrut in thirty Arab villages revealed
the average income per Arab family in 1969 to have been 3,910 IL, 50 This
is compared to an average income of Jewish families of 10,500 IL for the
same year. 51 In 1971 yet another study of income inequality showed the
average income of Jewish families to have been 12,900 IL compared to
8,600 IL average income of Arab families.

52

While one can only speculate

on the discrepancies between the differe:'lt estimates, the fact remains
that they all report large gaps in the average incomes between Jewish
and Arab families.

49

53

Ibid., fn. 27, p. 276.

50

Gutman E., Klaf H., and Levi S., The Histadrut and its Activities
in the Arab Sector: Research on the Status, Opinions and Behavior of
Arab Villagers in Israel. Jerusalem, Israel Institute for Applied
Social Research, 1971, (Hebrew), p. 20. Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 7.
51

Lustick, 1980, Table 1, p. 7; Zureik, 1979, Table 5.9, p. 126.

52

Remba Oded, "Income Inequality in Israel: Ethnic Aspects," in
Michael Curtis and Mordechai Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure
and Change, New Brunswick, N. J. Transaction Books, 1973, p. 207.
53

Since the different estimates do not relate to the same years the
discrepancies between them may be partly due to inflation which, in
Israel affects the level of wages in absolute as well as in relative
terms. An agreement which was signed and has been in effect since 1952
with periodic revisions between the government, the Industrialists Union
and the Histadrut stipulates that part of their wages employees should
receive cost-of-living allowance which is sensitive to inflation. For
more details on the way these calculations are made and their effect on
the level of inflation, see Pack, 1971, pp. 201-205.
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Two conclusions can be drawn from what has been said. First, the
relative occupational distribution of Jews

and Arabs since the

establishment of the state has been unfavorable to the Arabs. Data on
employment show that as late as 1975, 19.2 percent of the Arabs compared
with

51.1 percent

of

the

Jews held white-collar

(scientific,

professional, managerial, clerical and business) jobs. 54 The grouping
together of these occupational categories, however, gives

a false

impression concerning the extent of Arab involvement in these top jobs
since most Arab white-collar workers are employed by the Ministry of
Education as school teachers in the Arab sector.
In a survey taken in 1963 of high school graduates, for example, it
was reported that of the 457 respondents 98 were unemployed. Of those
who were employed, 39.6 percent worked as school teachers, 21.2 percent
as clerks, 8. 0 percent as laborers and 31. 2 percent were continuing
their education in Israel and abroad. 5 5 That is to say, of those
employed in white collar occupations 65 percent were school teachers.
Furthermore, in another study which was sponsored by the government, it
was reported that 47.3 percent of those Arab university graduates who
received their degrees between 1961 and 1971 and were employed in white
collar occupations worked as teachers.

56

54

For these comparisons and others, see also S. Smooha, Israel:
Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978,
pp. 138-41.
55

Attalah Mansour, "Arab Intellectuals Not Integrated," New Outlook,
7, no. 3, June 1964, p. 28.
Eli Rechess, ~ Survey of Israeli-Arab Graduates from Inst~tutions
of Higher Learning in Isreal, (1961-1971), Cited in Lustick, 1980, p.
21.
56
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Other categories of employment show that for the same year (1975),
the nonskilled workers among the Arabs amounted to 13.0 percent compared
with 5.2 percent among the Jews; 40.3 percent of the Arab employees were
concentrated in the low-status blue-collar branches of agriculture and
construction compared with only 11.8 percent of Jews.
The second conclusion to be drawn is that while admission of Arabs to
the labor union has contributed somewhat to a rise in their wages, no
equalization effect either occupationally or in terms of hierarchical
positioning, which reflect wages and incomes, were allowed to take
place.

Arabs are still paid less than Jews for doing the same work.

Similarly, while differences in per capita incomes bet•.-1een Arab and
Jewish families have narrowed they are still wide.

It is reported that

in 1973 the per capita income of an average Arab family reached 56
percent of an average income of a Jewish family. This is compared to 35
percent reported in 1956-7. 5 7 These figures are consistent with the
figures reported by Zarhi and Acheizra which show that in 1963 the
average income of an Arab earner is 45 percent of that of a Jewish
earner. 58
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is expected that Arab
family incomes will continue to increase but only up to a point. Since
incomes reflect both wages and occupational and hierarchical locations,
and since Arabs are not expected to reach or even come close to reaching
parity with respect to either their occupational distribution or

57

Smooha, 1978, p. 140.

58

S. Zarhi and A. Acheizra, 1966, p.12.
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hierarchical positioning, it follows that parity in incomes with the
Jewish families should not be expected.
Summary
On the basis of the foregoing it is possible to highlight several
observations. First, the Histadrut has been antagonistic toward Arab
labor and its policies have affected their wages and occupational and
hierarchical locations.

During the first eleven years of statehood

(1948-59) Arab labor was kept out of the Histadrut which practiced a
policy of total exclusion of Arab labor.

This lack of union protection

increased the vulnerability of Arab labor to exploitation.
Second, even the opening up of the Histadrut to Arab membership seems
to have been in line with its original ideology of serving Jewish labor.
This step was taken by the Histadrut following a relaxation on travel
restriction (itself a function of the pressure of expanding economy and
increased demand for labor) which resulted in an increase in Arab
labor's participation in the labor market.
more threatening position to Jewish

The latter placed Arabs in a

labor because of their wage

differentials.
Clearly, then, equalization of wages and benefits for similar work
was in the long-term interest of expensive, i.,e., Jewish labor, because
it minimizes competition and undercutting allowing expensive labor to
preserve whatever gains they had achieved.

The ext ens ion of union

protection to Arab labor has produced such equalization between Arab and
Jewish labor to a great extent.

The immediate results for the Arabs
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have been a considerable improvement in their wages, incomes and status.
Had Arab labor not been extended union protection, equalization of wages
would still have happened as a result of freer entry of Arabs to the
labor market and the resulting effect of crowdedness.

However, such

equalization would have occured under most unfa\r.orable conditions to
Jewish labor, who would have been dragged down trying to compete with
cheaper labor.
The Histadrut opened itself to Arab membership only after the passage
of the Employment Service Law (1959) which set forth the mechanisms of
protectionsm and preservation for Jewish labor.

The law not only

provided a basis of justification for limiting the accessabilty to
certain occupations and positions to Jews (by virtue of their security
standings) but the freer entry of Arabs under these conditions has had
the effect of upward displacement of Jewish labor.

The

lack of

objections by the Histadrut to this differential treatment of its
members coupled with the fact that the Histadrut itself still maintains
a separate department for Arab labor leads me to conclude that the
admission of Arabs to the Histadrut was merely a strategy designed to
protect Jewish labor and not to integrate the Arabs.

To use a different

terminology, the status of the Arabs was transformed from exclusion to
caste-like.

This is to say that by extending union protection to Arab

labor the Histadrut was not compromising the interests of its Jewish
constituency.

Far from it. The data presented show that the Arabs take

jobs which, for the most part, are least desired by Jews.

The more

prestigious jobs are reserved, through protectionist policies, to Jewish
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labor.

Furthermore, while both Arabs and Jews were shown to have

improved their occupational status and incomes, the rate of improvement
among Jews has been far greater.

Hence, while the gap in incomes

between the two groups was very wide prior to the admission of Arabs to
the Histadrut, the data presented in this chapter show that xoward the
1980's this gap grew even wider.

From this perspective, it could be

argued that the Histadrut is still continuing in its long-standing
tradition of protecting Jewish labor, and will continue to do so in the
foreseable future.
As to the business sector, while its access to Arab labor was limited
during the initial period, employers benefited from the lack of union
protection for the Arabs.

Hence, whereas the business sector was active

against the travel restrictions there was no such activity on behalf of
status equalization of Arabs with Jewish labor.

Needless to say that

following the 1967 war and the occupation of the West-Bank and Gaza,
business gained access to the biggest pool of non-unionized, disoriented
and cheap

labor yet.

And,

it is there where business has been

successful in resisting Histadrut's attempts to get employers to pay
higher wages and better benefits for the noncitizen Arab labor which
would,

inevitably,

limit their competitive potential agianst the

Histadrut's Jewish and citizen Arab constituency.
Finally, it is of interest to note that as an employer the Histadrut
should have been equally interested in cheap labor.

After all, the

Histadrut owns and manages many economic firms and projects.

By the mid

1960's the Histadrut had become one of the largest employers in the
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country, second only to the government. It is reported that by 1968 the
Histadrut owned, either fully or in part, 54 of the 205 top companies in
Israel.

59

However, for the Histadrut to have preferred short economic

gains, by allowing free entry of Arabs to a tight labor market, over
long term interests would have
ideologically.

been irrational politically and

First, the Histadrut was a 'national institution' and

was competing for constituency among the Jewish population. Second, it
was ideologically committed to the Zionist ideas and for a long time
advocated the idea of 'Jewish labor'. Deviation from such ideas overnight would not have been either feasible or politically clever.

The

third and most important factor perhaps, was the fact that the Histadrut
was controlled by Mapai (the ruling party at the time) and so was the
government.

Leaders of the government and the Histadrut were related

(either ideologically or personally) 60 which made the Histadrut more
susceptible to influence by the leaders of Mapai and, perhaps, vice
versa.

Advocating policies which negatively effect Jewish

therefore, would have been contrary to party interests.

59

See details in Uri Davis, Israel ...

60

Ibid, p. 103.

1977, pp. 100-103.

labor,

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study an attempt was made to describe and analyse factors
which hindered the full integration of the Arab minority in Israel into
the economic, political and social life of the state.
establishment of the state the Arabs have been

Since the

'welcomed' to a

subordinate minority status where they still remain after almost four
decades of statehood.
There is no doubt that the Palestinian-Jewish conflict which began
long before Israel was established has played a major role in the
treatment of the Arabs.

The continued emphasis on the sectarian

character of the state as a Jewish state through the adoption of Jewish
symbols, history and laws which serve the interests of the Jewish
people, provided the basis for the Arab-Jewish division within the
state.

By virtue of definition, such emphasis regards the Arabs as

outsiders and justifies their treatment as nonequals.
However, despite the continuation and even the intensification of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, certain liberalization of policies toward
the Arabs have ensued.

These can hardly be attributed to any effective

struggle by the Arabs or to the goodwill of the Israeli authorities.
The Arabs were never allowed to organize in an independent political
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party nor could they have developed into an effective pressure group
within the Israeli political system.

The Arab minority which remained

in Israel was basically rural and leaderless, a fact which was further
exacerbated by intra-Arab cleavages along religious, parochial and
geographic lines.

These divisions, which had been maintained during the

Ottoman rule and the British mandate, and reinforced by the Israelis,
delayed the development of national spokesmen for the Arabs.
On the other hand,

it would be naive to argue that changes

policies come as a result of the goodwill of governments.

in

Governments,

and particularly elected governments, tend to be sensitive ·to the
interests and pressures of their constituency.
is no exception.

The Israeli government

By virtue of numerical superiority of Jews over the

Arabs (87:13) and a sense of shared goals and interests, the Jews rather
than the Arabs, are the ones considered the real constituency.

Hence,

policies toward the Arabs seem to be attuned to the service of the
Jewish, rather than the Arab, population.
Needless to say, the interests of the Jewish community do not always
converge and even come in conflict at times.

For example, the interests

of the religious versus the non-religious,

labor versus

Orientals versus Ashkenazim, and so on.

capital,

Throughout this study I have

maintianed that the status of the Arab minority in Israel has been
sensitive to intra-Jewish conflicts, itself a function of Jewish interethnic differentiation between, mainly, Ashkenazim and Orientals.
have shown

that

as

a

consequence of this

differentiation differential attitudes

Jewish

inter-ethnic

toward the Arabs have been

I
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institutionalized in the Jewish population.

The correspondence between

the attitudes of the two Jewish ethnic groups toward the Arabs and their
respective conflicting benefits

lend substantial support to this

argument.
I have argued that Orientals, by virtue of their differentiated
position relative to Ashkenazim benefit the most from a rigid ArabJewish division.

Subsequently, I have shown that not only do Orientals

express more hostile attitudes toward the Arabs than do Ashkenazim, but
they also support policies which have the effect of keeping the Arabs in
a subordinate position.
Ashkenazim,

On the other hand, it was argued that while

in general, benefit from an Arab-Jewish division their

benefits are greatest when such a division is less rigid and therefore
may support or object to those policies in accordance with their
perceived intersts.

As an example, it was shown that while hardly any

objection was raised over the expropriation of Arab land, the policies
of restriction on the movement of Arabs drew harsh criticisms, and
objections to such policies seem to have intensified in conjunction with
economic expansion and decline in immigration rates.

Similarly, Jewish

voices were kept silent over the objection of the Histadrut to extend
union protection to Arab labor which made them more vulnerable to
exploitation.
This selective advocacy of liberal approaches to the Arabs by certain
segments of the Jewish population is a reflection of the interests of
those segments.

It was shown that whereas land expropriation resulted

in the generation of Arab labor which had the potential of serving the

212
interests of the business community, the policy of travel restriction
limited the access of this community to the cheap labor.

Hence, self-

interest seems to be the motive which dictated the response of the
business community toward those issues.
On the other hand, labor was shown to be antagonistic to Arabs.
Exclusion was advocated and practiced whenever it was politically and
economically feasible.

However, when exclusion could not be practiced

it was replaced with a caste-like treatment.

During the first eleven

years of statehood (1948-59) the Histadrut, representing labor, refused
membership to Arab labor and fought against their employment.

But even

when it admitted Arabs to its ranks the Histadrut sought to enhance the
interests of its Jewish constituency rather than integrate the Arabs on
an equal basis.

Consequently, while the Arabs gained considerably in

terms of wages, incomes and occupational status, the limitations on
their upward mobility and occupational undertakings still persist and
are the basis for continuously widening gap between Arabs and Jews.

The

fact that these limitations have been institutionalized and legitimized
by the Employment Service Law (1959) suggests that any improvement in
the occupational status of the Arabs will always lag behind that of
Jews.
If the attitudes of Orientals toward the Arabs are not a derivative
of these dynamics,

they nevertheless have been institutionalized

through the labor market.

It must be recalled that while Ashkenazim

occupy the managerial and upper positions, the Orientals in general man
the middle and lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy.

Since these
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are the only positions open to Arabs a competitive and confrontational
relationships develop between them and Orientals.

It was also shown

that as a result of more integrational policies toward the Arabs, the
middle-class Orientals stand to lose certain employment opportunities
and that the Oriental community may have to share development funds with
the Arabs.

Hence, both lower and middle-class Orientals are more likely

to adopt antagonistic attitudes toward any notion of liberalization
toward the Arabs.
Implications and Future Developments
Th~

split labor market perspective predicts that in the absence of

conditions which reproduce a split
equalization will occur.

in the labor market certain

Among the most effective of the factors which

continuously help reproduce a split in the labor market is the presence
of a strong ideology.

However, it has not been made clear by this

perspective under what conditions, short of a complete disappearance of
ideology, equalization can be acheived.
As noted, throughout the statehood period ideology has been used to
rationalize the maintenance of the Arab-Jewish division and the limited
progress toward full integration of the Arabs into the life of the
state.

Without the use of ideology it would have been very difficult

nationally and internationally, for example, to forcefully transfer over
two-thirds of the land from Arab to Jewish hands, restrict the movement
and limit the civil and political freedom and organization of the Arabs,
and maintain the Arabs outside the labor market or in its lower rungs.
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The ideology used by Jews to justify domination over the Arabs
stresses

the their

'inherent'

right over the

land of Palestine,

emphasizing the fact that Israel was established for the purpose of
'redeeming' the land and the Jewish people.
Jews are superior to others.

Accordingly, the rights of

This ideology has not only not weakened

but in fact has been recently gaining strength.

It is in this fact that

the grimmness of the findings of this study for the future of the Arab
minority lies.

Ideology in Israel has been institutionalized through

such things as the national anthem, the Star of David, the Law of
Return, and the continued operation of Jewish, but not Israeli agencies,
nuch as the JNF and the Jewish Agency.

Such institutionalization has

made ineffective the efforts of some Jewish groups --such as Shelli, the
Civil Rights Movement and Mapam-second class citizens.

who oppose the treatment of Arabs as

The continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli

conflict which provided the basis for ideological rationalization and
whose outcome is very difficult to predict makes any conclusions
regarding the future of the Arab minority in Israel at best tentative.
On the other hand, since its establishment Israel has experienced a
very high

economic growth rate due,

in no small

contributions from the World Jewish community,

measure,

to

reparation from West

Germany and much financial and military support from other Western
countries.

This expansion, irrespective of its sources and causes, has

also benefited the Arab minority in an indirect way through a continuous
rise in demand for labor which precipitated a liberalization of policies
toward the Arabs.

Under more stringent conditions the Arabs would not

have experienced such liberalization.
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Hence, it should not be surprising to find that in times of slow
economic growth and high unemployment, such as the one experienced since
1983, hostility against the Arabs in general and Arab labor
particular reappear.
feelings

Here,

again,

of hostility are aroused.

unemployment among Jews.

in

ideology is invoked and latent
Arabs

are blamed for high

As Meier Kahane (a member of Knesset since

1984 and the head of a right wing party, Kach), addressing a gathering
of Oriental Jews explains: "the greedy Jewish employer can hire two
Arabs for the wages of one Jew." 1 The way to deal with this Jewish greed
is to throw the Arabs out.

As Kahane explains to his audience, "there

is one solution. It is not partial solution.

ARABS OUT (emphasis in

original) .... That's the solution .... Don't ask me how ... Let me be a
minister of defense for two months and not a single cockroach will be
left here.

I promise you a clean Eretz Israel". 2

The significance of Kahane's ideas and statements is not that they
demonstrate Kahane's racism, which has been established since the days
when he headed the JDL (Jewish Defense League) in the United States.
The significance of such statements lies, rather, in the growing support
for such ideas among the Israeli public.

While during the 1970's Kahane

was considered marginal in Israeli society, in 1984 he won a seat in the
Parliament, and as noted (see Chapter 2) in 1985 over 40 percent of
young Israelis are reported to be sympathetic to Kahane and his ideas.
A few public opinion polls report that in coming elections Kahane is

1

New Outlook, July, 1985, p. 13.

2

Ibid., p. 13.
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expected to increase his parliamentary power substantially, and that his
support among Orientals is gaining in strength.

3

If the increase in support for Kahane and/or his ideas are indeed
related to the economic conditions, then a further deterioration in the
economic situation will have grave consequences for the Arabs.

It is

conceivable that as a result of high unemployment due either to a
continued stagnation of the economy or a resumption of Jewish mass
immigration

(for example from Russia)

or both,

the process of

incorporating the Arabs will not only be halted but even reversed,
especially, if the ideology to support such a development continues to
be operative.

The fact that both conditions, i.e., continued economic

weakness and mass immigration, are likely to happen (considering the
world economic problems and the recent developments in the IsraeliRussian relations) leads me to conclude that the final chapter on the
Arab minority in Israel has yet to be written.

3

Ibid., pp. 11-14.
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